[EM] Approval ballots in "Four Condorcet-Hare hybrid methods"? (was: Re: Manipulability stats for (some) poll methods)

[Michael Ossipoff]

When you do that simulation, I hope that you’ll repeat each simulated
election, but with the largest losing-faction burying the CW.

…recording & reporting, for each Condorcet-complying method, the ratio of
burial’s successes to burial’s backfires (in which it elects someone whom
the buriers like less than the CW).


On Sat, Apr 27, 2024 at 05:48 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
wrote:

> On 2024-04-27 14:10, Chris Benham wrote:
> > Kristofer,
> >
> > How did Approval interpret these fully ranked ballots?
>
> That's part of why I'm just referring to JGA. To do the simulation
> myself, I would have to implicitly code a guideline that says where the
> cutoff should be placed, given candidate-voter distances (which stand in
> for absolute utilities). (The other part is that my simulator doesn't
> support forcing the strategic ballots to be approval-style either yet.)
>
> Unfortunately, James doesn't say just how he did it, so I'm CCing this
> post to him. How were the approval ballots generated in "Four
> Condorcet-Hare hybrid methods"?
>
> In the absence of any information, I'd guess he used above-mean utility
> thresholding. The strategic ballots (used to try to flip the winner)
> don't have to care about utility at all: that process just tries
> approval ballots at random until something works.
>
> -km
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20240429/0e3147c8/attachment.htm>