[EM] November election with Approval & Condorcet

[Michael Ossipoff]

Actual elections are the best demonstration & clarification for voting
systems. That’s an important value of polls. How would you vote in November
with Approval or Condorcet?

(This post isn’t a poll-suggestion …at least not yet).

So say it’s an assortment of progressives, & Republocrats, Libertarians &
the like, but just a few of them:

e.g. Cornell West, Jill Stein, Marianne Williamson, JFK Jr, the
Libertarian, Joe Biden & Donald Trump.   …7 candidates.

With Approval:

Of course it’s well-known that most people, at least 2/3,  want a whole
list of things that the two right-wings of the Republocratic Party will
never allow.

That’s why there’s the Green Party, among others, to offer those things.

But it’s also well-known that most of those many people who want better
than Republocratic are going to vote Republocratic…for Joe, because they
want to support some pretty horrific & despicable war-crimes that are about
to result in an arrest-warrant.

Of course those who are going to insincerely vote for Joe in Plurality will
surely approve him in Approval.

But the big advantage with Approval is that those voters, even if they feel
a need to fully vote for Joe over Donald, can also support the candidates
who offer what they actually really want.

For one thing, in that way those voters aren’t really doing any
harm—They’re just canceling themselves out. That might not sound like much,
but it’s better than now with Plurality, which forces people (in their
mistaken perception) to vote worse over better.

If the number of honest, non-giveaway, progressives is greater than the
genuine Republocratic-prreferrers, then a genuinely preferred candidate
will actually win, for a change. Don’t say that can’t happen.  Polls say at
least 2/3 want many changes that no Republocrat would allow.

But,aside from that, the Approval count result will show the full genuine
support for the genuinely-preferred candidates.

That will show the giveaway voters that they needn’t do so. Approval’s
Meyerson-Weber equibrium is at the voter-median.

Sincere CWs will start winning.

Actually, in polls, I haven’t heard of one in which Approval didn’t choose
the voted CW.

Sure, it’s been said that it would be better for a sincere CW to
immediately win, rather than wait for Approval to reach its voter-median
equilibrium.

wv Condorcet is better for the lesser-evil giveaway voter who believes that
an evil is acceptable, because it allows hir to freely vote favorite over
compromise.

Yes, but, for one thing, if it takes a lot longer to enact Condorcet, might
not Approval reach its median equilibrium before Condorcet even gets
enacted?

Additionally, what good will Condorcet’s ideal result do, when the winner
is instead chosen by count-fraud…which the rank-methods greatly facilitate
by their computation-intensive count?

I claim that there are unacceptable candidates. Then Approval is the
perfect strategy-free method: Simple approve (only) all of the Acceptables.

Suppose you agree that Republicrats are unacceptable. So just approved the
candidates better than them.  …the ones who offer what we actually want.

I’d approve (only) all of the Progressives.

It has been lamented that someone doesn’t know whether to approve his 2nd
choice.

Well, if there are unacceptable candidates, is your 2nd choice acceptable?
If yes, than approve hir. If no, then don’t approve hir. How hard is that?

The other ways I’ve described for choosing whom to approve are for when
they’re all acceptable to you. They aren’t difficult either. No need to
repeat them here.

With wv Condorcet:

I’d rank sincerely.

If it’s only a poll, I’d rank everyone, which is safe due to probabilistic-
autodeterence.

If it’s an actual public political election, I’d only rank the Acceptables,
to get the *additional* inevitable penalization of burial that happens if
others likewise do that defensive-truncation.

…just an added precaution.

Ideally, with unacceptable candidates in a public political  election, one
would do the drastic defensive-strategy of IRV, with *any* rank-method,
even the best.

In practice that’s, for all practical purposes, unnecessary with wv
Condorcet, & wouldn’t be a good idea, because the lesser-evil
giveaway-voters might notice you doing that, & then do the same to protect
their Democrat…which would defeat the whole purpose of good Condorcet
methods.
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