[EM] Poll, preliminary ballots

[Closed Limelike Curves]

I suspect that FairVote has so deeply poisoned the voting reform well that,
soon enough, IRV systems will be seen as politically toxic. (Just a matter
of time until a Democrat is the Condorcet winner but still gets eliminated.)

Related to that, any system working off of ranked ballots has a good chance
of being discredited soon enough, as being a kind of "RCV". Luckily, that
still leaves some top-shelf methods like Score, Smith//Score, ICA, or
cardinal-pairwise; or even just running an ordinal system off cardinal
ballots. Anything involving runoffs will probably be seen with mistrust,
though.

On Mon, Apr 22, 2024 at 8:42 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
electionmethods at votefair.org> wrote:

> On 4/21/2024 4:33 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>  > What do you think of BTR-IRV in that respect? Or Borda-elimination?
>  > Neither explicitly checks for a Condorcet winner.
>
> Regarding BTR-IRV, yes it's simpler and fully Condorcet compliant.
>
> However, some voters will distrust the idea that the Condorcet winner is
> being protected from elimination in spite of possibly repeatedly getting
> the fewest transferred votes.
>
> I suspect that BTR-IRV inherits some odd characteristics from IRV, such
> as the ones that show up in a Yee diagram and what Star fans refer to as
> the center-squeeze effect.
>
> Adding another layer on top of a flawed method doesn't make it better.
>
> I think of RCIPE as being like a pyramid where the foundation layer is
> solid because pairwise losing candidates deserve to be eliminated
> (because they must not be allowed to win).  On top of that is the IRV
> layer, which is not as strong, but it's only invoked when a counting
> cycle does not include a pairwise losing candidate.
>
> Regarding Borda-elimination, I distrust any method that's based on Borda
> counting because that method is vulnerable to strategic voting and, for
> fair results, requires only one mark in each row and only one mark in
> each column (on a paper ballot of the kind used here in the US).
>
> As an alternative to Borda counting I prefer the counting method in
> Instant Pairwise Elimination:
>
> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Instant_Pairwise_Elimination
>
> "... If an elimination round has no pairwise-losing candidate, then the
> method eliminates the candidate with the largest pairwise opposition
> count, which is determined by counting on each ballot the number of
> not-yet-eliminated candidates who are ranked above that candidate, and
> adding those numbers across all the ballots. ..."
>
> Specifically, using IPE, when a voter buries a disliked candidate, the
> counting is not affected by how deep that candidate is buried.
>
> KM, thanks for your wise questions.
>
> Richard Fobes
> The VoteFair guy
>
>
> On 4/21/2024 4:33 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> > On 2024-04-22 01:11, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> >> Hello,
> >>
> >>  From a marketability standpoint I kind of like RCIPE. If your audience
> >> understands IRV then they probably can understand the concept of a
> >> candidacy
> >> that has become futile during the count, who can be foretold to be a
> >> loser
> >> well in advance of the end.
> >>
> >> To me it is not that the pairwise losing candidate "deserves to be
> >> eliminated" but that within the logic of IRV it's intuitive that that
> >> candidate shouldn't need to play a role, affecting things, if they're
> >> doomed
> >> to lose. (Or perhaps it's just me who thinks that's intuitive.)
> >>
> >> In contrast the "beats all" winner concept would be a bridge too far,
> >> because while there might be a candidate who can win every final
> pairing,
> >> IRV imposes additional requirements to get to that point, so nothing is
> >> assured about that status.
> >>
> >> But if the audience doesn't know IRV then it would be harder for me to
> >> find
> >> an argument for RCIPE.
> >
> > What do you think of BTR-IRV in that respect? Or Borda-elimination?
> > Neither explicitly checks for a Condorcet winner.
> >
> > -km
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> info
>
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