[EM] Relative vs. Majority Condorcet

[Michael Ossipoff]

Yes, there’s no need for an FBC-complying method more complicated than
Approval.

The best Condorcet versions don’t really give any
favorite-burial-incentive, though they don’t strictly pass FBC. They really
don’t require any defensive strategy…the ideal of voting-systems.

But most ranked-methods, including Condorcet other than a few classes of
it, have a big serious FBC-failure that I consider prohibitive.

I could accept it in Hare, if people wouldn’t bury their favoriteunder a
lesser-evil—& they might well not…if they know & like what they’re getting
when they enact it. …which obviously isn’t the case when it’s fraudulently
sold to them.

But otherwise (when Hare is all that’s currently up for enactment this
year, where I reside) I’d be willing to accept Hare’s top-end
favorite-burial defensive-strategy, though I wouldn’t like it…if people
wouldn’t use it to protect an evil.

…but not when it’s being dishonesty misrepresented to voters.





On Sat, Apr 27, 2024 at 05:00 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:

> There was some advantage of ICA & ICT that I really liked, but public
> proposals have to be as simple as possible.
>
>
> In that case I say forget about FBC methods other than Approval.   I came
> to the conclusion that any good more sophisticated FBC methods need to use
> Kevin's  "Tied at the Top Rule" mechanism.
>
> There is some small movement and enthusiasm for Condorcet compliance, but
> none that I discern for strict FBC compliance.  I would think most voters
> would satisfied with the massive reduction in Compromise incentive compared
> to FPP afforded by properly implemented IRV, let alone the still greater
> reduction we get from Condorcet.
>
> In general FBC is much more slippery and "expensive" (in terms of being
> compatible with other criteria) than Condorcet.  I went off my own
> "Irrelevant-Ballot Independent Fall-back Approval" idea (which isn't "very
> simple") when Kevin showed that it fails Woodall's Plurality criterion.
>
> And I'm generally allergic to, and find very silly, methods that fail
> Irrelevant Ballots Independence like Median Ratings methods and this
> "Majority-Condorcet" idea.
>
> You have an apparent "majority Condorcet" winner, and then a few extra
> ballots that vote for nobody are found and then the winner changes because
> the "majority" threshold goes up. Absurd and potentially embarrassing.
>
> Chris B.
>
> On 27/04/2024 3:40 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
> There was some advantage of ICA & ICT that I really liked, but public
> proposals have to be as simple as possible. Few methods proposed here are
> simple enough for public proposal.
>
> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 22:50 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 10:02 Closed Limelike Curves <
>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> *Does "Majority-Condorcet" mean the CW needs to have a majority over
>>> every other candidate?*
>>>
>>> Yes: a CW needs more than 50% of the vote, including tied ranks, to
>>> defeat every other candidate. This version of Condorcet is compatible with
>>> FBC.
>>>
>>
>> I guess a lot of CWs wouldn’t be getting elected.
>>
>> The best Condorcet methods don’t importantly fail FBC. A sincere CW can
>> only lose by offensive strategy, & the better Condorcet methods well-deter
>> offensive strategy. No need for any defensive strategy.
>>
>> Was it you who once said that people would try offensive strategy? The
>> whole point of strategy is action based on an analysis of what the result
>> will be. It’s a strategist’s business to find that out first.
>>
>> Anyway when it’s noticed to usually backfire…
>>
>>
>>> On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 3:43 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
>>> km_elmet at t-online.de> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 2024-04-24 12:32, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>>>>
>>>> > The second option doesn't offer Smith, but if it did, I would note
>>>> that Smith is a
>>>> > poor guarantee of quality. Here's a 1025-voter election where a
>>>> 2-vote candidate is
>>>> > in the Smith set (along with all other candidates):
>>>> >
>>>> > 2: A>B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
>>>> > 1: B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
>>>> > 2: C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
>>>> > 4: D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
>>>> > 8: E>F>G>H>I>J>K
>>>> > 16: F>G>H>I>J>K
>>>> > 32: G>H>I>J>K
>>>> > 64: H>I>J>K
>>>> > 128: I>J>K
>>>> > 256: J>K
>>>> > 512: K
>>>> >
>>>> > While this is not realistic, I do think it is realistic that a
>>>> candidate of limited
>>>> > interest to most voters would sometimes manage to pairwise defeat a
>>>> more viable
>>>> > candidate. And we should be ready to interpret this as noise.
>>>>
>>>> That was phrased a bit oddly in the context of the rest of your post,
>>>> but I understand you to be saying "the worst method that passes Smith
>>>> may still be pretty bad", not necessarily that proposed methods passing
>>>> Smith are actually bad. Is that right?
>>>>
>>>> -km
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