[EM] November election with Approval & Condorcet

[Michael Garman]

“because they want to support some pretty horrific & despicable war-crimes
that are about to result in an arrest-warrant.”

Or because we’re pragmatists who recognize only two people can win and
would prefer the war criminal who doesn’t want to put trans people in camps
to the one who does?


On Wed, Jun 5, 2024 at 3:37 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Actual elections are the best demonstration & clarification for voting
> systems. That’s an important value of polls. How would you vote in November
> with Approval or Condorcet?
>
> (This post isn’t a poll-suggestion …at least not yet).
>
> So say it’s an assortment of progressives, & Republocrats, Libertarians &
> the like, but just a few of them:
>
> e.g. Cornell West, Jill Stein, Marianne Williamson, JFK Jr, the
> Libertarian, Joe Biden & Donald Trump.   …7 candidates.
>
> With Approval:
>
> Of course it’s well-known that most people, at least 2/3,  want a whole
> list of things that the two right-wings of the Republocratic Party will
> never allow.
>
> That’s why there’s the Green Party, among others, to offer those things.
>
> But it’s also well-known that most of those many people who want better
> than Republocratic are going to vote Republocratic…for Joe, because they
> want to support some pretty horrific & despicable war-crimes that are about
> to result in an arrest-warrant.
>
> Of course those who are going to insincerely vote for Joe in Plurality
> will surely approve him in Approval.
>
> But the big advantage with Approval is that those voters, even if they
> feel a need to fully vote for Joe over Donald, can also support the
> candidates who offer what they actually really want.
>
> For one thing, in that way those voters aren’t really doing any
> harm—They’re just canceling themselves out. That might not sound like much,
> but it’s better than now with Plurality, which forces people (in their
> mistaken perception) to vote worse over better.
>
> If the number of honest, non-giveaway, progressives is greater than the
> genuine Republocratic-prreferrers, then a genuinely preferred candidate
> will actually win, for a change. Don’t say that can’t happen.  Polls say at
> least 2/3 want many changes that no Republocrat would allow.
>
> But,aside from that, the Approval count result will show the full genuine
> support for the genuinely-preferred candidates.
>
> That will show the giveaway voters that they needn’t do so. Approval’s
> Meyerson-Weber equibrium is at the voter-median.
>
> Sincere CWs will start winning.
>
> Actually, in polls, I haven’t heard of one in which Approval didn’t choose
> the voted CW.
>
> Sure, it’s been said that it would be better for a sincere CW to
> immediately win, rather than wait for Approval to reach its voter-median
> equilibrium.
>
> wv Condorcet is better for the lesser-evil giveaway voter who believes
> that an evil is acceptable, because it allows hir to freely vote favorite
> over compromise.
>
> Yes, but, for one thing, if it takes a lot longer to enact Condorcet,
> might not Approval reach its median equilibrium before Condorcet even gets
> enacted?
>
> Additionally, what good will Condorcet’s ideal result do, when the winner
> is instead chosen by count-fraud…which the rank-methods greatly facilitate
> by their computation-intensive count?
>
> I claim that there are unacceptable candidates. Then Approval is the
> perfect strategy-free method: Simple approve (only) all of the Acceptables.
>
> Suppose you agree that Republicrats are unacceptable. So just approved the
> candidates better than them.  …the ones who offer what we actually want.
>
> I’d approve (only) all of the Progressives.
>
> It has been lamented that someone doesn’t know whether to approve his 2nd
> choice.
>
> Well, if there are unacceptable candidates, is your 2nd choice acceptable?
> If yes, than approve hir. If no, then don’t approve hir. How hard is that?
>
> The other ways I’ve described for choosing whom to approve are for when
> they’re all acceptable to you. They aren’t difficult either. No need to
> repeat them here.
>
> With wv Condorcet:
>
> I’d rank sincerely.
>
> If it’s only a poll, I’d rank everyone, which is safe due to probabilistic-
> autodeterence.
>
> If it’s an actual public political election, I’d only rank the
> Acceptables, to get the *additional* inevitable penalization of burial that
> happens if others likewise do that defensive-truncation.
>
> …just an added precaution.
>
> Ideally, with unacceptable candidates in a public political  election, one
> would do the drastic defensive-strategy of IRV, with *any* rank-method,
> even the best.
>
> In practice that’s, for all practical purposes, unnecessary with wv
> Condorcet, & wouldn’t be a good idea, because the lesser-evil
> giveaway-voters might notice you doing that, & then do the same to protect
> their Democrat…which would defeat the whole purpose of good Condorcet
> methods.
>
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