[EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 234, Issue 11

Thu Jan 11 16:11:09 PST 2024

Yes, that has a bestness-sound that would appeal to people. But so do some
of the other simple Condorcet versions.

…& its need for a tiebreaker counts against its simplicity.

CW,Fav & CW,IA intuitively choose someone superlative too.

Admittedly MinMax(wv) needs specification of how to measure
defeat-strength. …thereby lengthening the definition.

CW,IA beat it in the STAR-poll that I conducted.

On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 15:26 Sass <sass at equal.vote> wrote:

> What I like about Ranked Robin is that it's still "elect the candidate
> with the most _____", which I think will be an easier cognitive
> transition for voters, and you get a results screen where each candidate
> gets a (usually) different number of things and the one with the most wins.
> Transparent results is a big block for Condorcet methods.
>
> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 8:52 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Fantastic !! That’s good news. Theirs is a good proposal, because
>> Topcount is the natural, most obvious, most un-arbitrary fallback, electing
>> the favorite.
>>
>> It sounds similar to something that I’ve suggested, but haven’t mentioned
>> here:
>>
>> If no voted CW, elect the most favorite candidate who pairbeats the most
>> favorite candidate.
>>
>> Justification: On a normal-distribution, the max & median coincide. Yes,
>> median-crowding can spoil that, but, other than Bernie, we don’t have a
>> median-crowding problem, because it’s necessary to keep up the pretense
>> that the middle is between Democrat & Republican.
>>
>> Therefore it’s likely to elect the person who pairbeats the CW. In a
>> strategic top-cycle, that person is a “Bus” (candidate under whom the
>> buriers bury the CW). Electing Bus 🚌 means that the burial backfires.
>>
>> It’s an effort toward autodeterence, probabilistic deterrence of
>> offensive strategy.
>>
>> Forest Simmons & I have proposed a number of methods trying for
>> autodeterence, & they all use clues about who’s the Bus. This particular
>> one uses the fact that offensive strategy can’t change topcount, & there’s
>> some tendency for median & max probability-density to coincide.
>>
>> For the past 35 years since wv Condorcet was introduced, wv has been the
>> best effort for realizing or approaching the strategy-freeness that
>> Condorcet is ideally capable of.
>>
>> But autodeterence promises to deliver even better on the promise of
>> Condorcet.
>>
>> (On another subject, I’ve been trying to rejoin Slack, but I didn’t
>> realize that it’s necessary to change the password from the old one. Will
>> keep trying.)
>>
>> Ranked-Robin (Copeland) might do a good job of electing the sincere CW in
>> a strategic cycle when there are lots of candidates. But, otherwise, it’s
>> just affected by the vagaries of how split the various parts of the
>> electorate are.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 16:49 Sass <sass at equal.vote> wrote:
>>
>>> Vermont is considering a Condorcet bill. If there's no Condorcet Winner,
>>> then it elects the candidates with the most first choices.
>>>
>>> The Equal Vote Coalition recommends Ranked Robin, which elects the
>>> candidate preferred over the most others:
>>> https://rankedrobin.org
>>>
>>> On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 1:05 PM <
>>> election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com> wrote:
>>>
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>>>> Today's Topics:
>>>>
>>>>    1. Why no Condorcet proposals? (Michael Ossipoff)
>>>>    2. Re: Why no Condorcet proposals? (Bob Richard [lists])
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> Message: 1
>>>> Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 11:34:57 -0800
>>>> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>>> To: EM list <election-methods at electorama.com>
>>>> Subject: [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals?
>>>> Message-ID:
>>>>         <CAOKDY5BFiodf0Kgq6DyY84Npa==
>>>> 1B4KrR1LrDjw2m+Tn6Df0fQ at mail.gmail.com>
>>>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>>>>
>>>> That question was recently asked.
>>>>
>>>> Condorcet has many versions, & there?s no agreement on that matter.
>>>>
>>>> So Condorcet doesn?t have any enactment-projects, or even an
>>>> organization.
>>>>
>>>> Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few
>>>> candidates, in
>>>> the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. Hence its
>>>> particularly great unfamiliarity.
>>>>
>>>> Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully reassure
>>>> our
>>>> thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn?t too-vote an
>>>> evil.
>>>>
>>>> How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it in
>>>> various nonpolitical votes.
>>>>
>>>> Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact a
>>>> voting-system reform. That?s happened for RCV.
>>>>
>>>> ?or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise happened
>>>> for
>>>> RCV.
>>>>
>>>> But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, online,
>>>> in
>>>> the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee, for
>>>> the
>>>> pursuit of an initiative.
>>>>
>>>> Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, such
>>>> as:
>>>>
>>>> MinMax(wv)
>>>> CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA).
>>>>
>>>> Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles.
>>>>
>>>> Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the
>>>> defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don?t like & don?t
>>>> wish
>>>> to beat the CW via burial.
>>>>
>>>> That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online, to
>>>> find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of
>>>> initiative-enactment.
>>>>
>>>> Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that
>>>> focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be asked to
>>>> approve (only) the proposal(s) that they?d support in an initiative.
>>>> -------------- next part --------------
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>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> Message: 2
>>>> Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 20:07:35 +0000
>>>> From: "Bob Richard [lists]" <lists001 at robertjrichard.com>
>>>> To: election-methods at electorama.com
>>>> Subject: Re: [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals?
>>>> Message-ID: <em781b1feb-15d0-4909-b320-c210a91db894 at 3fe7043c.com>
>>>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; Format="flowed"
>>>>
>>>> A Condorcet-compliant method, Nanson, was used in the small city of
>>>> Marquette, Michigan in the 1920s. It would be very instructive to learn
>>>> why it was repealed. I have never seen anything more than a passing
>>>> mention of this episode, so this research would probably involve
>>>> traveling to Marquette and rummaging around in newspaper archives,
>>>> county election records and the public library. On the other hand, this
>>>> part of Michigan is a beautiful place to visit. Any takers?
>>>>
>>>> --Bob Richard
>>>>
>>>> ------ Original Message ------
>>>> >From "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>>> To "EM list" <election-methods at electorama.com>
>>>> Date 1/10/2024 11:34:57 AM
>>>> Subject [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals?
>>>>
>>>> >That question was recently asked.
>>>> >
>>>> >Condorcet has many versions, & there?s no agreement on that matter.
>>>> >
>>>> >So Condorcet doesn?t have any enactment-projects, or even an
>>>> >organization.
>>>> >
>>>> >Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few
>>>> >candidates, in the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago.
>>>> >Hence its particularly great unfamiliarity.
>>>> >
>>>> >Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully
>>>> reassure
>>>> >our thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn?t
>>>> >too-vote an evil.
>>>> >
>>>> >How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it in
>>>> >various nonpolitical votes.
>>>> >
>>>> >Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact a
>>>> >voting-system reform. That?s happened for RCV.
>>>> >
>>>> >?or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise
>>>> happened
>>>> >for RCV.
>>>> >
>>>> >But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, online,
>>>> >in the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee,
>>>> >for the pursuit of an initiative.
>>>> >
>>>> >Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, such
>>>> >as:
>>>> >
>>>> >MinMax(wv)
>>>> >CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA).
>>>> >
>>>> >Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles.
>>>> >
>>>> >Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the
>>>> >defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don?t like & don?t
>>>> >wish to beat the CW via burial.
>>>> >
>>>> >That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online,
>>>> to
>>>> >find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of
>>>> >initiative-enactment.
>>>> >
>>>> >Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that
>>>> >focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be asked
>>>> >to approve (only) the proposal(s) that they?d support in an initiative.
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> >
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>>>>
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>>>> End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 234, Issue 11
>>>> *************************************************
>>>>
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