[EM] Question to the Condorcetists

[Michael Ossipoff]

I call RP(wv) with that modification “Nonsense-Free RP(wv)”, & propose it
for Germany’s single-winner elections, including the single member district
elections in their Additional-Member proportional topping-up Parliamentary
elections.

On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 21:47 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 21:07 Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> . Some alternative criterion that gets us "99% of the way to Condorcet,"
>>> so it behaves like Condorcet except in the rare cases where it conflicts
>>> with participation (or maybe just mono-add-top/remove-bottom).
>>
>>
> There might be better ways, but there’s always the lexicographical way.
> The criterion could require that Participation (& other
> non-opposite-response criteria) & Consistency be met.  …& that the voted
> CW, when there is one must be elected when that doesn’t conflict with the
> above requirements.
>
> A complying method could just repeat that wording, along with a
> specification about what to do if there’s no voted CW, & what to do if the
> ballot-configuration is such that additional of a new ballot could violate
> Participation, or if some division of the electorate into 2 parts could
> show a Consistency violation.
>
> Maybe apply Implicit-Approval to the ballots then. (Ranked = approved)
>
>>
>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 8:57 PM Closed Limelike Curves <
>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
>>>> Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>>>>
>>> I'm actually not sure it is--the Supreme Court has never ruled on , and
>>> courts also haven't ruled on the constitutionality of non-monotone voting
>>> rules. STV has been upheld as constitutional in the past, but the
>>> challenges were never brought over monotonicity failures. It's entirely
>>> possible a new challenge could overturn it; there's a strong argument that
>>> monotonicity failures violate due process and the equal protection clause.
>>>
>>> The ideal case to bring to the Supreme Court would have been for
>>> Begich's campaign to sue after the 2022 Alaska election. A moderate
>>> Republican plaintiff is appealing to the mostly-Republican Supreme
>>> Court, without being too controversial. Being the Condorcet winner makes
>>> his case look even stronger.
>>>
>>> On the other hand, if someone says the word "monotonicity" in front of a
>>> judge, their eyes will glaze over and they'll immediately stop caring about
>>> all this weird, complicated nerd math. The way to explain participation
>>> failures is to run a ton of ads explaining to Alaska Republicans that
>>> Begich lost because *he got* *too many votes. *
>>>
>>> One suggestion: why not rename monotonicity to "helpfulness?" (Voting
>>> should help your candidate, not hurt them). We can call monotonicity
>>> failures "spitefulness" (because the system is going out of its way to do
>>> the opposite of what you ask it to).
>>>
>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 11:32 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
>>>> Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>>>>
>>>> It’s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet isn’t.
>>>> Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it’s
>>>> participation-failure, a pass.
>>>>
>>>> I’ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually
>>>> incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable price for
>>>> the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy
>>>> improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably
>>>> irrelevant to strategy.
>>>>
>>>> But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out, shows
>>>> that single-winner elections aren’t perfect.  …making a good argument for
>>>> PR…*monotonic* PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.
>>>>
>>>> Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world’s countries), Germany
>>>> feels no need to compromise participation.
>>>>
>>>> We’re told that list-PR “hasn’t been tried”. No, just in 2/3 of the
>>>> world’s countries for about a century.
>>>>
>>>> But, with that counterfactual “hasn’t been tried” excuse, we’re stuck
>>>> in the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has moved on
>>>> to democracy.
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet
>>>>> methods have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
>>>>> vulnerable to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as
>>>>> seen in Germany.
>>>>> ----
>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>> list info
>>>>>
>>>>
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