[EM] Poll on voting-systems, to inform voters in upcoming enactment-elections

[Closed Limelike Curves]

>
> But if you're right about the results of its clone dependence, isn't
> STAR just Range with cowbell? That is, it would reduce to Range itself
> due to the existence of rated (rated-equal) clones.
>
Yesish—although, with STAR, I think of "clones" as rated-next-to-equal.
Clones in the sense of rated-equal-on-all-ballots don't really exist, so
any "clones" would probably be copartisans. (Which is why the runoff
probably makes elections a bit more Condorcet-efficient). In practice,
that's a huge improvement on IRV and FPP for Condorcet advocates (since
Score has a high Condorcet efficiency).

To be honest, every well-designed voting rule—anything that doesn't make
strategy too complicated or require order-reversal—will probably converge
to a rough approximation of a maximal lottery (since that's the
group-strategyproof Nash equilibrium).

On Mon, Apr 8, 2024 at 8:32 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
wrote:

> On 2024-04-08 07:26, Closed Limelike Curves wrote:
> >>     That's it.  One-person-one-vote leads to Majority rule which leads
> >>     to some Condorcet-consistent method.  I believe that this principle
> >>     takes primacy over any other for deciding single-winner elections
> >>     when there is no proportionality to be had.  For multi-winner
> >>     elections I might be for an STV method.
> >
> > Then STAR should be great, since it has sky-high Condorcet efficiency.
> > It's easily more Condorcet-efficient than approval (because of the extra
> > runoff, which can elect a Condorcet winner in second place), and
> > approval already tends to pick Condorcet winners in practice.
>
> But if you're right about the results of its clone dependence, isn't
> STAR just Range with cowbell? That is, it would reduce to Range itself
> due to the existence of rated (rated-equal) clones.
>
> -km
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