<div dir="ltr">What I like about Ranked Robin is that it's still "elect the candidate with the most _____", which I think will be an easier cognitive transition for voters, and you get a results screen where each candidate gets a (usually) different number of things and the one with the most wins. Transparent results is a big block for Condorcet methods.</div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 8:52 AM Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com">email9648742@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto">Fantastic !! That’s good news. Theirs is a good proposal, because Topcount is the natural, most obvious, most un-arbitrary fallback, electing the favorite. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">It sounds similar to something that I’ve suggested, but haven’t mentioned here:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">If no voted CW, elect the most favorite candidate who pairbeats the most favorite candidate.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Justification: On a normal-distribution, the max & median coincide. Yes, median-crowding can spoil that, but, other than Bernie, we don’t have a median-crowding problem, because it’s necessary to keep up the pretense that the middle is between Democrat & Republican.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Therefore it’s likely to elect the person who pairbeats the CW. In a strategic top-cycle, that person is a “Bus” (candidate under whom the buriers bury the CW). Electing Bus 🚌 means that the burial backfires.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">It’s an effort toward autodeterence, probabilistic deterrence of offensive strategy.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Forest Simmons & I have proposed a number of methods trying for autodeterence, & they all use clues about who’s the Bus. This particular one uses the fact that offensive strategy can’t change topcount, & there’s some tendency for median & max probability-density to coincide.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">For the past 35 years since wv Condorcet was introduced, wv has been the best effort for realizing or approaching the strategy-freeness that Condorcet is ideally capable of.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But autodeterence promises to deliver even better on the promise of Condorcet.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">(On another subject, I’ve been trying to rejoin Slack, but I didn’t realize that it’s necessary to change the password from the old one. Will keep trying.)</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Ranked-Robin (Copeland) might do a good job of electing the sincere CW in a strategic cycle when there are lots of candidates. But, otherwise, it’s just affected by the vagaries of how split the various parts of the electorate are.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 16:49 Sass <<a href="mailto:sass@equal.vote" target="_blank">sass@equal.vote</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr">Vermont is considering a Condorcet bill. If there's no Condorcet Winner, then it elects the candidates with the most first choices.<div><br></div><div>The Equal Vote Coalition recommends Ranked Robin, which elects the candidate preferred over the most others:</div><div><a href="https://rankedrobin.org" target="_blank">https://rankedrobin.org</a></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 1:05 PM <<a href="mailto:election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com" target="_blank">election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to<br>
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Today's Topics:<br>
<br>
1. Why no Condorcet proposals? (Michael Ossipoff)<br>
2. Re: Why no Condorcet proposals? (Bob Richard [lists])<br>
<br>
<br>
----------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
<br>
Message: 1<br>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 11:34:57 -0800<br>
From: Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>><br>
To: EM list <<a href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com" target="_blank">election-methods@electorama.com</a>><br>
Subject: [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals?<br>
Message-ID:<br>
<CAOKDY5BFiodf0Kgq6DyY84Npa==<a href="mailto:1B4KrR1LrDjw2m%2BTn6Df0fQ@mail.gmail.com" target="_blank">1B4KrR1LrDjw2m+Tn6Df0fQ@mail.gmail.com</a>><br>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"<br>
<br>
That question was recently asked.<br>
<br>
Condorcet has many versions, & there?s no agreement on that matter.<br>
<br>
So Condorcet doesn?t have any enactment-projects, or even an organization.<br>
<br>
Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few candidates, in<br>
the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. Hence its<br>
particularly great unfamiliarity.<br>
<br>
Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully reassure our<br>
thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn?t too-vote an<br>
evil.<br>
<br>
How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it in<br>
various nonpolitical votes.<br>
<br>
Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact a<br>
voting-system reform. That?s happened for RCV.<br>
<br>
?or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise happened for<br>
RCV.<br>
<br>
But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, online, in<br>
the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee, for the<br>
pursuit of an initiative.<br>
<br>
Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, such as:<br>
<br>
MinMax(wv)<br>
CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA).<br>
<br>
Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles.<br>
<br>
Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the<br>
defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don?t like & don?t wish<br>
to beat the CW via burial.<br>
<br>
That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online, to<br>
find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of<br>
initiative-enactment.<br>
<br>
Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that<br>
focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be asked to<br>
approve (only) the proposal(s) that they?d support in an initiative.<br>
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Message: 2<br>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 20:07:35 +0000<br>
From: "Bob Richard [lists]" <<a href="mailto:lists001@robertjrichard.com" target="_blank">lists001@robertjrichard.com</a>><br>
To: <a href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com" target="_blank">election-methods@electorama.com</a><br>
Subject: Re: [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals?<br>
Message-ID: <<a href="mailto:em781b1feb-15d0-4909-b320-c210a91db894@3fe7043c.com" target="_blank">em781b1feb-15d0-4909-b320-c210a91db894@3fe7043c.com</a>><br>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; Format="flowed"<br>
<br>
A Condorcet-compliant method, Nanson, was used in the small city of <br>
Marquette, Michigan in the 1920s. It would be very instructive to learn <br>
why it was repealed. I have never seen anything more than a passing <br>
mention of this episode, so this research would probably involve <br>
traveling to Marquette and rummaging around in newspaper archives, <br>
county election records and the public library. On the other hand, this <br>
part of Michigan is a beautiful place to visit. Any takers?<br>
<br>
--Bob Richard<br>
<br>
------ Original Message ------<br>
>From "Michael Ossipoff" <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>><br>
To "EM list" <<a href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com" target="_blank">election-methods@electorama.com</a>><br>
Date 1/10/2024 11:34:57 AM<br>
Subject [EM] Why no Condorcet proposals?<br>
<br>
>That question was recently asked.<br>
><br>
>Condorcet has many versions, & there?s no agreement on that matter.<br>
><br>
>So Condorcet doesn?t have any enactment-projects, or even an <br>
>organization.<br>
><br>
>Condorcet was computationally infeasible for more than a few <br>
>candidates, in the days when Hare began being adopted a century ago. <br>
>Hence its particularly great unfamiliarity.<br>
><br>
>Those things are regrettable, because only Condorcet can fully reassure <br>
>our thoroughly-conditioned lesser-evil voters that they needn?t <br>
>too-vote an evil.<br>
><br>
>How about proposing Condorcet in your community, & demonstrating it in <br>
>various nonpolitical votes.<br>
><br>
>Sometimes a city, county or state governing-body will outright enact a <br>
>voting-system reform. That?s happened for RCV.<br>
><br>
>?or maybe would order & schedule a referendum, as has likewise happened <br>
>for RCV.<br>
><br>
>But, as a last-resort, one could advertise on bulletin-boards, online, <br>
>in the classifieds, etc., to convene a Condorcet enactment committee, <br>
>for the pursuit of an initiative.<br>
><br>
>Suggest, to them, a few of the simpler & long-discussed versions, such <br>
>as:<br>
><br>
>MinMax(wv)<br>
>CW, Implicit-Approval (CW, IA).<br>
><br>
>Neither needs mention of the Smith-set or cycles.<br>
><br>
>Both thwart offensive-truncation, & deter burial if people use the <br>
>defensive-strategy of refusing to rank anyone they don?t like & don?t <br>
>wish to beat the CW via burial.<br>
><br>
>That committee could then conduct focus-groups, in person or online, to <br>
>find out which Condorcet version would have the best chance of <br>
>initiative-enactment.<br>
><br>
>Obviously Approval would be the best voting-system by which for that <br>
>focus-group to vote among the proposals. Participants should be asked <br>
>to approve (only) the proposal(s) that they?d support in an initiative.<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
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