[EM] Question to the Condorcetists

[Michael Ossipoff]

It’s surprising that participation-violation is unconstitutional in
Germany, because, here, even Hare’s greater nonmonotonicity is okay.

It’s disingenuous to say that Hare is nonmonotonic & Condorcet isn’t.
Nonmonotonicity is just defined to give Condorcet, with it’s
participation-failure, a pass.

I’ve heard that Participation & the Condorcet Criterion are mutually
incompatible. I feel that participation-failure is an acceptable price for
the Condorcet Criterion. Always electing the voted CW brings strategy
improvement, & the unpredictable & rare participation-failure is probably
irrelevant to strategy.

But that incompatibility, along with the ones Arrow pointed-out, shows that
single-winner elections aren’t perfect.  …making a good argument for
PR…*monotonic* PR, which excludes STV & Largest-Remainder.

Maybe, as a PR country (like 2/3 of the world’s countries), Germany feels
no need to compromise participation.

We’re told that list-PR “hasn’t been tried”. No, just in 2/3 of the world’s
countries for about a century.

But, with that counterfactual “hasn’t been tried” excuse, we’re stuck in
the 18th century, & always will be, while most of the world has moved on to
democracy.

On Wed, Feb 28, 2024 at 10:36 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:

> Can Condorcet be weakened to comply with participation? Condorcet methods
> have plenty of advantages, but systems failing participation are vulnerable
> to court challenges or being struck down as unconstitutional, as seen in
> Germany.
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