[EM] Poll, preliminary ballots

[Richard Lung]

That obviously isn't the view of FairVote. They are not friendly but the 
issue is too important for me to mind that. It gives me an opportunity 
to comment on what one of your colleagues and my opponents himself 
admitted to be the lists bubble (or "parallel universe.") How many 
people are even aware of all these systems, promoted by the list, he 
wanted to know?

In my opinion IRV may well be turned against, but not in favor of the 
obscure single winner alternatives, the list appears to back, but 
because it is not proportional. It may be seen, eventually, that IRV 
makes very little difference to the result. Then the baby of a necessary 
preference vote may be thrown out with the bathwater of eliminative 
counts. And America turn to the obvious (but "toxic") alternative of 
European party list systems, which deny individual freedom of 
representation, and are really party referendums, that don't properly 
"elect" or "choose-out" representation of the people.

Condorcet pairing is treated as if it were a definitive election system 
but this is not so. Two cenutries ago, Laplace refuted it, for treating 
orders of choice as having the same weight.

Regards,

Richard Lung.


On 23/04/2024 02:08, Closed Limelike Curves wrote:
> I suspect that FairVote has so deeply poisoned the voting reform well 
> that, soon enough, IRV systems will be seen as politically toxic. 
> (Just a matter of time until a Democrat is the Condorcet winner but 
> still gets eliminated.)
>
> Related to that, any system working off of ranked ballots has a good 
> chance of being discredited soon enough, as being a kind of "RCV". 
> Luckily, that still leaves some top-shelf methods like Score, 
> Smith//Score, ICA, or cardinal-pairwise; or even just running an 
> ordinal system off cardinal ballots. Anything involving runoffs will 
> probably be seen with mistrust, though.
>
> On Mon, Apr 22, 2024 at 8:42 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy 
> <electionmethods at votefair.org> wrote:
>
>     On 4/21/2024 4:33 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>      > What do you think of BTR-IRV in that respect? Or Borda-elimination?
>      > Neither explicitly checks for a Condorcet winner.
>
>     Regarding BTR-IRV, yes it's simpler and fully Condorcet compliant.
>
>     However, some voters will distrust the idea that the Condorcet
>     winner is
>     being protected from elimination in spite of possibly repeatedly
>     getting
>     the fewest transferred votes.
>
>     I suspect that BTR-IRV inherits some odd characteristics from IRV,
>     such
>     as the ones that show up in a Yee diagram and what Star fans refer
>     to as
>     the center-squeeze effect.
>
>     Adding another layer on top of a flawed method doesn't make it better.
>
>     I think of RCIPE as being like a pyramid where the foundation
>     layer is
>     solid because pairwise losing candidates deserve to be eliminated
>     (because they must not be allowed to win).  On top of that is the IRV
>     layer, which is not as strong, but it's only invoked when a counting
>     cycle does not include a pairwise losing candidate.
>
>     Regarding Borda-elimination, I distrust any method that's based on
>     Borda
>     counting because that method is vulnerable to strategic voting
>     and, for
>     fair results, requires only one mark in each row and only one mark in
>     each column (on a paper ballot of the kind used here in the US).
>
>     As an alternative to Borda counting I prefer the counting method in
>     Instant Pairwise Elimination:
>
>     https://electowiki.org/wiki/Instant_Pairwise_Elimination
>
>     "... If an elimination round has no pairwise-losing candidate,
>     then the
>     method eliminates the candidate with the largest pairwise opposition
>     count, which is determined by counting on each ballot the number of
>     not-yet-eliminated candidates who are ranked above that candidate,
>     and
>     adding those numbers across all the ballots. ..."
>
>     Specifically, using IPE, when a voter buries a disliked candidate,
>     the
>     counting is not affected by how deep that candidate is buried.
>
>     KM, thanks for your wise questions.
>
>     Richard Fobes
>     The VoteFair guy
>
>
>     On 4/21/2024 4:33 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>     > On 2024-04-22 01:11, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>     >> Hello,
>     >>
>     >>  From a marketability standpoint I kind of like RCIPE. If your
>     audience
>     >> understands IRV then they probably can understand the concept of a
>     >> candidacy
>     >> that has become futile during the count, who can be foretold to
>     be a
>     >> loser
>     >> well in advance of the end.
>     >>
>     >> To me it is not that the pairwise losing candidate "deserves to be
>     >> eliminated" but that within the logic of IRV it's intuitive
>     that that
>     >> candidate shouldn't need to play a role, affecting things, if
>     they're
>     >> doomed
>     >> to lose. (Or perhaps it's just me who thinks that's intuitive.)
>     >>
>     >> In contrast the "beats all" winner concept would be a bridge
>     too far,
>     >> because while there might be a candidate who can win every
>     final pairing,
>     >> IRV imposes additional requirements to get to that point, so
>     nothing is
>     >> assured about that status.
>     >>
>     >> But if the audience doesn't know IRV then it would be harder
>     for me to
>     >> find
>     >> an argument for RCIPE.
>     >
>     > What do you think of BTR-IRV in that respect? Or Borda-elimination?
>     > Neither explicitly checks for a Condorcet winner.
>     >
>     > -km
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