[EM] Quick and Clean Burial Resistant Smith

Richard, the VoteFair guy electionmethods at votefair.org
Fri Jan 7 17:42:01 PST 2022


On 1/7/2022 4:27 PM, Forest Simmons wrote:
 > Actually, neither RP nor Schulze has better Condorcet efficiency than
 > Smith//TopTwoRunOff, which is the simple method you should be aiming for.

To anyone, I have some questions (that might also be in the minds of a 
few lurkers).

How are the "top two" candidates determined according to the 
Smith//TopTwoRunoff method?

Or, where is Smith//TopTwoRunoff described? (I didn't find it in 
Electowiki.)

Since the topic is simplicity, how can ballots be hand counted to 
determine the Smith set?

Yes I know that pairwise counting can be done by having each person at a 
table keep track of only one pair of candidates -- as each ballot is 
passed from person to person.  But how can those pairwise vote counts be 
simply(!) converted into the Smith set -- for any set of ballots?

As a related question, how does "//" differ from "/"?  In other words, 
is Smith/TopTwoRunoff different from Smith//TopTwoRunoff, and if so, how?

Thanks!

Richard Fobes


On 1/7/2022 4:27 PM, Forest Simmons wrote:
> Robert,
>
> You opined ...
>
> "Probably Schulze or RP is the best thing to do for those cases when
> there is no Condorcet winner.  But getting that into legislative
> language is difficult, which is why I have advocated for BTR-STV."
>
> Actually, neither RP nor Schulze has better Condorcet efficiency than
> Smith//TopTwoRunOff, which is the simple method you should be aiming for.
>
> Here's the typical example that I used earlier today:
>
> 40 A>C
> 35 B>C
> 25 C>A
>
> The sincere CW is C, which any Condorcet method will elect in an ideal
> neighborhood, but only a burial resistant method like Q&D/C will
> reliably elect in a saavy, scrappy neighborhood.
>
> All of the standard (head-in-the-sand) Universal Domain methods like RP,
> Schulze, MinMax, etc. are more or less likely to elect A, depending on
> how politically saavy/street smart the A faction is.
>
> So those highly vaunted methods are no better than Condorcet completed
> byTopTwoRunoff, which produces the exact same result as they do 100
> percent of the time in this context, but much more simply.
>
> So TopTwoRunoff works just as well as Schulze for cycle resolution in
> this context, yet it is by far the most adoptable proposal for Condorcet
> completion.... because of its simplicity and familiarity.
>
> Don't worry about the legislative language .. just copy the language
> from existing jurisdictions where it is already in use ... with the
> simple tweak of replacing the phrase, "In the event there is no absolute
> majority candidate ..."  ... with the phrase, "In the event there is no
> head-to-head majority candidate ..."
>
> There is no valid excuse for proposing Plurality as a Condorcet finisher
> when this more adoptable proposal is there for the taking.
>
> Plurality as a finisher would be a huge liability/embarrassment even if
> you could get it adopted, which is doubtful.
>
> Fair Vote people would rightly mock a Condorcet method that in principle
> allows a Condorcet Loser to win.
>
> How would we prevent that happening?
>
> Of course we could say ... "In the event there is no majority
> head-to-head winner, elect the FPTP winner, unless all Plurality counts
> fall short of 50 percent, in which case complete the Plurality finisher
> with a TopTwoRunOff finisher, finisher."
>
> That wouldn't even make sense, because there could never be a 50% plus
> Plutality winner without already having a Condorcet Winner... since a 50
> percent plus Plurality winner is automatically a Condorcet Winner.
>
> I hate to be pedantic, but let's not squander our opportunity on an
> atrocious proposal. If there were not a simpler, more adoptable proposal
> readily available, I would say, "Go ahead, leave your keys in the car,
> cross your fingers, and take your chances!"
>
> In my humble, but expert opinion, there are only two tenable proposals
> for Burlington, Vt. at this time ...
>
> 1. Condorcet completed by TopTwoRunoff when necessary... of course under
> a more attractive name.
>
> 2. TopTwoRunoff restricted to the "top cycle" or "Smith Set" ... even
> more important to get a better name.
>
> This second method is just as good as Schulze for public elections, so
> don't pine for the day when the world is safe for Kemeny-Young, for
> Pete's sake!
>
> You should put the choice to the people who control the decision
> orocess. After making clear the prestige of an ISDA upgrade at
> practically no extra cost, let them decide between the two options.
>
> Either choice will result in a respectable method that cannot be easily
> gainsayed.
>
> Good Luck!
>
> -Forest


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