[EM] Quick and Clean Burial Resistant Smith

[Forest Simmons]

Robert,

You opined ...

"Probably Schulze or RP is the best thing to do for those cases when there
is no Condorcet winner.  But getting that into legislative language is
difficult, which is why I have advocated for BTR-STV."

Actually, neither RP nor Schulze has better Condorcet efficiency than
Smith//TopTwoRunOff, which is the simple method you should be aiming for.

Here's the typical example that I used earlier today:

40 A>C
35 B>C
25 C>A

The sincere CW is C, which any Condorcet method will elect in an ideal
neighborhood, but only a burial resistant method like Q&D/C will reliably
elect in a saavy, scrappy neighborhood.

All of the standard (head-in-the-sand) Universal Domain methods like RP,
Schulze, MinMax, etc. are more or less likely to elect A, depending on how
politically saavy/street smart the A faction is.

So those highly vaunted methods are no better than Condorcet completed
byTopTwoRunoff, which produces the exact same result as they do 100 percent
of the time in this context, but much more simply.

So TopTwoRunoff works just as well as Schulze for cycle resolution in this
context, yet it is by far the most adoptable proposal for Condorcet
completion.... because of its simplicity and familiarity.

Don't worry about the legislative language .. just copy the language from
existing jurisdictions where it is already in use ... with the simple tweak
of replacing the phrase, "In the event there is no absolute majority
candidate ..."  ... with the phrase, "In the event there is no head-to-head
majority candidate ..."

There is no valid excuse for proposing Plurality as a Condorcet finisher
when this more adoptable proposal is there for the taking.

Plurality as a finisher would be a huge liability/embarrassment even if you
could get it adopted, which is doubtful.

Fair Vote people would rightly mock a Condorcet method that in principle
allows a Condorcet Loser to win.

How would we prevent that happening?

Of course we could say ... "In the event there is no majority head-to-head
winner, elect the FPTP winner, unless all Plurality counts fall short of 50
percent, in which case complete the Plurality finisher with a TopTwoRunOff
finisher, finisher."

That wouldn't even make sense, because there could never be a 50% plus
Plutality winner without already having a Condorcet Winner... since a 50
percent plus Plurality winner is automatically a Condorcet Winner.

I hate to be pedantic, but let's not squander our opportunity on an
atrocious proposal. If there were not a simpler, more adoptable proposal
readily available, I would say, "Go ahead, leave your keys in the car,
cross your fingers, and take your chances!"

In my humble, but expert opinion, there are only two tenable proposals for
Burlington, Vt. at this time ...

1. Condorcet completed by TopTwoRunoff when necessary... of course under a
more attractive name.

2. TopTwoRunoff restricted to the "top cycle" or "Smith Set" ... even more
important to get a better name.

This second method is just as good as Schulze for public elections, so
don't pine for the day when the world is safe for Kemeny-Young, for Pete's
sake!

You should put the choice to the people who control the decision orocess.
After making clear the prestige of an ISDA upgrade at practically no extra
cost, let them decide between the two options.

Either choice will result in a respectable method that cannot be easily
gainsayed.

Good Luck!

-Forest




El vie., 7 de ene. de 2022 12:15 a. m., robert bristow-johnson <
rbj at audioimagination.com> escribió:

>
>
> > On 01/07/2022 1:05 AM Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21 at gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> > Most designers of Condorcet methods asume that the gentlemanly thing to
> do is to give the votes a benefit of a doubt and assume that they must have
> voted sincerely
>
> I just think that, without some other information to suggest otherwise,
> the marked ballot should be assumed to represent the voter's sincere
> preferences.
>
> > but cycles are a result of errores of judgement.
> >
>
> A preference cycle would need a very close 3-way race *and* and somewhat
> schizoid electorate.  "If I can't have my favorite Bernie Sanders, then I'm
> voting for T****."
>
> Probably Schulze or RP is the best thing to do for those cases when there
> is no Condorcet winner.  But getting that into legislative language is
> difficult, which is why I have advocated for BTR-STV.
>
> > Because of these assumptions they attempt to filter out the erroneous
> preferences statistically
>
> I just think that the method tries to make the best thing out of a
> confusing situation that will rarely happen.
>
> > .. the main heuristic is that larger majorities are less apt to hold
> erroneous opinions than smaller ones ... hence cycles are broken by
> annulling the defeats with the smallest majorities.
> >
>
> That's one way to do it.
>
> > I used to think that way, too.
> >
> > But seasoned election observers are of the opinion that the vast
> majority (more than 90 percent) of public elections for political office
> have a sincere Condorcet candidate, and that when there is a defeat cycle,
> it is more likely to be the result of intentional subversion of the
> Condorcet candidate than of erroneous voter judgment.
> >
>
> The thing is more like 99.5% have Condorcet winner.  Right now, at least
> with the 440 RCV elections that FairVote says they analyzed, that all had
> Condorcet winners and all but one succeeded at electing the Condorcet
> winner.
>
> I just sorta wanna get any Condorcet method.  The simpler language the
> better.  I think cycles will be rare.  If we elect the plurality winner in
> case of a cycle, that might be an indication of preference.  It's not
> Schulze.  It might not elect the bestest candidate that disincentivizes
> certain tactical voting.  But if simple language get a Condorcet method
> understood, it has a better chance of maybe someday getting legislated.
>
> --
>
> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
> .
> .
> .
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
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