[EM] Question to the Condorcetists

[Michael Ossipoff]

Maybe it might be good enough to just require that there must not be a
Participation-violation with respect to any one of the voters, had s/he
voted last?

On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 22:17 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Well I don’t know if the Consistency-check would be
> Computationally-feasible, because of course there are a lot of ways to
> divide a large electorate into 2 parts.
>
> That might be one more good reason to use Approval instead, for those
> single-winner elections.
>
> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 22:07 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> I call RP(wv) with that modification “Nonsense-Free RP(wv)”, & propose it
>> for Germany’s single-winner elections, including the single member district
>> elections in their Additional-Member proportional topping-up Parliamentary
>> elections.
>>
>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 21:47 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 21:07 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> . Some alternative criterion that gets us "99% of the way to
>>>>> Condorcet," so it behaves like Condorcet except in the rare cases where it
>>>>> conflicts with participation (or maybe just mono-add-top/remove-bottom).
>>>>
>>>>
>>> There might be better ways, but there’s always the lexicographical way.
>>> The criterion could require that Participation (& other
>>> non-opposite-response criteria) & Consistency be met.  …& that the voted
>>> CW, when there is one must be elected when that doesn’t conflict with the
>>> above requirements.
>>>
>>> A complying method could just repeat that wording, along with a
>>> specification about what to do if there’s no voted CW, & what to do if the
>>> ballot-configuration is such that additional of a new ballot could violate
>>> Participation, or if some division of the electorate into 2 parts could
>>> show a Consistency violation.
>>>
>>> Maybe apply Implicit-Approval to the ballots then. (Ranked = approved)
>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 8:57 PM Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
>>>>>> Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>>>>>>
>>>>> I'm actually not sure it is--the Supreme Court has never ruled on ,
>>>>> and courts also haven't ruled on the constitutionality of non-monotone
>>>>> voting rules. STV has been upheld as constitutional in the past, but the
>>>>> challenges were never brought over monotonicity failures. It's entirely
>>>>> possible a new challenge could overturn it; there's a strong argument that
>>>>> monotonicity failures violate due process and the equal protection clause.
>>>>>
>>>>> The ideal case to bring to the Supreme Court would have been for
>>>>> Begich's campaign to sue after the 2022 Alaska election. A moderate
>>>>> Republican plaintiff is appealing to the mostly-Republican Supreme
>>>>> Court, without being too controversial. Being the Condorcet winner makes
>>>>> his case look even stronger.
>>>>>
>>>>> On the other hand, if someone says the word "monotonicity" in front of
>>>>> a judge, their eyes will glaze over and they'll immediately stop
>>>>> caring about all this weird, complicated nerd math. The way to explain
>>>>> participation failures is to run a ton of ads explaining to Alaska
>>>>> Republicans that Begich lost because *he got* *too many votes. *
>>>>>
>>>>> One suggestion: why not rename monotonicity to "helpfulness?" (Voting
>>>>> should help your candidate, not hurt them). We can call monotonicity
>>>>> failures "spitefulness" (because the system is going out of its way to do
>>>>> the opposite of what you ask it to).
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 11:32 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
>>>>>> Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It’s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet isn’t.
>>>>>> Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it’s
>>>>>> participation-failure, a pass.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I’ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually
>>>>>> incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable price for
>>>>>> the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy
>>>>>> improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably
>>>>>> irrelevant to strategy.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out,
>>>>>> shows that single-winner elections aren’t perfect.  …making a good argument
>>>>>> for PR…*monotonic* PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world’s countries), Germany
>>>>>> feels no need to compromise participation.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We’re told that list-PR “hasn’t been tried”. No, just in 2/3 of the
>>>>>> world’s countries for about a century.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But, with that counterfactual “hasn’t been tried” excuse, we’re stuck
>>>>>> in the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has moved on
>>>>>> to democracy.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet
>>>>>>> methods have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
>>>>>>> vulnerable to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as
>>>>>>> seen in Germany.
>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20240228/b3325537/attachment-0001.htm>