[EM] Question to the Condorcetists

[Michael Ossipoff]

On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 21:07 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:

> . Some alternative criterion that gets us "99% of the way to Condorcet,"
>> so it behaves like Condorcet except in the rare cases where it conflicts
>> with participation (or maybe just mono-add-top/remove-bottom).
>
>
There might be better ways, but there’s always the lexicographical way. The
criterion could require that Participation (& other non-opposite-response
criteria) & Consistency be met.  …& that the voted CW, when there is one
must be elected when that doesn’t conflict with the above requirements.

A complying method could just repeat that wording, along with a
specification about what to do if there’s no voted CW, & what to do if the
ballot-configuration is such that additional of a new ballot could violate
Participation, or if some division of the electorate into 2 parts could
show a Consistency violation.

Maybe apply Implicit-Approval to the ballots then. (Ranked = approved)

>
> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 8:57 PM Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
>>> Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>>>
>> I'm actually not sure it is--the Supreme Court has never ruled on , and
>> courts also haven't ruled on the constitutionality of non-monotone voting
>> rules. STV has been upheld as constitutional in the past, but the
>> challenges were never brought over monotonicity failures. It's entirely
>> possible a new challenge could overturn it; there's a strong argument that
>> monotonicity failures violate due process and the equal protection clause.
>>
>> The ideal case to bring to the Supreme Court would have been for Begich's
>> campaign to sue after the 2022 Alaska election. A moderate Republican
>> plaintiff is appealing to the mostly-Republican Supreme Court, without
>> being too controversial. Being the Condorcet winner makes his case look
>> even stronger.
>>
>> On the other hand, if someone says the word "monotonicity" in front of a
>> judge, their eyes will glaze over and they'll immediately stop caring about
>> all this weird, complicated nerd math. The way to explain participation
>> failures is to run a ton of ads explaining to Alaska Republicans that
>> Begich lost because *he got* *too many votes. *
>>
>> One suggestion: why not rename monotonicity to "helpfulness?" (Voting
>> should help your candidate, not hurt them). We can call monotonicity
>> failures "spitefulness" (because the system is going out of its way to do
>> the opposite of what you ask it to).
>>
>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 11:32 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
>>> Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>>>
>>> It’s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet isn’t.
>>> Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it’s
>>> participation-failure, a pass.
>>>
>>> I’ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually
>>> incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable price for
>>> the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy
>>> improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably
>>> irrelevant to strategy.
>>>
>>> But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out, shows
>>> that single-winner elections aren’t perfect.  …making a good argument for
>>> PR…*monotonic* PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.
>>>
>>> Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world’s countries), Germany
>>> feels no need to compromise participation.
>>>
>>> We’re told that list-PR “hasn’t been tried”. No, just in 2/3 of the
>>> world’s countries for about a century.
>>>
>>> But, with that counterfactual “hasn’t been tried” excuse, we’re stuck in
>>> the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has moved on to
>>> democracy.
>>>
>>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet
>>>> methods have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
>>>> vulnerable to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as
>>>> seen in Germany.
>>>> ----
>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>>> info
>>>>
>>>
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