[EM] A Path to Success
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_elmet at t-online.de
Fri Mar 10 09:45:38 PST 2023
On 3/9/23 23:14, Forest Simmons wrote:
> Kristofer suggested introducing a sequence of methods m0, m1, m2, ...
> forming a path of small steps gradually progressing from some simple
> method m0 towards some ideal end method m_infinity.
>
> Any ideas?
Here are some:
BTR-IRV to Benham (if the voters don't care about monotonicity or
summability);
first preference Copeland to Benham (if they care about strategy
resistance but not monotonicity);
Minmax to Schulze, Ranked Pairs or River (if failing Condorcet loser is
not too tough a sell); possibly to some uncovered RP variant after this?
STAR to Smith,Range or Smith|Range (for cardinal ballots; X|Y is just
notation I made up now for renormalizing after excluding everybody in
the X set as I couldn't find a better designation for it)
These are all finite sequences. /Perhaps/ Approval -> STAR ->
Smith,Range would work, but it would require a ballot format change.
On a related subject, as I understand it, FairVote likes to point out
that their preferred single-winner method is a stepping stone to
multiwinner. The IRV-likes above easily generalize to STV by adding the
surplus election and redistribution steps, e.g. STV-ME (BTR-IV).
I once devised a multiwinner Ranked Pairs method with a polynomial
runtime (in the number of voters and candidates), but in practice the
polynomial is too large for large elections; it requires solving large
linear programs. There's also CPO-STV and Schulze STV, but they're very
complex.
Range has PRV, so possibly something like PRV -> Sequential Monroe ->
Monroe (or PRV -> Sequential Ebert -> Ebert). For Majority Judgement or
Bucklin there's BTV/EAR and my MCAB (though the latter is also pretty
complex).
Condorcet methods in general? STV-CLE, but it feels kind of like
cheating; the step from Condorcet to bolting it onto STV may feel a bit
too artificial.
-km
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