[EM] Question to the Condorcetists

[Michael Ossipoff]

Well I don’t know if the Consistency-check would be
Computationally-feasible, because of course there are a lot of ways to
divide a large electorate into 2 parts.

That might be one more good reason to use Approval instead, for those
single-winner elections.

On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 22:07 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> I call RP(wv) with that modification “Nonsense-Free RP(wv)”, & propose it
> for Germany’s single-winner elections, including the single member district
> elections in their Additional-Member proportional topping-up Parliamentary
> elections.
>
> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 21:47 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 21:07 Closed Limelike Curves <
>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> . Some alternative criterion that gets us "99% of the way to Condorcet,"
>>>> so it behaves like Condorcet except in the rare cases where it conflicts
>>>> with participation (or maybe just mono-add-top/remove-bottom).
>>>
>>>
>> There might be better ways, but there’s always the lexicographical way.
>> The criterion could require that Participation (& other
>> non-opposite-response criteria) & Consistency be met.  …& that the voted
>> CW, when there is one must be elected when that doesn’t conflict with the
>> above requirements.
>>
>> A complying method could just repeat that wording, along with a
>> specification about what to do if there’s no voted CW, & what to do if the
>> ballot-configuration is such that additional of a new ballot could violate
>> Participation, or if some division of the electorate into 2 parts could
>> show a Consistency violation.
>>
>> Maybe apply Implicit-Approval to the ballots then. (Ranked = approved)
>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 8:57 PM Closed Limelike Curves <
>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
>>>>> Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>>>>>
>>>> I'm actually not sure it is--the Supreme Court has never ruled on , and
>>>> courts also haven't ruled on the constitutionality of non-monotone voting
>>>> rules. STV has been upheld as constitutional in the past, but the
>>>> challenges were never brought over monotonicity failures. It's entirely
>>>> possible a new challenge could overturn it; there's a strong argument that
>>>> monotonicity failures violate due process and the equal protection clause.
>>>>
>>>> The ideal case to bring to the Supreme Court would have been for
>>>> Begich's campaign to sue after the 2022 Alaska election. A moderate
>>>> Republican plaintiff is appealing to the mostly-Republican Supreme
>>>> Court, without being too controversial. Being the Condorcet winner makes
>>>> his case look even stronger.
>>>>
>>>> On the other hand, if someone says the word "monotonicity" in front of
>>>> a judge, their eyes will glaze over and they'll immediately stop
>>>> caring about all this weird, complicated nerd math. The way to explain
>>>> participation failures is to run a ton of ads explaining to Alaska
>>>> Republicans that Begich lost because *he got* *too many votes. *
>>>>
>>>> One suggestion: why not rename monotonicity to "helpfulness?" (Voting
>>>> should help your candidate, not hurt them). We can call monotonicity
>>>> failures "spitefulness" (because the system is going out of its way to do
>>>> the opposite of what you ask it to).
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 11:32 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
>>>>> Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>>>>>
>>>>> It’s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet isn’t.
>>>>> Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it’s
>>>>> participation-failure, a pass.
>>>>>
>>>>> I’ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually
>>>>> incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable price for
>>>>> the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy
>>>>> improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably
>>>>> irrelevant to strategy.
>>>>>
>>>>> But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out, shows
>>>>> that single-winner elections aren’t perfect.  …making a good argument for
>>>>> PR…*monotonic* PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.
>>>>>
>>>>> Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world’s countries), Germany
>>>>> feels no need to compromise participation.
>>>>>
>>>>> We’re told that list-PR “hasn’t been tried”. No, just in 2/3 of the
>>>>> world’s countries for about a century.
>>>>>
>>>>> But, with that counterfactual “hasn’t been tried” excuse, we’re stuck
>>>>> in the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has moved on
>>>>> to democracy.
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet
>>>>>> methods have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
>>>>>> vulnerable to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as
>>>>>> seen in Germany.
>>>>>> ----
>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>
>>>>>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20240228/61971ebe/attachment.htm>