<div dir="auto"><div>Robert, </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">You opined ...</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">"<span style="font-family:sans-serif">Probably Schulze or RP is the best thing to do for those cases when there is no Condorcet winner. But getting that into legislative language is difficult, which is why I have advocated for BTR-STV."</span></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif"><br></font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif">Actually, neither RP nor Schulze has better Condorcet efficiency than Smith//TopTwoRunOff, which is the simple method you should be aiming for.</font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif"><br></font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif">Here's the typical example that I used earlier today:</font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif"><br></font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif">40 A>C </font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif">35 B>C</font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif">25 C>A</font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif"><br></font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif">The sincere CW is C, which any Condorcet method will elect in an ideal neighborhood, but only a burial resistant method like Q&D/C will reliably elect in a saavy, scrappy neighborhood.</font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif"><br></font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif">All of the standard (head-in-the-sand) Universal Domain methods like RP, Schulze, MinMax, etc. are more or less likely to elect A, depending on how politically saavy/street smart the A faction is.</font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif"><br></font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif">So those highly vaunted methods are no better than Condorcet completed byTopTwoRunoff, which produces the exact same result as they do 100 percent of the time in this context, but much more simply.</font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif"><br></font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif">So TopTwoRunoff works just as well as Schulze for cycle resolution in this context, yet it is by far the most adoptable proposal for Condorcet completion.... because of its simplicity and familiarity. </font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif"><br></font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif">Don't worry about the legislative language ..</font><span style="font-family:sans-serif"> just copy the language from existing jurisdictions where it is already in use ... with the simple tweak of replacing the phrase, "In the event there is no absolute majority candidate ..." ... with the phrase, "In the event there is no head-to-head majority candidate ..."</span></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif"><br></font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif">There is no valid excuse for proposing Plurality as a Condorcet finisher when this more adoptable proposal is there for the taking.</font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif"><br></font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif">Plurality as a finisher would be a huge liability/embarrassment even if you could get it adopted, which is doubtful.</font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif"><br></font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif">Fair Vote people would rightly mock a Condorcet method that in principle allows a Condorcet Loser to win.</font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif"><br></font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif">How would we prevent that happening?</font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif"><br></font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif">Of course we could say ... "In the event there is no majority head-to-head winner, elect the FPTP winner, unless all Plurality counts fall short of 50 percent, in which case complete the Plurality finisher with a TopTwoRunOff finisher, finisher."</font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif"><br></font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif">That wouldn't even make sense, because there could never be a 50% plus Plutality winner without already having a Condorcet Winner... since a 50 percent plus Plurality winner is automatically a Condorcet Winner.</font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif"><br></font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif">I hate to be pedantic, but let's not squander our opportunity on an atrocious proposal. If there were not a simpler, more adoptable proposal readily available, I would say, "Go ahead, leave your keys in the car, cross your fingers, and take your chances!"</font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif"><br></font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif">In my humble, but expert opinion, there are only two tenable proposals for Burlington, Vt. at this time ...</font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif"><br></font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif">1. Condorcet completed by TopTwoRunoff when necessary... of course under a more attractive name.</font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif"><br></font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif">2. TopTwoRunoff restricted to the "top cycle" or "Smith Set" ... even more important to get a better name.</font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif"><br></font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif">This second method is just as good as Schulze for public elections, so don't pine for the day when the world is safe for Kemeny-Young, for Pete's sake!</font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif"><br></font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif">You should put the choice to the people who control the decision orocess. After making clear the prestige of an ISDA upgrade at practically no extra cost, let them decide between the two options.</font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif"><br></font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif">Either choice will result in a respectable method that cannot be easily gainsayed.</font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif"><br></font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif">Good Luck!</font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif"><br></font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif">-Forest</font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif"><br></font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif"><br></font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif"><br></font><br><div class="gmail_quote" dir="auto"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">El vie., 7 de ene. de 2022 12:15 a. m., robert bristow-johnson <<a href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com">rbj@audioimagination.com</a>> escribió:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
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> On 01/07/2022 1:05 AM Forest Simmons <<a href="mailto:forest.simmons21@gmail.com" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">forest.simmons21@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br>
> <br>
> <br>
> Most designers of Condorcet methods asume that the gentlemanly thing to do is to give the votes a benefit of a doubt and assume that they must have voted sincerely<br>
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I just think that, without some other information to suggest otherwise, the marked ballot should be assumed to represent the voter's sincere preferences.<br>
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> but cycles are a result of errores of judgement.<br>
> <br>
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A preference cycle would need a very close 3-way race *and* and somewhat schizoid electorate. "If I can't have my favorite Bernie Sanders, then I'm voting for T****."<br>
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Probably Schulze or RP is the best thing to do for those cases when there is no Condorcet winner. But getting that into legislative language is difficult, which is why I have advocated for BTR-STV.<br>
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> Because of these assumptions they attempt to filter out the erroneous preferences statistically<br>
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I just think that the method tries to make the best thing out of a confusing situation that will rarely happen.<br>
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> .. the main heuristic is that larger majorities are less apt to hold erroneous opinions than smaller ones ... hence cycles are broken by annulling the defeats with the smallest majorities.<br>
> <br>
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That's one way to do it.<br>
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> I used to think that way, too.<br>
> <br>
> But seasoned election observers are of the opinion that the vast majority (more than 90 percent) of public elections for political office have a sincere Condorcet candidate, and that when there is a defeat cycle, it is more likely to be the result of intentional subversion of the Condorcet candidate than of erroneous voter judgment.<br>
> <br>
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The thing is more like 99.5% have Condorcet winner. Right now, at least with the 440 RCV elections that FairVote says they analyzed, that all had Condorcet winners and all but one succeeded at electing the Condorcet winner.<br>
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I just sorta wanna get any Condorcet method. The simpler language the better. I think cycles will be rare. If we elect the plurality winner in case of a cycle, that might be an indication of preference. It's not Schulze. It might not elect the bestest candidate that disincentivizes certain tactical voting. But if simple language get a Condorcet method understood, it has a better chance of maybe someday getting legislated.<br>
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--<br>
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r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ <a href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">rbj@audioimagination.com</a><br>
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"Imagination is more important than knowledge."<br>
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