[EM] Question to the Condorcetists

[Closed Limelike Curves]

That seems to exclude participation failures except in the case
of near-ties; I think adding a batch of ballots, all of which rank A>B,
shouldn't cause B to defeat A.

I don't think we need perfect consistency, just participation. Consistency
failures are paradoxical, but consistency is a very strong criterion and
isn't needed for the weaker case of participation (which limits consistency
to the ). It's also strong enough that it could lock you into Kemeny-Young
(the unique order-consistent Condorcet method).

Checking for participation naively definitely isn't feasible, so we'd need
a more elegant approach.

Alternatively, we could try finding a Condorcet system that violates
participation "as little as possible," in the sense that any participation
failures are forced by Condorcet-compliance. A judge might be willing to
sign off on that, since it's a tradeoff between two similarly-important
values (equal protection and majority rule).

On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:30 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Maybe it might be good enough to just require that there must not be a
> Participation-violation with respect to any one of the voters, had s/he
> voted last?
>
> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 22:17 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Well I don’t know if the Consistency-check would be
>> Computationally-feasible, because of course there are a lot of ways to
>> divide a large electorate into 2 parts.
>>
>> That might be one more good reason to use Approval instead, for those
>> single-winner elections.
>>
>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 22:07 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> I call RP(wv) with that modification “Nonsense-Free RP(wv)”, & propose
>>> it for Germany’s single-winner elections, including the single member
>>> district elections in their Additional-Member proportional topping-up
>>> Parliamentary elections.
>>>
>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 21:47 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 21:07 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> . Some alternative criterion that gets us "99% of the way to
>>>>>> Condorcet," so it behaves like Condorcet except in the rare cases where it
>>>>>> conflicts with participation (or maybe just mono-add-top/remove-bottom).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> There might be better ways, but there’s always the lexicographical way.
>>>> The criterion could require that Participation (& other
>>>> non-opposite-response criteria) & Consistency be met.  …& that the voted
>>>> CW, when there is one must be elected when that doesn’t conflict with the
>>>> above requirements.
>>>>
>>>> A complying method could just repeat that wording, along with a
>>>> specification about what to do if there’s no voted CW, & what to do if the
>>>> ballot-configuration is such that additional of a new ballot could violate
>>>> Participation, or if some division of the electorate into 2 parts could
>>>> show a Consistency violation.
>>>>
>>>> Maybe apply Implicit-Approval to the ballots then. (Ranked = approved)
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 8:57 PM Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
>>>>>>> Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> I'm actually not sure it is--the Supreme Court has never ruled on ,
>>>>>> and courts also haven't ruled on the constitutionality of non-monotone
>>>>>> voting rules. STV has been upheld as constitutional in the past, but the
>>>>>> challenges were never brought over monotonicity failures. It's entirely
>>>>>> possible a new challenge could overturn it; there's a strong argument that
>>>>>> monotonicity failures violate due process and the equal protection clause.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The ideal case to bring to the Supreme Court would have been for
>>>>>> Begich's campaign to sue after the 2022 Alaska election. A moderate
>>>>>> Republican plaintiff is appealing to the mostly-Republican Supreme
>>>>>> Court, without being too controversial. Being the Condorcet winner makes
>>>>>> his case look even stronger.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On the other hand, if someone says the word "monotonicity" in front
>>>>>> of a judge, their eyes will glaze over and they'll immediately stop
>>>>>> caring about all this weird, complicated nerd math. The way to explain
>>>>>> participation failures is to run a ton of ads explaining to Alaska
>>>>>> Republicans that Begich lost because *he got* *too many votes. *
>>>>>>
>>>>>> One suggestion: why not rename monotonicity to "helpfulness?" (Voting
>>>>>> should help your candidate, not hurt them). We can call monotonicity
>>>>>> failures "spitefulness" (because the system is going out of its way to do
>>>>>> the opposite of what you ask it to).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 11:32 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
>>>>>>> Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It’s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet
>>>>>>> isn’t. Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it’s
>>>>>>> participation-failure, a pass.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I’ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually
>>>>>>> incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable price for
>>>>>>> the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy
>>>>>>> improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably
>>>>>>> irrelevant to strategy.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out,
>>>>>>> shows that single-winner elections aren’t perfect.  …making a good argument
>>>>>>> for PR…*monotonic* PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world’s countries), Germany
>>>>>>> feels no need to compromise participation.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We’re told that list-PR “hasn’t been tried”. No, just in 2/3 of the
>>>>>>> world’s countries for about a century.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But, with that counterfactual “hasn’t been tried” excuse, we’re
>>>>>>> stuck in the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has
>>>>>>> moved on to democracy.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet
>>>>>>>> methods have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
>>>>>>>> vulnerable to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as
>>>>>>>> seen in Germany.
>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
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