[EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 234, Issue 11

Thu Jan 11 08:52:39 PST 2024

Fantastic !! That’s good news. Theirs is a good proposal, because Topcount
is the natural, most obvious, most un-arbitrary fallback, electing the
favorite.

It sounds similar to something that I’ve suggested, but haven’t mentioned
here:

If no voted CW, elect the most favorite candidate who pairbeats the most
favorite candidate.

Justification: On a normal-distribution, the max & median coincide. Yes,
median-crowding can spoil that, but, other than Bernie, we don’t have a
median-crowding problem, because it’s necessary to keep up the pretense
that the middle is between Democrat & Republican.

Therefore it’s likely to elect the person who pairbeats the CW. In a
strategic top-cycle, that person is a “Bus” (candidate under whom the
buriers bury the CW). Electing Bus 🚌 means that the burial backfires.

It’s an effort toward autodeterence, probabilistic deterrence of offensive
strategy.

Forest Simmons & I have proposed a number of methods trying for
autodeterence, & they all use clues about who’s the Bus. This particular
one uses the fact that offensive strategy can’t change topcount, & there’s
some tendency for median & max probability-density to coincide.

For the past 35 years since wv Condorcet was introduced, wv has been the
best effort for realizing or approaching the strategy-freeness that
Condorcet is ideally capable of.

But autodeterence promises to deliver even better on the promise of
Condorcet.

(On another subject, I’ve been trying to rejoin Slack, but I didn’t realize
that it’s necessary to change the password from the old one. Will keep
trying.)

Ranked-Robin (Copeland) might do a good job of electing the sincere CW in a
strategic cycle when there are lots of candidates. But, otherwise, it’s
just affected by the vagaries of how split the various parts of the
electorate are.

On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 16:49 Sass <sass at equal.vote> wrote:

> Vermont is considering a Condorcet bill. If there's no Condorcet Winner,
> then it elects the candidates with the most first choices.
>
> The Equal Vote Coalition recommends Ranked Robin, which elects the
> candidate preferred over the most others:
> https://rankedrobin.org
>
> On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 1:05 PM <
> election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com> wrote:
>
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>> Today's Topics:
>>
>>    1. Why no Condorcet proposals? (Michael Ossipoff)
>>    2. Re: Why no Condorcet proposals? (Bob Richard [lists])
>>
>>
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> Message: 1
>> Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 11:34:57 -0800
>> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> To: EM list <election-methods at electorama.com>
>> Subject: [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals?
>> Message-ID:
>>         <CAOKDY5BFiodf0Kgq6DyY84Npa==
>> 1B4KrR1LrDjw2m+Tn6Df0fQ at mail.gmail.com>
>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>>
>> That question was recently asked.
>>
>> Condorcet has many versions, & there?s no agreement on that matter.
>>
>> So Condorcet doesn?t have any enactment-projects, or even an organization.
>>
>> Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few candidates,
>> in
>> the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. Hence its
>> particularly great unfamiliarity.
>>
>> Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully reassure
>> our
>> thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn?t too-vote an
>> evil.
>>
>> How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it in
>> various nonpolitical votes.
>>
>> Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact a
>> voting-system reform. That?s happened for RCV.
>>
>> ?or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise happened
>> for
>> RCV.
>>
>> But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, online, in
>> the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee, for the
>> pursuit of an initiative.
>>
>> Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, such as:
>>
>> MinMax(wv)
>> CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA).
>>
>> Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles.
>>
>> Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the
>> defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don?t like & don?t wish
>> to beat the CW via burial.
>>
>> That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online, to
>> find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of
>> initiative-enactment.
>>
>> Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that
>> focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be asked to
>> approve (only) the proposal(s) that they?d support in an initiative.
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>> ------------------------------
>>
>> Message: 2
>> Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 20:07:35 +0000
>> From: "Bob Richard [lists]" <lists001 at robertjrichard.com>
>> To: election-methods at electorama.com
>> Subject: Re: [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals?
>> Message-ID: <em781b1feb-15d0-4909-b320-c210a91db894 at 3fe7043c.com>
>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; Format="flowed"
>>
>> A Condorcet-compliant method, Nanson, was used in the small city of
>> Marquette, Michigan in the 1920s. It would be very instructive to learn
>> why it was repealed. I have never seen anything more than a passing
>> mention of this episode, so this research would probably involve
>> traveling to Marquette and rummaging around in newspaper archives,
>> county election records and the public library. On the other hand, this
>> part of Michigan is a beautiful place to visit. Any takers?
>>
>> --Bob Richard
>>
>> ------ Original Message ------
>> >From "Michael Ossipoff" <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> To "EM list" <election-methods at electorama.com>
>> Date 1/10/2024 11:34:57 AM
>> Subject [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals?
>>
>> >That question was recently asked.
>> >
>> >Condorcet has many versions, & there?s no agreement on that matter.
>> >
>> >So Condorcet doesn?t have any enactment-projects, or even an
>> >organization.
>> >
>> >Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few
>> >candidates, in the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago.
>> >Hence its particularly great unfamiliarity.
>> >
>> >Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully reassure
>> >our thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn?t
>> >too-vote an evil.
>> >
>> >How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it in
>> >various nonpolitical votes.
>> >
>> >Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact a
>> >voting-system reform. That?s happened for RCV.
>> >
>> >?or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise happened
>> >for RCV.
>> >
>> >But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, online,
>> >in the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee,
>> >for the pursuit of an initiative.
>> >
>> >Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, such
>> >as:
>> >
>> >MinMax(wv)
>> >CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA).
>> >
>> >Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles.
>> >
>> >Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the
>> >defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don?t like & don?t
>> >wish to beat the CW via burial.
>> >
>> >That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online, to
>> >find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of
>> >initiative-enactment.
>> >
>> >Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that
>> >focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be asked
>> >to approve (only) the proposal(s) that they?d support in an initiative.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
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>> End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 234, Issue 11
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