<div dir="auto">So, in a public political election among the 7 candidates that I named, my ballot would be:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Approval:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Cornell West </div><div dir="auto">Jill Stein</div><div dir="auto">Marianne Williamson </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">wv Condorcet:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">1. Cornell West </div><div dir="auto">2. Jill Stein</div><div dir="auto">3. Marianne Williamson </div><div dir="auto">———-</div><div dir="auto">wv Condorcet, as I mean it, would be:<br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">RP(wv) or MinMax(wv).</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Preferably RP(wv).</div><div dir="auto">————</div><div dir="auto">The choice between West & Stein is difficult. Especially in Plurality.<br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I like West’s more extreme progressivism.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But Jill (or the Green Party) is the one who’s winning ballot-access all around the country, & has the most name-recognition…& she is fully progressive enough.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But, in some polls, West is beating Stein. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">…probably because many of her preferrers are already giving it all away to Joe.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">…& more of West’s preferrers have no use for that giveaway.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">So then, which is more winnable? Jill or Cornell?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Jun 5, 2024 at 12:36 Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com">email9648742@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Actual elections are the best demonstration & clarification for voting systems. That’s an important value of polls. How would you vote in November with Approval or Condorcet? <div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">(This post isn’t a poll-suggestion …at least not yet).<div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">So say it’s an assortment of progressives, & Republocrats, Libertarians & the like, but just a few of them:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">e.g. Cornell West, Jill Stein, Marianne Williamson, JFK Jr, the Libertarian, Joe Biden & Donald Trump. …7 candidates. <br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">With Approval:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Of course it’s well-known that most people, at least 2/3, want a whole list of things that the two right-wings of the Republocratic Party will never allow.<br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">That’s why there’s the Green Party, among others, to offer those things.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But it’s also well-known that most of those many people who want better than Republocratic are going to vote Republocratic…for Joe, because they want to support some pretty horrific & despicable war-crimes that are about to result in an arrest-warrant.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Of course those who are going to insincerely vote for Joe in Plurality will surely approve him in Approval.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But the big advantage with Approval is that those voters, even if they feel a need to fully vote for Joe over Donald, can also support the candidates who offer what they actually really want.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">For one thing, in that way those voters aren’t really doing any harm—They’re just canceling themselves out. That might not sound like much, but it’s better than now with Plurality, which forces people (in their mistaken perception) to vote worse over better.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">If the number of honest, non-giveaway, progressives is greater than the genuine Republocratic-prreferrers, then a genuinely preferred candidate will actually win, for a change. Don’t say that can’t happen. Polls say at least 2/3 want many changes that no Republocrat would allow.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But,aside from that, the Approval count result will show the full genuine support for the genuinely-preferred candidates.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">That will show the giveaway voters that they needn’t do so. Approval’s Meyerson-Weber equibrium is at the voter-median.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Sincere CWs will start winning.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Actually, in polls, I haven’t heard of one in which Approval didn’t choose the voted CW.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Sure, it’s been said that it would be better for a sincere CW to immediately win, rather than wait for Approval to reach its voter-median equilibrium.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">wv Condorcet is better for the lesser-evil giveaway voter who believes that an evil is acceptable, because it allows hir to freely vote favorite over compromise.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Yes, but, for one thing, if it takes a lot longer to enact Condorcet, might not Approval reach its median equilibrium before Condorcet even gets enacted?<br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Additionally, what good will Condorcet’s ideal result do, when the winner is instead chosen by count-fraud…which the rank-methods greatly facilitate by their computation-intensive count?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I claim that there are unacceptable candidates. Then Approval is the perfect strategy-free method: Simple approve (only) all of the Acceptables.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Suppose you agree that Republicrats are unacceptable. So just approved the candidates better than them. …the ones who offer what we actually want.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I’d approve (only) all of the Progressives.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">It has been lamented that someone doesn’t know whether to approve his 2nd choice.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Well, if there are unacceptable candidates, is your 2nd choice acceptable? If yes, than approve hir. If no, then don’t approve hir. How hard is that?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">The other ways I’ve described for choosing whom to approve are for when they’re all acceptable to you. They aren’t difficult either. No need to repeat them here.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">With wv Condorcet:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I’d rank sincerely.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">If it’s only a poll, I’d rank everyone, which is safe due to probabilistic-</div><div dir="auto">autodeterence. <br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">If it’s an actual public political election, I’d only rank the Acceptables, to get the *additional* inevitable penalization of burial that happens if others likewise do that defensive-truncation. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">…just an added precaution.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Ideally, with unacceptable candidates in a public political election, one would do the drastic defensive-strategy of IRV, with *any* rank-method, even the best. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">In practice that’s, for all practical purposes, unnecessary with wv Condorcet, & wouldn’t be a good idea, because the lesser-evil giveaway-voters might notice you doing that, & then do the same to protect their Democrat…which would defeat the whole purpose of good Condorcet methods.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div></div>
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