[EM] Quick and Clean Burial Resistant Smith

[Forest Simmons]

 Esteemed & Indefatigable Robert:

I used to think like you about Condorcet Completion, but after years of
designing methods based  on the assumption of innocent cycle creation, you
brought up the extreme rarity of Condorcet cycles among native voters ...
now you are quoting 99.5 percent cycle free ...which reinforces my about
face even more!

So here's the thing:

"Decisiones based on false assumptions lead to undesireable consequences."

For example, designing Condorcet completion methods on the false assumption
that cycles are usually created innocently/honestly/unintentionally has the
undesireable consequence of encouraging dishonest cycle creators, because
that false assumption allows the culprits to act with impunity

If you let them get away with it, they will do it more and more, making
ballot CW's less likely.

But if you punish it, they will stop doing it so that there will always be
a CW  .... which, in turn, will always be elected by Q&C, because it
satisfies Independence from Smith Dominated Alternatives.

In summary, the best Condorcet completion method is the one that is best at
discouraging cycle creation.

Because Schulze is more tolerant of cycle creation, it is less likely to
find a Condorcet winner ... Schulze is no better than the next method at
resurrecting buried CW's.

"An ounce of prevention ..."

It's better to install a guard rail at the top of a cliff than to park an
ambulance at the bottom of the cliff.

The whole point of Q&D/C is to show how simple it is to install an
effective guard rail compared to the academically reputable but complex and
ineffective ambulances like Schulze, RP, etc that naively assume that
cycles are created innocently ... just bad judgment, not intentional
dishonest manipulaion.

[I used to admire those methods, too, but not any more.They are more
complex but less effective than Quick&Dirty/Clean. Why? Because they put
all of their focus on reconstructing an intentionally contaminated signal
instead of preventing the contamination by making it back-fire. They were
designed before the importance of game theory was fully appreciated.]

If we don't think game theoretically, then we are at the mercy of the
gamers.

"Be as wise as serpents, but as harmless as doves."

I hope you know that I admire and appreciate your activism, and I
understand that Top Two Runoff may be the best politically feasible cycle
resolution method for now, but hope you can see the importance of a simple
manipulation resistant cycle resolution method in the long run.

Q&D/C guard rail at the top of the cliff trumps an elaborate RP/Schulze
hospital at the bottom!

My Best To You!

Forest




El vie., 7 de ene. de 2022 12:15 a. m., robert bristow-johnson <
rbj at audioimagination.com> escribió:

>
>
> > On 01/07/2022 1:05 AM Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21 at gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> > Most designers of Condorcet methods asume that the gentlemanly thing to
> do is to give the votes a benefit of a doubt and assume that they must have
> voted sincerely
>
> I just think that, without some other information to suggest otherwise,
> the marked ballot should be assumed to represent the voter's sincere
> preferences.
>
> > but cycles are a result of errores of judgement.
> >
>
> A preference cycle would need a very close 3-way race *and* and somewhat
> schizoid electorate.  "If I can't have my favorite Bernie Sanders, then I'm
> voting for T****."
>
> Probably Schulze or RP is the best thing to do for those cases when there
> is no Condorcet winner.  But getting that into legislative language is
> difficult, which is why I have advocated for BTR-STV.
>
> > Because of these assumptions they attempt to filter out the erroneous
> preferences statistically
>
> I just think that the method tries to make the best thing out of a
> confusing situation that will rarely happen.
>
> > .. the main heuristic is that larger majorities are less apt to hold
> erroneous opinions than smaller ones ... hence cycles are broken by
> annulling the defeats with the smallest majorities.
> >
>
> That's one way to do it.
>
> > I used to think that way, too.
> >
> > But seasoned election observers are of the opinion that the vast
> majority (more than 90 percent) of public elections for political office
> have a sincere Condorcet candidate, and that when there is a defeat cycle,
> it is more likely to be the result of intentional subversion of the
> Condorcet candidate than of erroneous voter judgment.
> >
>
> The thing is more like 99.5% have Condorcet winner.  Right now, at least
> with the 440 RCV elections that FairVote says they analyzed, that all had
> Condorcet winners and all but one succeeded at electing the Condorcet
> winner.
>
> I just sorta wanna get any Condorcet method.  The simpler language the
> better.  I think cycles will be rare.  If we elect the plurality winner in
> case of a cycle, that might be an indication of preference.  It's not
> Schulze.  It might not elect the bestest candidate that disincentivizes
> certain tactical voting.  But if simple language get a Condorcet method
> understood, it has a better chance of maybe someday getting legislated.
>
> --
>
> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
> .
> .
> .
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
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