[EM] Relative vs. Majority Condorcet

[Michael Ossipoff]

There was some advantage of ICA & ICT that I really liked, but public
proposals have to be as simple as possible. Few methods proposed here are
simple enough for public proposal.

On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at 22:50 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 10:02 Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>
>> *Does "Majority-Condorcet" mean the CW needs to have a majority over
>> every othercandidate?*
>>
>> Yes: a CW needs more than 50% of the vote, including tied ranks, to
>> defeat every other candidate. This version of Condorcet is compatible with
>> FBC.
>>
>
> I guess a lot of CWs wouldn’t be getting elected.
>
> The best Condorcet methods don’t importantly fail FBC. A sincere CW can
> only lose by offensive strategy, & the better Condorcet methods well-deter
> offensive strategy. No need for any defensive strategy.
>
> Was it you who once said that people would try offensive strategy? The
> whole point of strategy is action based on an analysis of what the result
> will be. It’s a strategist’s business to find that out first.
>
> Anyway when it’s noticed to usually backfire…
>
>
>> On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 3:43 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
>> km_elmet at t-online.de> wrote:
>>
>>> On 2024-04-24 12:32, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>>>
>>> > The second option doesn't offer Smith, but if it did, I would note
>>> that Smith is a
>>> > poor guarantee of quality. Here's a 1025-voter election where a 2-vote
>>> candidate is
>>> > in the Smith set (along with all other candidates):
>>> >
>>> > 2: A>B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
>>> > 1: B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
>>> > 2: C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
>>> > 4: D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K
>>> > 8: E>F>G>H>I>J>K
>>> > 16: F>G>H>I>J>K
>>> > 32: G>H>I>J>K
>>> > 64: H>I>J>K
>>> > 128: I>J>K
>>> > 256: J>K
>>> > 512: K
>>> >
>>> > While this is not realistic, I do think it is realistic that a
>>> candidate of limited
>>> > interest to most voters would sometimes manage to pairwise defeat a
>>> more viable
>>> > candidate. And we should be ready to interpret this as noise.
>>>
>>> That was phrased a bit oddly in the context of the rest of your post,
>>> but I understand you to be saying "the worst method that passes Smith
>>> may still be pretty bad", not necessarily that proposed methods passing
>>> Smith are actually bad. Is that right?
>>>
>>> -km
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