[EM] Poll, preliminary ballots

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Fri Apr 26 22:39:02 PDT 2024


On Mon, Apr 22, 2024 at 18:09 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:

 Anything involving runoffs will probably be seen with mistrust, though.

..,then at least something good would come from it.  :-)

>
> On Mon, Apr 22, 2024 at 8:42 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <
> electionmethods at votefair.org> wrote:
>
>> On 4/21/2024 4:33 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>>  > What do you think of BTR-IRV in that respect? Or Borda-elimination?
>>  > Neither explicitly checks for a Condorcet winner.
>>
>> Regarding BTR-IRV, yes it's simpler and fully Condorcet compliant.
>>
>> However, some voters will distrust the idea that the Condorcet winner is
>> being protected from elimination in spite of possibly repeatedly getting
>> the fewest transferred votes.
>>
>> I suspect that BTR-IRV inherits some odd characteristics from IRV, such
>> as the ones that show up in a Yee diagram and what Star fans refer to as
>> the center-squeeze effect.
>>
>> Adding another layer on top of a flawed method doesn't make it better.
>>
>> I think of RCIPE as being like a pyramid where the foundation layer is
>> solid because pairwise losing candidates deserve to be eliminated
>> (because they must not be allowed to win).  On top of that is the IRV
>> layer, which is not as strong, but it's only invoked when a counting
>> cycle does not include a pairwise losing candidate.
>>
>> Regarding Borda-elimination, I distrust any method that's based on Borda
>> counting because that method is vulnerable to strategic voting and, for
>> fair results, requires only one mark in each row and only one mark in
>> each column (on a paper ballot of the kind used here in the US).
>>
>> As an alternative to Borda counting I prefer the counting method in
>> Instant Pairwise Elimination:
>>
>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Instant_Pairwise_Elimination
>>
>> "... If an elimination round has no pairwise-losing candidate, then the
>> method eliminates the candidate with the largest pairwise opposition
>> count, which is determined by counting on each ballot the number of
>> not-yet-eliminated candidates who are ranked above that candidate, and
>> adding those numbers across all the ballots. ..."
>>
>> Specifically, using IPE, when a voter buries a disliked candidate, the
>> counting is not affected by how deep that candidate is buried.
>>
>> KM, thanks for your wise questions.
>>
>> Richard Fobes
>> The VoteFair guy
>>
>>
>> On 4/21/2024 4:33 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>> > On 2024-04-22 01:11, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>> >> Hello,
>> >>
>> >>  From a marketability standpoint I kind of like RCIPE. If your audience
>> >> understands IRV then they probably can understand the concept of a
>> >> candidacy
>> >> that has become futile during the count, who can be foretold to be a
>> >> loser
>> >> well in advance of the end.
>> >>
>> >> To me it is not that the pairwise losing candidate "deserves to be
>> >> eliminated" but that within the logic of IRV it's intuitive that that
>> >> candidate shouldn't need to play a role, affecting things, if they're
>> >> doomed
>> >> to lose. (Or perhaps it's just me who thinks that's intuitive.)
>> >>
>> >> In contrast the "beats all" winner concept would be a bridge too far,
>> >> because while there might be a candidate who can win every final
>> pairing,
>> >> IRV imposes additional requirements to get to that point, so nothing is
>> >> assured about that status.
>> >>
>> >> But if the audience doesn't know IRV then it would be harder for me to
>> >> find
>> >> an argument for RCIPE.
>> >
>> > What do you think of BTR-IRV in that respect? Or Borda-elimination?
>> > Neither explicitly checks for a Condorcet winner.
>> >
>> > -km
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>> info
>>
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