[EM] Poll on voting-systems, to inform voters in upcoming enactment-elections

[Michael Garman]

>> what if it finishes low here? That would be worse for the Eugene
initiative than not including it.

I thought this poll was meant to be an objective search for the truth, not
a cudgel to advance an agenda. I also think you’re vastly overestimating
the influence this little poll is going to have.

In any case, I’m nominating STAR. Someone please relay the message to
Ossipoff as I believe he’s blocked me.

Michael J. Garman | he/him

Digital & Campus Organizer | Rank the Vote

Book a meeting with me! <https://calendly.com/michael-j-garman>

(401) 644-4108 | michael.garman at rankthevote.us


On Sat, Apr 6, 2024 at 2:16 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

>
> This is to acknowledge the nominations of Smith//Default-Approval,
> Smith//Explicit-Approval, Margins-Sorted Approval, & Smith//DAC.
>
> I’d say include STAR, because that’s what its advocates would want.  …or
> would they? Its enactment is going to be voted-on in Eugene next month, &
> what if it finishes low here? That would be worse for the Eugene initiative
> than not including it.
>
> Of course showing voters about methods’ popularity here is my
> stated-purpose for the poll, & the fact that it’s about to be voted on for
> enactment would seem to suggest including it.
>
> But the advocates of STAR have been working hard, completely in good
> faith, & STAR is a lot better than IRV. Those are two good reasons to let
> EqualVote decide on STAR’s inclusion in the poll.
>
> I’ll ask the EqualVote group, & go by what they say.
>
> (In fact STAR, while more complicated than Approval, has nothing like the
> amount of count-complexity of Condorcet, or the consequent amount of
> count-insecurity & count-fraud vulnerability. I personally don’t propose
> STAR, because I regard it as an inbetween compromise between Approval & the
> ranked-methods, & I want the absolutely minimal. (I only propose Condorcet
> to jurisdictions where people insist on rankings.) …but, by my
> simplicity-standard, STAR scores high, even though I don’t propose it.)
>
> So the nominations list so-far is now (listed in order of nomination):
>
> Approval
> RP(wv)
> Schulze
> IRV
> Plurality
> MinMax(wv)
> Black
> Baldwin
> Benham
> Woodall
> Schwartz-Woodall
> Smith//Approval (of all ranked)
> Smith//Approval (of what is specified)
> Margin-Sorted Approval
> Smith//DAC
>
>
>
> On Sat, Apr 6, 2024 at 04:03 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:
>
>>
>> I would like to nominate several methods.
>>
>> Smith//Approval (Ranking):
>>
>> Voters rank from the top only those candidates they "approve",
>> equal-ranking allowed,
>> the most approved member of the voted Smith set wins.
>>
>> Smith//Approval (specified cutoff):
>>
>> Voters rank from the top however many candidates they wish and can also
>> specify an approval
>> cutoff/threshold. Default approval is only for candidates ranked below no
>> others (i.e. ranked top
>> or equal-top).
>> The most approved member of the Smith set wins.
>>
>> Margins Sorted Approval (specified cutoff):
>>
>> Voters rank from the top however many candidates they wish and can also
>> specify an approval
>> cutoff/threshold. Default approval is only for candidates ranked below no
>> others (i.e. ranked top
>> or equal-top).
>>
>> A Forrest Simmons invention. Candidates are listed in approval score
>> order and if any adjacent pairs
>> are pairwise out of order then this is corrected by flipping the
>> out-of-order pair with the smallest
>> margin. If there is a tie for this we flip the less approved pair. Repeat
>> until there are no adjacent pairs
>> of candidates that are pairwise out of order, then elect the
>> highest-ordered candidate.
>>
>> Smith//:DAC
>>
>> Voters rank from the top however many candidates they wish, equal-ranking
>> allowed.
>> Eliminate candidates not in the Smith set and then apply
>> Woodall's Descending Acquiescing Coalitions method.
>>
>> There is a method I hate that is apparently contending in the real world:
>> "STAR". Given the stated purpose of
>> this poll, is there a case for including it?
>>
>> Chris Benham
>>
>>
>>
>> *Michael Ossipoff* email9648742 at gmail.com
>> <election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%20on%20voting-systems%2C%0A%20to%20inform%20voters%20in%20upcoming%20enactment-elections&In-Reply-To=%3CCAOKDY5BkSGJkX%3D7zWXBr2t1SBNVMNj96wm-T8ubvr_wGM5h51w%40mail.gmail.com%3E>
>> *Wed Apr 3 22:13:28 PDT 2024*
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------
>>
>> EM used to do a lot of polls, but now never does. So I wouldn’t propose
>> one, if it weren’t for the fact that, this year, the voters of at least two
>> states are going to vote on whether to enact a certain voting-system.
>>
>> It seems to me—tell me if I’m wrong—that those people have a right to know
>> how people familiar with voting-systems feel about the relative merits of
>> some voting-systems.
>>
>> So, though I claim that polls are valuable for demonstrating the experience
>> of using the voting systems, & how they work, & what they’ll do—& are
>> therefore useful & worthwhile for their own sake—this poll that I now
>> propose isn’t a poll for its own sake.
>>
>> It is, as I said, proposed for the important practical purpose of letting
>> the voters in the upcoming enactment-elections know how we feel about the
>> relative merits of some voting-systems, including the one that they’re
>> about to vote on the enactment of.
>>
>> The voting-method for the poll:
>>
>> It seems to me that Schulze is the most popular ranked voting-system, among
>> the people at EM.
>>
>> …& it seems to me that the last time we voted on EM’s collective favorite
>> voting-system, Approval won.
>>
>> Those seem the top-two, in EM popularity.
>>
>>
>> ----
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