[EM] Approval ballots in "Four Condorcet-Hare hybrid methods"? (was: Re: Manipulability stats for (some) poll methods)

[Closed Limelike Curves]

I generally use the stochastic rounding model, i.e. I treat approval as
just being score voting. Mostly because, if I don't:
1) Why stop at 2 categories instead of a full analysis depending on whether
I use 2, 3, 4, ...?
2) I can make approval satisfy increasingly ridiculous sets of properties
by using otherwise-equivalent definitions of criteria. (Did you guys know
approval is a Condorcet method? It's true! If, in every pairwise matchup, a
candidate is given a strictly higher score than their opponent by most
voters, that candidate wins under approval!)

On Mon, Apr 29, 2024 at 12:37 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> When you do that simulation, I hope that you’ll repeat each simulated
> election, but with the largest losing-faction burying the CW.
>
> …recording & reporting, for each Condorcet-complying method, the ratio of
> burial’s successes to burial’s backfires (in which it elects someone whom
> the buriers like less than the CW).
>
>
> On Sat, Apr 27, 2024 at 05:48 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
> wrote:
>
>> On 2024-04-27 14:10, Chris Benham wrote:
>> > Kristofer,
>> >
>> > How did Approval interpret these fully ranked ballots?
>>
>> That's part of why I'm just referring to JGA. To do the simulation
>> myself, I would have to implicitly code a guideline that says where the
>> cutoff should be placed, given candidate-voter distances (which stand in
>> for absolute utilities). (The other part is that my simulator doesn't
>> support forcing the strategic ballots to be approval-style either yet.)
>>
>> Unfortunately, James doesn't say just how he did it, so I'm CCing this
>> post to him. How were the approval ballots generated in "Four
>> Condorcet-Hare hybrid methods"?
>>
>> In the absence of any information, I'd guess he used above-mean utility
>> thresholding. The strategic ballots (used to try to flip the winner)
>> don't have to care about utility at all: that process just tries
>> approval ballots at random until something works.
>>
>> -km
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