[EM] Question to the Condorcetists

[Closed Limelike Curves]

>
> Always electing the voted CW brings strategy improvement, & the
> unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably irrelevant to
> strategy.

I lean towards agreeing, which is why I brought this up. Condorcet and
participation conflict with each other in theory, but such pathologies seem
likely to be rare in practice. OTOH, "We promise we'll only *occasionally*
violate your basic constitutional rights" strikes me as an argument that
wouldn't hold up in court. Some alternative criterion that gets us "99% of
the way to Condorcet," so it behaves like Condorcet except in the rare
cases where it conflicts with participation (or maybe just
mono-add-top/remove-bottom).

On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 8:57 PM Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:

> It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
>> Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>>
> I'm actually not sure it is--the Supreme Court has never ruled on , and
> courts also haven't ruled on the constitutionality of non-monotone voting
> rules. STV has been upheld as constitutional in the past, but the
> challenges were never brought over monotonicity failures. It's entirely
> possible a new challenge could overturn it; there's a strong argument that
> monotonicity failures violate due process and the equal protection clause.
>
> The ideal case to bring to the Supreme Court would have been for Begich's
> campaign to sue after the 2022 Alaska election. A moderate Republican
> plaintiff is appealing to the mostly-Republican Supreme Court, without
> being too controversial. Being the Condorcet winner makes his case look
> even stronger.
>
> On the other hand, if someone says the word "monotonicity" in front of a
> judge, their eyes will glaze over and they'll immediately stop caring about
> all this weird, complicated nerd math. The way to explain participation
> failures is to run a ton of ads explaining to Alaska Republicans that
> Begich lost because *he got* *too many votes. *
>
> One suggestion: why not rename monotonicity to "helpfulness?" (Voting
> should help your candidate, not hurt them). We can call monotonicity
> failures "spitefulness" (because the system is going out of its way to do
> the opposite of what you ask it to).
>
> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 11:32 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
>> Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>>
>> It’s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet isn’t.
>> Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it’s
>> participation-failure, a pass.
>>
>> I’ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually
>> incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable price for
>> the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy
>> improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably
>> irrelevant to strategy.
>>
>> But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out, shows
>> that single-winner elections aren’t perfect.  …making a good argument for
>> PR…*monotonic* PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.
>>
>> Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world’s countries), Germany feels
>> no need to compromise participation.
>>
>> We’re told that list-PR “hasn’t been tried”. No, just in 2/3 of the
>> world’s countries for about a century.
>>
>> But, with that counterfactual “hasn’t been tried” excuse, we’re stuck in
>> the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has moved on to
>> democracy.
>>
>> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <
>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet
>>> methods have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are
>>> vulnerable to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as
>>> seen in Germany.
>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>> info
>>>
>>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20240228/5a42c531/attachment-0001.htm>