[EM] Question to the Condorcetists

[Closed Limelike Curves]

>
> It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
> Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>
I'm actually not sure it is--the Supreme Court has never ruled on , and
courts also haven't ruled on the constitutionality of non-monotone voting
rules. STV has been upheld as constitutional in the past, but the
challenges were never brought over monotonicity failures. It's entirely
possible a new challenge could overturn it; there's a strong argument that
monotonicity failures violate due process and the equal protection clause.

The ideal case to bring to the Supreme Court would have been for Begich's
campaign to sue after the 2022 Alaska election. A moderate Republican
plaintiff is appealing to the mostly-Republican Supreme Court, without
being too controversial. Being the Condorcet winner makes his case look
even stronger.

On the other hand, if someone says the word "monotonicity" in front of a
judge, their eyes will glaze over and they'll immediately stop caring about
all this weird, complicated nerd math. The way to explain participation
failures is to run a ton of ads explaining to Alaska Republicans that
Begich lost because *he got* *too many votes. *

One suggestion: why not rename monotonicity to "helpfulness?" (Voting
should help your candidate, not hurt them). We can call monotonicity
failures "spitefulness" (because the system is going out of its way to do
the opposite of what you ask it to).

On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 11:32 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
> Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.
>
> It’s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet isn’t.
> Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it’s
> participation-failure, a pass.
>
> I’ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually
> incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable price for
> the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy
> improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably
> irrelevant to strategy.
>
> But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out, shows
> that single-winner elections aren’t perfect.  …making a good argument for
> PR…*monotonic* PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.
>
> Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world’s countries), Germany feels
> no need to compromise participation.
>
> We’re told that list-PR “hasn’t been tried”. No, just in 2/3 of the
> world’s countries for about a century.
>
> But, with that counterfactual “hasn’t been tried” excuse, we’re stuck in
> the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has moved on to
> democracy.
>
> On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet methods
>> have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are vulnerable
>> to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen in
>> Germany.
>> ----
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>>
>
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