[EM] Majority-SP contd.

[Michael Ossipoff]

Of course, with Majority-SP, the winner depends on the order in which the
“principals” (top-cycle candidates: CW, BF, & Bus(es) ) encounter
eachother, if all the defeats among them are majority defeats.

“IA” stands for “ implicit Approval” (number of ballots that rank a
candidate, where voters understand that it’s in their best interest to rank
only the candidates whom they like or approve).

If the sequential-comparison-agenda is ordered by IA, the most-liked
candidates are later in the sequential order. That’s most likely CW.

So, most likely, BF & Bus will encounter eachother first, eliminating Bus,
who will then be eliminated by BE.

But which of {BF, Bus} is more likely to win, if CW isn’t the most
approved? That’s what determines deterrence,

Well the buriers have to rank Bus, but not vice-versus. So of those two,
Bus is more likely to be ranked by more people.

So, BF encounters CW & eliminated hir, & then CW encounters Bus & gets
eliminated by hir.

So Bus is more likely to win than BF.

There’s probabilistic-deterrence.

That would be true even if no defensive-strategy were used.

But, if the CW voters aren’t ranking candidates that they don’t approve, &
if they don’t approve BF, then BF can’t have a majority-defeat against Bus.

That’s because there can’t be a majority that doesn’t include the CW
voters…who refuse to rank BF.

…resulting in the impossibility of Bus having a majority-defeat, & making
hir win inevitable.
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