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<p> </p>
<p>That obviously isn't the view of FairVote. They are not friendly
but the issue is too important for me to mind that. It gives me an
opportunity to comment on what one of your colleagues and my
opponents himself admitted to be the lists bubble (or "parallel
universe.") How many people are even aware of all these systems,
promoted by the list, he wanted to know?</p>
<p>In my opinion IRV may well be turned against, but not in favor of
the obscure single winner alternatives, the list appears to back,
but because it is not proportional. It may be seen, eventually,
that IRV makes very little difference to the result. Then the baby
of a necessary preference vote may be thrown out with the
bathwater of eliminative counts. And America turn to the obvious
(but "toxic") alternative of European party list systems, which
deny individual freedom of representation, and are really party
referendums, that don't properly "elect" or "choose-out"
representation of the people.<br>
</p>
<p>Condorcet pairing is treated as if it were a definitive election
system but this is not so. Two cenutries ago, Laplace refuted it,
for treating orders of choice as having the same weight.</p>
<p>Regards,</p>
<p>Richard Lung.<br>
</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 23/04/2024 02:08, Closed Limelike
Curves wrote:<br>
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<div dir="auto">I suspect that FairVote has so deeply poisoned
the voting reform well that, soon enough, IRV systems will
be seen as politically toxic. (Just a matter of time until a
Democrat is the Condorcet winner but still gets eliminated.)</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Related to that, any system working off of
ranked ballots has a good chance of being discredited soon
enough, as being a kind of "RCV". Luckily, that still leaves
some top-shelf methods like Score, Smith//Score, ICA, or
cardinal-pairwise; or even just running an ordinal system
off cardinal ballots. Anything involving runoffs will
probably be seen with mistrust, though.</div>
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<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Apr 22, 2024 at
8:42 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <<a
href="mailto:electionmethods@votefair.org"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">electionmethods@votefair.org</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">On
4/21/2024 4:33 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:<br>
> What do you think of BTR-IRV in that respect? Or
Borda-elimination?<br>
> Neither explicitly checks for a Condorcet winner.<br>
<br>
Regarding BTR-IRV, yes it's simpler and fully Condorcet
compliant.<br>
<br>
However, some voters will distrust the idea that the
Condorcet winner is <br>
being protected from elimination in spite of possibly
repeatedly getting <br>
the fewest transferred votes.<br>
<br>
I suspect that BTR-IRV inherits some odd characteristics
from IRV, such <br>
as the ones that show up in a Yee diagram and what Star
fans refer to as <br>
the center-squeeze effect.<br>
<br>
Adding another layer on top of a flawed method doesn't
make it better.<br>
<br>
I think of RCIPE as being like a pyramid where the
foundation layer is <br>
solid because pairwise losing candidates deserve to be
eliminated <br>
(because they must not be allowed to win). On top of
that is the IRV <br>
layer, which is not as strong, but it's only invoked
when a counting <br>
cycle does not include a pairwise losing candidate.<br>
<br>
Regarding Borda-elimination, I distrust any method
that's based on Borda <br>
counting because that method is vulnerable to strategic
voting and, for <br>
fair results, requires only one mark in each row and
only one mark in <br>
each column (on a paper ballot of the kind used here in
the US).<br>
<br>
As an alternative to Borda counting I prefer the
counting method in <br>
Instant Pairwise Elimination:<br>
<br>
<a
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Instant_Pairwise_Elimination"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Instant_Pairwise_Elimination</a><br>
<br>
"... If an elimination round has no pairwise-losing
candidate, then the <br>
method eliminates the candidate with the largest
pairwise opposition <br>
count, which is determined by counting on each ballot
the number of <br>
not-yet-eliminated candidates who are ranked above that
candidate, and <br>
adding those numbers across all the ballots. ..."<br>
<br>
Specifically, using IPE, when a voter buries a disliked
candidate, the <br>
counting is not affected by how deep that candidate is
buried.<br>
<br>
KM, thanks for your wise questions.<br>
<br>
Richard Fobes<br>
The VoteFair guy<br>
<br>
<br>
On 4/21/2024 4:33 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:<br>
> On 2024-04-22 01:11, Kevin Venzke wrote:<br>
>> Hello,<br>
>><br>
>> From a marketability standpoint I kind of like
RCIPE. If your audience<br>
>> understands IRV then they probably can
understand the concept of a <br>
>> candidacy<br>
>> that has become futile during the count, who
can be foretold to be a <br>
>> loser<br>
>> well in advance of the end.<br>
>><br>
>> To me it is not that the pairwise losing
candidate "deserves to be<br>
>> eliminated" but that within the logic of IRV
it's intuitive that that<br>
>> candidate shouldn't need to play a role,
affecting things, if they're <br>
>> doomed<br>
>> to lose. (Or perhaps it's just me who thinks
that's intuitive.)<br>
>><br>
>> In contrast the "beats all" winner concept
would be a bridge too far,<br>
>> because while there might be a candidate who
can win every final pairing,<br>
>> IRV imposes additional requirements to get to
that point, so nothing is<br>
>> assured about that status.<br>
>><br>
>> But if the audience doesn't know IRV then it
would be harder for me to <br>
>> find<br>
>> an argument for RCIPE.<br>
> <br>
> What do you think of BTR-IRV in that respect? Or
Borda-elimination? <br>
> Neither explicitly checks for a Condorcet winner.<br>
> <br>
> -km<br>
----<br>
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target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">https://electorama.com/em</a>
for list info<br>
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<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">----
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