[EM] Relative vs. Majority Condorcet

[Closed Limelike Curves]

Hi Chris, thanks for your response!

 I came to the conclusion that any good more sophisticated FBC methods need
> to use Kevin's  "Tied at the Top Rule" mechanism.
>
Yes, that's the main question I'm looking to answer with this poll: do
tied-at-the-top, or other tied-rank mechanisms, have substantial support on
this email list? (ICT is a similar, but not-quite-working, attempt at
satisfying Minimal Defense as well.)


> There is some small movement and enthusiasm for Condorcet compliance, but
> none that I discern for strict FBC compliance.  I would think most voters
> would satisfied with the massive reduction in Compromise incentive compared
> to FPP afforded by properly implemented IRV, let alone the still greater
> reduction we get from Condorcet.
>
There's a major IRV-repeal effort underway in Alaska at the moment because
they had one (!) election with a favorite-betrayal incentive. I'm also not
aware of any movements for strict relative-majority Condorcet compliance.
The organization that comes closest is EVC (with their Copeland//Borda
proposal), but even they're not very purist about it.

And I'm generally allergic to, and find very silly, methods that fail
> Irrelevant Ballots Independence like Median Ratings methods and this
> "Majority-Condorcet" idea.

I fully agree with you that this is a big problem for median ratings. A
voter who shows up and says they think all the candidates are bad isn't
provide any new information about the relative quality of the candidates.

However, I don't think an all-equal ballot is providing no information in
every situation. As an example, say we had a system like approval, but with
a 50% threshold for election (and elections with <50% support for the
winner resulting in reopening nominations). Then, a fully-blank ballot is a
way for voters to meaningfully express their preference for somebody
else, other
than the current crop of candidates.

Something similar applies to the tied-at-the-top rule: a voter who ties two
candidates is saying they want these two candidates to be compared using
the tiebreaking mechanism, *rather than* the relative-Condorcet mechanism.

On Sat, Apr 27, 2024 at 5:00 AM Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:

> There was some advantage of ICA & ICT that I really liked, but public
> proposals have to be as simple as possible.
>
>
> In that case I say forget about FBC methods other than Approval.   I came
> to the conclusion that any good more sophisticated FBC methods need to use
> Kevin's  "Tied at the Top Rule" mechanism.
>
> There is some small movement and enthusiasm for Condorcet compliance, but
> none that I discern for strict FBC compliance.  I would think most voters
> would satisfied with the massive reduction in Compromise incentive compared
> to FPP afforded by properly implemented IRV, let alone the still greater
> reduction we get from Condorcet.
>
> In general FBC is much more slippery and "expensive" (in terms of being
> compatible with other criteria) than Condorcet.  I went off my own
> "Irrelevant-Ballot Independent Fall-back Approval" idea (which isn't "very
> simple") when Kevin showed that it fails Woodall's Plurality criterion.
>
> And I'm generally allergic to, and find very silly, methods that fail
> Irrelevant Ballots Independence like Median Ratings methods and this
> "Majority-Condorcet" idea.
>
> You have an apparent "majority Condorcet" winner, and then a few extra
> ballots that vote for nobody are found and then the winner changes because
> the "majority" threshold goes up. Absurd and potentially embarrassing.
>
> Chris B.
>
> On 27/04/2024 3:40 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
> There was some advantage of ICA & ICT that I really liked, but public
> proposals have to be as simple as possible. Few methods proposed here are
> simple enough for public proposal.
>
> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 22:50 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 10:02 Closed Limelike Curves <
>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> *Does "Majority-Condorcet" mean the CW needs to have a majority over
>>> every other candidate?*
>>>
>>> Yes: a CW needs more than 50% of the vote, including tied ranks, to
>>> defeat every other candidate. This version of Condorcet is compatible with
>>> FBC.
>>>
>>
>> I guess a lot of CWs wouldn’t be getting elected.
>>
>> The best Condorcet methods don’t importantly fail FBC. A sincere CW can
>> only lose by offensive strategy, & the better Condorcet methods well-deter
>> offensive strategy. No need for any defensive strategy.
>>
>> Was it you who once said that people would try offensive strategy? The
>> whole point of strategy is action based on an analysis of what the result
>> will be. It’s a strategist’s business to find that out first.
>>
>> Anyway when it’s noticed to usually backfire…
>>
>>
>>> On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 3:43 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
>>> km_elmet at t-online.de> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 2024-04-24 12:32, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>>>>
>>>> > The second option doesn't offer Smith, but if it did, I would note
>>>> that Smith is a
>>>> > poor guarantee of quality. Here's a 1025-voter election where a
>>>> 2-vote candidate is
>>>> > in the Smith set (along with all other candidates):
>>>> >
>>>> > 2: A>B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
>>>> > 1: B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
>>>> > 2: C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
>>>> > 4: D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
>>>> > 8: E>F>G>H>I>J>K
>>>> > 16: F>G>H>I>J>K
>>>> > 32: G>H>I>J>K
>>>> > 64: H>I>J>K
>>>> > 128: I>J>K
>>>> > 256: J>K
>>>> > 512: K
>>>> >
>>>> > While this is not realistic, I do think it is realistic that a
>>>> candidate of limited
>>>> > interest to most voters would sometimes manage to pairwise defeat a
>>>> more viable
>>>> > candidate. And we should be ready to interpret this as noise.
>>>>
>>>> That was phrased a bit oddly in the context of the rest of your post,
>>>> but I understand you to be saying "the worst method that passes Smith
>>>> may still be pretty bad", not necessarily that proposed methods passing
>>>> Smith are actually bad. Is that right?
>>>>
>>>> -km
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