<div dir="auto">Yes, there’s no need for an FBC-complying method more complicated than Approval.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">The best Condorcet versions don’t really give any favorite-burial-incentive, though they don’t strictly pass FBC. They really don’t require any defensive strategy…the ideal of voting-systems.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But most ranked-methods, including Condorcet other than a few classes of it, have a big serious FBC-failure that I consider prohibitive.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I could accept it in Hare, if people wouldn’t bury their favoriteunder a lesser-evil—& they might well not…if they know & like what they’re getting when they enact it. …which obviously isn’t the case when it’s fraudulently sold to them.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But otherwise (when Hare is all that’s currently up for enactment this year, where I reside) I’d be willing to accept Hare’s top-end favorite-burial defensive-strategy, though I wouldn’t like it…if people wouldn’t use it to protect an evil.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">…but not when it’s being dishonesty misrepresented to voters.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sat, Apr 27, 2024 at 05:00 Chris Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><u></u>
<div>
<p>
</p><blockquote type="cite">There was some advantage of ICA & ICT
that I really liked, but public proposals have to be as simple
as possible. </blockquote>
<br>
In that case I say forget about FBC methods other than Approval.
I came to the conclusion that any good more sophisticated FBC
methods need to use Kevin's "Tied at the Top Rule" mechanism.<br>
<br>
There is some small movement and enthusiasm for Condorcet
compliance, but none that I discern for strict FBC compliance. I
would think most voters would satisfied with the massive reduction
in Compromise incentive compared to FPP afforded by properly
implemented IRV, let alone the still greater reduction we get from
Condorcet.<br>
<br>
In general FBC is much more slippery and "expensive" (in terms of
being compatible with other criteria) than Condorcet. I went off
my own "Irrelevant-Ballot Independent Fall-back Approval" idea
(which isn't "very simple") when Kevin showed that it fails
Woodall's Plurality criterion.<br>
<br>
And I'm generally allergic to, and find very silly, methods that
fail Irrelevant Ballots Independence like Median Ratings methods
and this "Majority-Condorcet" idea.<br>
<br>
You have an apparent "majority Condorcet" winner, and then a few
extra ballots that vote for nobody are found and then the winner
changes because the "majority" threshold goes up. Absurd and
potentially embarrassing.<br>
<br>
Chris B.<br>
<br>
<p></p></div><div>
<div>On 27/04/2024 3:40 pm, Michael Ossipoff
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">There was some advantage of ICA & ICT that I
really liked, but public proposals have to be as simple as
possible. Few methods proposed here are simple enough for public
proposal.</div>
<div><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Apr 26, 2024 at
22:50 Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Apr 24, 2024
at 10:02 Closed Limelike Curves <<a href="mailto:closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com" target="_blank">closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div>
<div><i><span style="font-family:-apple-system,"helvetica neue";font-size:16px;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:1px;text-decoration:none;float:none;display:inline!important;color:rgb(49,49,49)">Does
"Majority-Condorcet" mean the CW needs to have
a majority over every other</span><br style="color:rgb(49,49,49);font-family:-apple-system,"helvetica neue";font-size:16px;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:1px;text-decoration:none">
<span style="font-family:-apple-system,"helvetica neue";font-size:16px;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:1px;text-decoration:none;float:none;display:inline!important;color:rgb(49,49,49)">candidate?</span></i></div>
<br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Yes: a CW needs more than 50% of the
vote, including tied ranks, <span style="font-family:-apple-system,helveticaneue;background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);border-color:rgb(0,0,0);color:rgb(0,0,0)">to
defeat every other candidate. This version of
Condorcet is compatible with FBC.</span></div>
</blockquote>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">I guess a lot of CWs wouldn’t be getting
elected.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">The best Condorcet methods don’t
importantly fail FBC. A sincere CW can only lose by
offensive strategy, & the better Condorcet methods
well-deter offensive strategy. No need for any
defensive strategy.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Was it you who once said that people
would try offensive strategy? The whole point of
strategy is action based on an analysis of what the
result will be. It’s a strategist’s business to find
that out first.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Anyway when it’s noticed to usually
backfire…</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div dir="auto"><span style="font-family:-apple-system,helveticaneue;background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);border-color:rgb(0,0,0);color:rgb(0,0,0)"></span></div>
<div><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Apr 24,
2024 at 3:43 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <<a href="mailto:km_elmet@t-online.de" target="_blank">km_elmet@t-online.de</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">On
2024-04-24 12:32, Kevin Venzke wrote:<br>
<br>
> The second option doesn't offer Smith, but
if it did, I would note that Smith is a<br>
> poor guarantee of quality. Here's a
1025-voter election where a 2-vote candidate is<br>
> in the Smith set (along with all other
candidates):<br>
> <br>
> 2:
A>B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K<br>
> 1:
B>C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K<br>
> 2:
C>D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K<br>
> 4: D>E>F>G>H>I>J>K<br>
> 8: E>F>G>H>I>J>K<br>
> 16: F>G>H>I>J>K<br>
> 32: G>H>I>J>K<br>
> 64: H>I>J>K<br>
> 128: I>J>K<br>
> 256: J>K<br>
> 512: K<br>
> <br>
> While this is not realistic, I do think it
is realistic that a candidate of limited<br>
> interest to most voters would sometimes
manage to pairwise defeat a more viable<br>
> candidate. And we should be ready to
interpret this as noise.<br>
<br>
That was phrased a bit oddly in the context of
the rest of your post, <br>
but I understand you to be saying "the worst
method that passes Smith <br>
may still be pretty bad", not necessarily that
proposed methods passing <br>
Smith are actually bad. Is that right?<br>
<br>
-km<br>
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</blockquote>
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