[EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 234, Issue 11

Thu Jan 11 15:26:19 PST 2024

What I like about Ranked Robin is that it's still "elect the candidate with
the most _____", which I think will be an easier cognitive transition for
voters, and you get a results screen where each candidate gets a (usually)
different number of things and the one with the most wins. Transparent
results is a big block for Condorcet methods.

On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 8:52 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Fantastic !! That’s good news. Theirs is a good proposal, because Topcount
> is the natural, most obvious, most un-arbitrary fallback, electing the
> favorite.
>
> It sounds similar to something that I’ve suggested, but haven’t mentioned
> here:
>
> If no voted CW, elect the most favorite candidate who pairbeats the most
> favorite candidate.
>
> Justification: On a normal-distribution, the max & median coincide. Yes,
> median-crowding can spoil that, but, other than Bernie, we don’t have a
> median-crowding problem, because it’s necessary to keep up the pretense
> that the middle is between Democrat & Republican.
>
> Therefore it’s likely to elect the person who pairbeats the CW. In a
> strategic top-cycle, that person is a “Bus” (candidate under whom the
> buriers bury the CW). Electing Bus 🚌 means that the burial backfires.
>
> It’s an effort toward autodeterence, probabilistic deterrence of offensive
> strategy.
>
> Forest Simmons & I have proposed a number of methods trying for
> autodeterence, & they all use clues about who’s the Bus. This particular
> one uses the fact that offensive strategy can’t change topcount, & there’s
> some tendency for median & max probability-density to coincide.
>
> For the past 35 years since wv Condorcet was introduced, wv has been the
> best effort for realizing or approaching the strategy-freeness that
> Condorcet is ideally capable of.
>
> But autodeterence promises to deliver even better on the promise of
> Condorcet.
>
> (On another subject, I’ve been trying to rejoin Slack, but I didn’t
> realize that it’s necessary to change the password from the old one. Will
> keep trying.)
>
> Ranked-Robin (Copeland) might do a good job of electing the sincere CW in
> a strategic cycle when there are lots of candidates. But, otherwise, it’s
> just affected by the vagaries of how split the various parts of the
> electorate are.
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 16:49 Sass <sass at equal.vote> wrote:
>
>> Vermont is considering a Condorcet bill. If there's no Condorcet Winner,
>> then it elects the candidates with the most first choices.
>>
>> The Equal Vote Coalition recommends Ranked Robin, which elects the
>> candidate preferred over the most others:
>> https://rankedrobin.org
>>
>> On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 1:05 PM <
>> election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com> wrote:
>>
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>>> Today's Topics:
>>>
>>>    1. Why no Condorcet proposals? (Michael Ossipoff)
>>>    2. Re: Why no Condorcet proposals? (Bob Richard [lists])
>>>
>>>
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>
>>> Message: 1
>>> Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 11:34:57 -0800
>>> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>> To: EM list <election-methods at electorama.com>
>>> Subject: [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals?
>>> Message-ID:
>>>         <CAOKDY5BFiodf0Kgq6DyY84Npa==
>>> 1B4KrR1LrDjw2m+Tn6Df0fQ at mail.gmail.com>
>>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>>>
>>> That question was recently asked.
>>>
>>> Condorcet has many versions, & there?s no agreement on that matter.
>>>
>>> So Condorcet doesn?t have any enactment-projects, or even an
>>> organization.
>>>
>>> Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few candidates,
>>> in
>>> the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. Hence its
>>> particularly great unfamiliarity.
>>>
>>> Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully reassure
>>> our
>>> thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn?t too-vote an
>>> evil.
>>>
>>> How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it in
>>> various nonpolitical votes.
>>>
>>> Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact a
>>> voting-system reform. That?s happened for RCV.
>>>
>>> ?or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise happened
>>> for
>>> RCV.
>>>
>>> But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, online, in
>>> the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee, for
>>> the
>>> pursuit of an initiative.
>>>
>>> Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, such
>>> as:
>>>
>>> MinMax(wv)
>>> CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA).
>>>
>>> Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles.
>>>
>>> Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the
>>> defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don?t like & don?t
>>> wish
>>> to beat the CW via burial.
>>>
>>> That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online, to
>>> find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of
>>> initiative-enactment.
>>>
>>> Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that
>>> focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be asked to
>>> approve (only) the proposal(s) that they?d support in an initiative.
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>>> ------------------------------
>>>
>>> Message: 2
>>> Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 20:07:35 +0000
>>> From: "Bob Richard [lists]" <lists001 at robertjrichard.com>
>>> To: election-methods at electorama.com
>>> Subject: Re: [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals?
>>> Message-ID: <em781b1feb-15d0-4909-b320-c210a91db894 at 3fe7043c.com>
>>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; Format="flowed"
>>>
>>> A Condorcet-compliant method, Nanson, was used in the small city of
>>> Marquette, Michigan in the 1920s. It would be very instructive to learn
>>> why it was repealed. I have never seen anything more than a passing
>>> mention of this episode, so this research would probably involve
>>> traveling to Marquette and rummaging around in newspaper archives,
>>> county election records and the public library. On the other hand, this
>>> part of Michigan is a beautiful place to visit. Any takers?
>>>
>>> --Bob Richard
>>>
>>> ------ Original Message ------
>>> >From "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>> To "EM list" <election-methods at electorama.com>
>>> Date 1/10/2024 11:34:57 AM
>>> Subject [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals?
>>>
>>> >That question was recently asked.
>>> >
>>> >Condorcet has many versions, & there?s no agreement on that matter.
>>> >
>>> >So Condorcet doesn?t have any enactment-projects, or even an
>>> >organization.
>>> >
>>> >Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few
>>> >candidates, in the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago.
>>> >Hence its particularly great unfamiliarity.
>>> >
>>> >Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully reassure
>>> >our thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn?t
>>> >too-vote an evil.
>>> >
>>> >How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it in
>>> >various nonpolitical votes.
>>> >
>>> >Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact a
>>> >voting-system reform. That?s happened for RCV.
>>> >
>>> >?or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise happened
>>> >for RCV.
>>> >
>>> >But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, online,
>>> >in the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee,
>>> >for the pursuit of an initiative.
>>> >
>>> >Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, such
>>> >as:
>>> >
>>> >MinMax(wv)
>>> >CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA).
>>> >
>>> >Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles.
>>> >
>>> >Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the
>>> >defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don?t like & don?t
>>> >wish to beat the CW via burial.
>>> >
>>> >That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online, to
>>> >find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of
>>> >initiative-enactment.
>>> >
>>> >Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that
>>> >focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be asked
>>> >to approve (only) the proposal(s) that they?d support in an initiative.
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
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