[EM] Approval ballots in "Four Condorcet-Hare hybrid methods"? (was: Re: Manipulability stats for (some) poll methods)

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

On 2024-04-27 14:10, Chris Benham wrote:
> Kristofer,
> 
> How did Approval interpret these fully ranked ballots?

That's part of why I'm just referring to JGA. To do the simulation 
myself, I would have to implicitly code a guideline that says where the 
cutoff should be placed, given candidate-voter distances (which stand in 
for absolute utilities). (The other part is that my simulator doesn't 
support forcing the strategic ballots to be approval-style either yet.)

Unfortunately, James doesn't say just how he did it, so I'm CCing this 
post to him. How were the approval ballots generated in "Four 
Condorcet-Hare hybrid methods"?

In the absence of any information, I'd guess he used above-mean utility 
thresholding. The strategic ballots (used to try to flip the winner) 
don't have to care about utility at all: that process just tries 
approval ballots at random until something works.

-km