[EM] Majority-SP contd.

[Michael Ossipoff]

I meant to say that if, as is most likely, Initially BF & Bus encounter
eachother, BF wins that encounter & then loses to CW.

On Thu, Dec 28, 2023 at 16:15 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Of course, with Majority-SP, the winner depends on the order in which the
> “principals” (top-cycle candidates: CW, BF, & Bus(es) ) encounter
> eachother, if all the defeats among them are majority defeats.
>
> “IA” stands for “ implicit Approval” (number of ballots that rank a
> candidate, where voters understand that it’s in their best interest to rank
> only the candidates whom they like or approve).
>
> If the sequential-comparison-agenda is ordered by IA, the most-liked
> candidates are later in the sequential order. That’s most likely CW.
>
> So, most likely, BF & Bus will encounter eachother first, eliminating Bus,
> who will then be eliminated by BE.
>
> But which of {BF, Bus} is more likely to win, if CW isn’t the most
> approved? That’s what determines deterrence,
>
> Well the buriers have to rank Bus, but not vice-versus. So of those two,
> Bus is more likely to be ranked by more people.
>
> So, BF encounters CW & eliminated hir, & then CW encounters Bus & gets
> eliminated by hir.
>
> So Bus is more likely to win than BF.
>
> There’s probabilistic-deterrence.
>
> That would be true even if no defensive-strategy were used.
>
> But, if the CW voters aren’t ranking candidates that they don’t approve, &
> if they don’t approve BF, then BF can’t have a majority-defeat against Bus.
>
> That’s because there can’t be a majority that doesn’t include the CW
> voters…who refuse to rank BF.
>
> …resulting in the impossibility of Bus having a majority-defeat, & making
> hir win inevitable.
>
>
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