[EM] A Path to Success

[Forest Simmons]

Perhaps VPR... vote for a published ranking or ballot at some early stage
of a method or sequence of methods... especially if there is some way to
keep political parties from hijacking the VPR process the way they have
hijacked the primaries, the debates, etc.

Versions of Asset Voting for single winner to multi winner ... with
proportional weighted votes in assemblies ... as steps towards more
sophisticated methods of proxy hierarchies.

Even proportional approval voting based on Vote For a Published Ballot
Approval Voting.

It could just be regular Approval ... it's so easy to copy a published
ballot ... just put check marks next to the names of the recommended
candidates (except the ones you disagree with) on your official ballot

Keep those ideas coming ...  then after we get past the pure brainstorming
we can flesh out some of the ones that.seem most promising.

On Fri, Mar 10, 2023, 9:45 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
wrote:

> On 3/9/23 23:14, Forest Simmons wrote:
> > Kristofer suggested introducing a sequence of methods m0,  m1, m2, ...
> > forming a path of small steps gradually progressing from some simple
> > method m0 towards some ideal end method m_infinity.
> >
> > Any ideas?
>
> Here are some:
>
> BTR-IRV to Benham (if the voters don't care about monotonicity or
> summability);
> first preference Copeland to Benham (if they care about strategy
> resistance but not monotonicity);
> Minmax to Schulze, Ranked Pairs or River (if failing Condorcet loser is
> not too tough a sell); possibly to some uncovered RP variant after this?
> STAR to Smith,Range or Smith|Range (for cardinal ballots; X|Y is just
> notation I made up now for renormalizing after excluding everybody in
> the X set as I couldn't find a better designation for it)
>
> These are all finite sequences. /Perhaps/ Approval -> STAR ->
> Smith,Range would work, but it would require a ballot format change.
>
> On a related subject, as I understand it, FairVote likes to point out
> that their preferred single-winner method is a stepping stone to
> multiwinner. The IRV-likes above easily generalize to STV by adding the
> surplus election and redistribution steps, e.g. STV-ME (BTR-IV).
>
> I once devised a multiwinner Ranked Pairs method with a polynomial
> runtime (in the number of voters and candidates), but in practice the
> polynomial is too large for large elections; it requires solving large
> linear programs. There's also CPO-STV and Schulze STV, but they're very
> complex.
>
> Range has PRV, so possibly something like PRV -> Sequential Monroe ->
> Monroe (or PRV -> Sequential Ebert -> Ebert). For Majority Judgement or
> Bucklin there's BTV/EAR and my MCAB (though the latter is also pretty
> complex).
>
> Condorcet methods in general? STV-CLE, but it feels kind of like
> cheating; the step from Condorcet to bolting it onto STV may feel a bit
> too artificial.
>
> -km
>
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