[EM] November election with Approval & Condorcet

[Michael Garman]

Stein
West
Biden

wv Condorcet:
1. West
2. Stein
3. Biden
4. Williamson
5. Kennedy
6. Libertarian
7. Trump

>> But Jill (or the Green Party) is the one who’s winning ballot-access all
around the country, & has the most name-recognition…& she is fully
progressive enough.

She's not on the ballot in enough states to be elected president. And I'd
say most people who've heard of her view her in a negative light, though
this is fully anecdotal.

On Wed, Jun 5, 2024 at 4:25 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> So, in a public political election among the 7 candidates that I named, my
> ballot would be:
>
> Approval:
>
> Cornell West
> Jill Stein
> Marianne Williamson
>
> wv Condorcet:
>
> 1. Cornell West
> 2. Jill Stein
> 3. Marianne Williamson
> ———-
> wv Condorcet, as I mean it, would be:
>
> RP(wv) or MinMax(wv).
>
> Preferably RP(wv).
> ————
> The choice between West & Stein is difficult. Especially in Plurality.
>
> I like West’s more extreme progressivism.
>
> But Jill (or the Green Party) is the one who’s winning ballot-access all
> around the country, & has the most name-recognition…& she is fully
> progressive enough.
>
> But, in some polls, West is beating Stein.
>
> …probably because many of her preferrers are already giving it all away to
> Joe.
>
> …& more of West’s preferrers have no use for that giveaway.
>
> So then, which is more winnable? Jill or Cornell?
>
>
> On Wed, Jun 5, 2024 at 12:36 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Actual elections are the best demonstration & clarification for voting
>> systems. That’s an important value of polls. How would you vote in November
>> with Approval or Condorcet?
>>
>> (This post isn’t a poll-suggestion …at least not yet).
>>
>> So say it’s an assortment of progressives, & Republocrats, Libertarians &
>> the like, but just a few of them:
>>
>> e.g. Cornell West, Jill Stein, Marianne Williamson, JFK Jr, the
>> Libertarian, Joe Biden & Donald Trump.   …7 candidates.
>>
>> With Approval:
>>
>> Of course it’s well-known that most people, at least 2/3,  want a whole
>> list of things that the two right-wings of the Republocratic Party will
>> never allow.
>>
>> That’s why there’s the Green Party, among others, to offer those things.
>>
>> But it’s also well-known that most of those many people who want better
>> than Republocratic are going to vote Republocratic…for Joe, because they
>> want to support some pretty horrific & despicable war-crimes that are about
>> to result in an arrest-warrant.
>>
>> Of course those who are going to insincerely vote for Joe in Plurality
>> will surely approve him in Approval.
>>
>> But the big advantage with Approval is that those voters, even if they
>> feel a need to fully vote for Joe over Donald, can also support the
>> candidates who offer what they actually really want.
>>
>> For one thing, in that way those voters aren’t really doing any
>> harm—They’re just canceling themselves out. That might not sound like much,
>> but it’s better than now with Plurality, which forces people (in their
>> mistaken perception) to vote worse over better.
>>
>> If the number of honest, non-giveaway, progressives is greater than the
>> genuine Republocratic-prreferrers, then a genuinely preferred candidate
>> will actually win, for a change. Don’t say that can’t happen.  Polls say at
>> least 2/3 want many changes that no Republocrat would allow.
>>
>> But,aside from that, the Approval count result will show the full genuine
>> support for the genuinely-preferred candidates.
>>
>> That will show the giveaway voters that they needn’t do so. Approval’s
>> Meyerson-Weber equibrium is at the voter-median.
>>
>> Sincere CWs will start winning.
>>
>> Actually, in polls, I haven’t heard of one in which Approval didn’t
>> choose the voted CW.
>>
>> Sure, it’s been said that it would be better for a sincere CW to
>> immediately win, rather than wait for Approval to reach its voter-median
>> equilibrium.
>>
>> wv Condorcet is better for the lesser-evil giveaway voter who believes
>> that an evil is acceptable, because it allows hir to freely vote favorite
>> over compromise.
>>
>> Yes, but, for one thing, if it takes a lot longer to enact Condorcet,
>> might not Approval reach its median equilibrium before Condorcet even gets
>> enacted?
>>
>> Additionally, what good will Condorcet’s ideal result do, when the winner
>> is instead chosen by count-fraud…which the rank-methods greatly facilitate
>> by their computation-intensive count?
>>
>> I claim that there are unacceptable candidates. Then Approval is the
>> perfect strategy-free method: Simple approve (only) all of the Acceptables.
>>
>> Suppose you agree that Republicrats are unacceptable. So just approved
>> the candidates better than them.  …the ones who offer what we actually want.
>>
>> I’d approve (only) all of the Progressives.
>>
>> It has been lamented that someone doesn’t know whether to approve his 2nd
>> choice.
>>
>> Well, if there are unacceptable candidates, is your 2nd choice
>> acceptable? If yes, than approve hir. If no, then don’t approve hir. How
>> hard is that?
>>
>> The other ways I’ve described for choosing whom to approve are for when
>> they’re all acceptable to you. They aren’t difficult either. No need to
>> repeat them here.
>>
>> With wv Condorcet:
>>
>> I’d rank sincerely.
>>
>> If it’s only a poll, I’d rank everyone, which is safe due to
>> probabilistic-
>> autodeterence.
>>
>> If it’s an actual public political election, I’d only rank the
>> Acceptables, to get the *additional* inevitable penalization of burial that
>> happens if others likewise do that defensive-truncation.
>>
>> …just an added precaution.
>>
>> Ideally, with unacceptable candidates in a public political  election,
>> one would do the drastic defensive-strategy of IRV, with *any* rank-method,
>> even the best.
>>
>> In practice that’s, for all practical purposes, unnecessary with wv
>> Condorcet, & wouldn’t be a good idea, because the lesser-evil
>> giveaway-voters might notice you doing that, & then do the same to protect
>> their Democrat…which would defeat the whole purpose of good Condorcet
>> methods.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20240605/482ce864/attachment-0001.htm>