<div><br></div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Apr 22, 2024 at 18:09 Closed Limelike Curves <<a href="mailto:closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com">closed.limelike.curves@gmail.com</a>> wrote: </div><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br></div><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"> Anything involving runoffs will probably be seen with mistrust, though.</div><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr"><br></div><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">..,then at least something good would come from it. :-)</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)"><div><div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Apr 22, 2024 at 8:42 AM Richard, the VoteFair guy <<a href="mailto:electionmethods@votefair.org" target="_blank">electionmethods@votefair.org</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">On 4/21/2024 4:33 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:<br>
> What do you think of BTR-IRV in that respect? Or Borda-elimination?<br>
> Neither explicitly checks for a Condorcet winner.<br>
<br>
Regarding BTR-IRV, yes it's simpler and fully Condorcet compliant.<br>
<br>
However, some voters will distrust the idea that the Condorcet winner is <br>
being protected from elimination in spite of possibly repeatedly getting <br>
the fewest transferred votes.<br>
<br>
I suspect that BTR-IRV inherits some odd characteristics from IRV, such <br>
as the ones that show up in a Yee diagram and what Star fans refer to as <br>
the center-squeeze effect.<br>
<br>
Adding another layer on top of a flawed method doesn't make it better.<br>
<br>
I think of RCIPE as being like a pyramid where the foundation layer is <br>
solid because pairwise losing candidates deserve to be eliminated <br>
(because they must not be allowed to win). On top of that is the IRV <br>
layer, which is not as strong, but it's only invoked when a counting <br>
cycle does not include a pairwise losing candidate.<br>
<br>
Regarding Borda-elimination, I distrust any method that's based on Borda <br>
counting because that method is vulnerable to strategic voting and, for <br>
fair results, requires only one mark in each row and only one mark in <br>
each column (on a paper ballot of the kind used here in the US).<br>
<br>
As an alternative to Borda counting I prefer the counting method in <br>
Instant Pairwise Elimination:<br>
<br>
<a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Instant_Pairwise_Elimination" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Instant_Pairwise_Elimination</a><br>
<br>
"... If an elimination round has no pairwise-losing candidate, then the <br>
method eliminates the candidate with the largest pairwise opposition <br>
count, which is determined by counting on each ballot the number of <br>
not-yet-eliminated candidates who are ranked above that candidate, and <br>
adding those numbers across all the ballots. ..."<br>
<br>
Specifically, using IPE, when a voter buries a disliked candidate, the <br>
counting is not affected by how deep that candidate is buried.<br>
<br>
KM, thanks for your wise questions.<br>
<br>
Richard Fobes<br>
The VoteFair guy<br>
<br>
<br>
On 4/21/2024 4:33 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:<br>
> On 2024-04-22 01:11, Kevin Venzke wrote:<br>
>> Hello,<br>
>><br>
>> From a marketability standpoint I kind of like RCIPE. If your audience<br>
>> understands IRV then they probably can understand the concept of a <br>
>> candidacy<br>
>> that has become futile during the count, who can be foretold to be a <br>
>> loser<br>
>> well in advance of the end.<br>
>><br>
>> To me it is not that the pairwise losing candidate "deserves to be<br>
>> eliminated" but that within the logic of IRV it's intuitive that that<br>
>> candidate shouldn't need to play a role, affecting things, if they're <br>
>> doomed<br>
>> to lose. (Or perhaps it's just me who thinks that's intuitive.)<br>
>><br>
>> In contrast the "beats all" winner concept would be a bridge too far,<br>
>> because while there might be a candidate who can win every final pairing,<br>
>> IRV imposes additional requirements to get to that point, so nothing is<br>
>> assured about that status.<br>
>><br>
>> But if the audience doesn't know IRV then it would be harder for me to <br>
>> find<br>
>> an argument for RCIPE.<br>
> <br>
> What do you think of BTR-IRV in that respect? Or Borda-elimination? <br>
> Neither explicitly checks for a Condorcet winner.<br>
> <br>
> -km<br>
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