[EM] Relative vs. Majority Condorcet

[Chris Benham]

> There was some advantage of ICA & ICT that I really liked, but public 
> proposals have to be as simple as possible. 

In that case I say forget about FBC methods other than Approval. I came 
to the conclusion that any good more sophisticated FBC methods need to 
use Kevin's  "Tied at the Top Rule" mechanism.

There is some small movement and enthusiasm for Condorcet compliance, 
but none that I discern for strict FBC compliance.  I would think most 
voters would satisfied with the massive reduction in Compromise 
incentive compared to FPP afforded by properly implemented IRV, let 
alone the still greater reduction we get from Condorcet.

In general FBC is much more slippery and "expensive" (in terms of being 
compatible with other criteria) than Condorcet.  I went off my own 
"Irrelevant-Ballot Independent Fall-back Approval" idea (which isn't 
"very simple") when Kevin showed that it fails Woodall's Plurality 
criterion.

And I'm generally allergic to, and find very silly, methods that fail 
Irrelevant Ballots Independence like Median Ratings methods and this 
"Majority-Condorcet" idea.

You have an apparent "majority Condorcet" winner, and then a few extra 
ballots that vote for nobody are found and then the winner changes 
because the "majority" threshold goes up. Absurd and potentially 
embarrassing.

Chris B.

On 27/04/2024 3:40 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
> There was some advantage of ICA & ICT that I really liked, but public 
> proposals have to be as simple as possible. Few methods proposed here 
> are simple enough for public proposal.
>
> On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 22:50 Michael Ossipoff 
> <email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>     On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 10:02 Closed Limelike Curves
>     <closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>         /Does "Majority-Condorcet" mean the CW needs to have a
>         majority over every other
>         candidate?/
>
>         Yes: a CW needs more than 50% of the vote, including tied
>         ranks, to defeat every other candidate. This version of
>         Condorcet is compatible with FBC.
>
>
>     I guess a lot of CWs wouldn’t be getting elected.
>
>     The best Condorcet methods don’t importantly fail FBC. A sincere
>     CW can only lose by offensive strategy, & the better Condorcet
>     methods well-deter offensive strategy. No need for any defensive
>     strategy.
>
>     Was it you who once said that people would try offensive strategy?
>     The whole point of strategy is action based on an analysis of what
>     the result will be. It’s a strategist’s business to find that out
>     first.
>
>     Anyway when it’s noticed to usually backfire…
>
>
>         On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 3:43 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm
>         <km_elmet at t-online.de> wrote:
>
>             On 2024-04-24 12:32, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>
>             > The second option doesn't offer Smith, but if it did, I
>             would note that Smith is a
>             > poor guarantee of quality. Here's a 1025-voter election
>             where a 2-vote candidate is
>             > in the Smith set (along with all other candidates):
>             >
>             > 2: A>B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
>             > 1: B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
>             > 2: C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
>             > 4: D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
>             > 8: E>F>G>H>I>J>K
>             > 16: F>G>H>I>J>K
>             > 32: G>H>I>J>K
>             > 64: H>I>J>K
>             > 128: I>J>K
>             > 256: J>K
>             > 512: K
>             >
>             > While this is not realistic, I do think it is realistic
>             that a candidate of limited
>             > interest to most voters would sometimes manage to
>             pairwise defeat a more viable
>             > candidate. And we should be ready to interpret this as
>             noise.
>
>             That was phrased a bit oddly in the context of the rest of
>             your post,
>             but I understand you to be saying "the worst method that
>             passes Smith
>             may still be pretty bad", not necessarily that proposed
>             methods passing
>             Smith are actually bad. Is that right?
>
>             -km
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