[EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
Richard Lung
voting at ukscientists.com
Fri Jun 23 11:28:54 PDT 2017
I do agree that quantitative counts are better than qualitative counts
of "greater than". How much quantitative measurement extracted from the
voting data (rather than imposed on it) is a simple way to assess a
voting method's efficiency. Sooner or later, tho, the method has to
resort to less precisely based decisions of greater or lesser. This, by
the way, proves or shows that election results are generally
probabilistic rather than deterministic, and therefore cannot be
decisively judged by deductive standards of electoral efficiency (like
social choice theory).
My own election method (Binomial Transferable Vote) does not resort to
elimination of candidates during the count, to avoid a more or less
arbitrary plurality count (greater than) decision.
Richard Lung.
On 23/06/2017 13:35, Brian Olson wrote:
> I was speaking only of ballots, and and in the abstract that
> /some/ election algorithm could take that information and make a good
> outcome of it.
>
> I don't favor raw Score summation. It's strategy prone. For choices
> where my honest vote might be [1.0, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2, 0.0] I should
> probably vote strategically [1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0].
>
> And if you don't like that and the varying vote power depending on how
> you vote: I have a system for you!
> "Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings" (IRNR)
> Each ballot is normalized so that all ballots have the same magnitude.
> The modified ballots are summed, and the choice with the lowest
> sumarry rating is disqualified. Each ballot is then normalized again
> as if the disqualified choice was not there, redistributing the vote
> across the choices in proportion to the original ballot. The new
> modified ballots are summed and the process is repeated until there
> are two choices remaining and one choice wins over the other.
>
> I think this works better with an honest ballot in the case where you
> like some choice more than another 'just a little bit' or by whatever
> margin.
>
> /Brian
>
>
> On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 1:02 AM, robert bristow-johnson
> <rbj at audioimagination.com <mailto:rbj at audioimagination.com>> wrote:
>
> so many discussions here are more arcane than i can grok. but i
> can grok most of this.
>
>
> ---------------------------- Original Message
> ----------------------------
> Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off
> paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
> From: "Brian Olson" <bql at bolson.org <mailto:bql at bolson.org>>
> Date: Thu, June 22, 2017 4:31 pm
> To: "Richard Lung" <voting at ukscientists.com
> <mailto:voting at ukscientists.com>>
> Cc: "EM" <election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> <mailto:election-methods at lists.electorama.com>>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> > Compared to a rankings ballot, a ratings ballot contains more
> information
> > about a voter's preference or utility for the available choices.
> > I can say
> > A > B > C > D
> > or I can say with more detail
> > A = 1.0; B = 0.9; C = 0.1; D = 0.0
> >
> > If there is more information available, it is possible for an
> election
> > algorithm to use that information and more accurately represent
> the voters
> > and find the greater global utility winner.
>
> but voters can skew that information quantitatively and, if they
> want to be tactical, insincerely.
>
> how does the voter know that by rating Candidate B with 0.9 and
> not lower, that he is not helping this candidate beat his
> favorite, Candidate A? maybe it should be 0.8. or 0.5.
>
> while Score voting requires too much information from the voters
> (making them act as a trained expert and consider quantitatively
> how candidates should be rated as if they are an Olympic ice
> skating judge) and while Approval doesn't get enough information
> from voters (does not differentiate preference between two
> "approved" candidates), there has always been the problem of
> either Score voting or Approval voting facing the voter about what
> to do with their second choice (Candidate B). how much juice
> should the voter give to Candidate B if they want B to beat C but
> do not want B to beat A? (and for Approval, the question is,
> having the same concern, shall the voter "approve" B or not?)
>
> Score and Approval cannot answer that question in any simple
> manner. but with Ranked-Choice the answer is clear.
>
> and the other problem with Score is the "One-Person-One-Vote"
> standard. if i really, really, really like Candidate A over
> Candidate B and you only sorta like B over A by just a little bit,
> it should not matter to what disparate degree we like our
> candidates. your vote for B should weigh just as much as my vote
> for A, even if my excitement for A exceeds your excitement for B.
> that's what "one-person-one-vote" means.
>
> i still just do not get why Score and Approval (in application to
> governmental elections) have the following they do have.
>
> bestest,
>
> r b-j
>
>
> >
> > If we had a specially insightful rational bayesian voting
> populace we might
> > ask them for their confidence interval of how sure they are are
> about each
> > choice and get more information still.
> > A = 1.0 (e=.3); B = 0.9 (e=.1), C = 0.1 (e=0.5), D = 0.0 (e=0.1)
> >
> > And then we'd work out an election algorithm to maximize the
> expected value
> > of the global utility over the known voter utility distributions.
>
> and, except for making examples to show how a system breaks (like
> a Proof by Contradiction in mathematics), i just cannot see how
> judging the comparative value of systems with simulated
> assumptions is helpful. there are not enough simulated cases to
> be able to consider how any system will work under all conditions.
>
>
> > On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 2:47 PM, Richard Lung
> <voting at ukscientists.com <mailto:voting at ukscientists.com>>
> > wrote:
> >
> >>
> >> Brian Olson,
> >>
> >> Where we differ is that I do not see ranked choice as a
> constraint. Single
> >> order choice, the x-vote is the constraint on ranked voting as a
> >> multiple-order choice.
> >> The problem with election methods, practical and theoretical is
> that they
> >> impose constraints on the voters freedom of choice, in one way
> or another,
> >> and so are that much less true election methods.
> >> (A minor example, the classic objections to cumulative voting
> seem to
> >> apply to some apprently modern versions or variations.)
> >>
> >> When Condorcet and Borda, disagreed on the best way to conduct
> a count of
> >> preference voting, Laplace decided in favor of Borda. (I grant
> you that
> >> Condorcet has information value, when weighted. But I am not
> well informed
> >> on this approach and know of no convincing reason why it should
> be adopted
> >> or how you would persuade the public of that.) JFS Ross
> explained that
> >> Laplace favored Method Borda because higher preferences were
> more important
> >> and should count more. The Gregory method removes the objection
> to Borda of
> >> "later harm." This is the direction I have followed (weighted
> count of
> >> ranked choice), following on from where Meek method STV leaves off.
> >>
> >> Richard Lung
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On 22/06/2017 15:01, Brian Olson wrote:
> >>
> >> I kinda don't accept this paradox. Just to compare the form of
> a election
> >> method paradox statement: Arrow's theorem was that given a set
> of desired
> >> properties and the constraint of rankings ballots, those set of
> desirable
> >> properties could not all be simultaneously fulfilled. One can
> almost
> >> trivially step outside of that paradox by eliminating the
> constraint of the
> >> rankings ballot.
> >>
> >> My model of understanding people and elections is a utilitarian
> one. A
> >> person derives some amount of utility from the outcome of an
> election and
> >> everyone is apportioned the same share of utility which we
> might count as
> >> 0..1 or -1..1 . These model persons can be summed up and and a
> global
> >> social utility calculated. The ideal election method perfectly
> knows every
> >> person and elects the true global social utility maximizing
> candidate. This
> >> sounds an awful lot like score voting. But then we have to start to
> >> complicate the model with imperfect knowledge of a voter's
> utility, the
> >> imperfect expression of that on a ballot, strategic ballot
> casting rather
> >> than honest, messy computation and practical administration
> issues of
> >> running an election in the real world, and so on. So we might
> wind up with
> >> a best practical method that isn't just simple score voting.
> >>
> >> But I still believe there is a pragmatic 'best' method, we have
> techniques
> >> for evaluating that, and we should do this and put something up
> in the real
> >> world. Personally I'll take a rankings ballot that's Condorcet
> counted with
> >> any cycle resolution method as 'good enough' and practically
> applicable;
> >> and tinkering around the edges for a slightly better method is fun
> >> mathematical curiosity but I'd also like to get some laws passed.
> >>
> >> What do you think of my model statement?
> >> Is there a more formal statement of limitations you were
> heading towards?
> >>
> >>
> >> On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 2:30 AM, Richard Lung
> <voting at ukscientists.com <mailto:voting at ukscientists.com>>
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems
> paradox.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> For the sake of argument, suppose a trade-off theory of
> elections that
> >>> there is no consistently democratic electoral system: the
> impossibility
> >>> supposition.
> >>>
> >>> That supposition implies some conception (albeit non-existent)
> of a
> >>> consistently derived right election result.
> >>>
> >>> If there is no such measure, then there is no standard even to
> judge that
> >>> there is a trade-off between electoral systems.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Suppose there is a consistent theory of choice, setting a
> standard by
> >>> which electoral systems can be judged for their democratic
> consistency.
> >>>
> >>> It follows that the election result will only be as consistent
> as the
> >>> electoral system, and there is no pre-conceivably right
> election result,
> >>> because that presupposes a perfection not given to science as
> a progressive
> >>> pursuit.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> --
> >>> Richard Lung.http://www.voting.ukscientists.com
> <http://www.voting.ukscientists.com>
> >>> Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in
> pdf:https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085
> <https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085>
> >>> E-books <https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085E-books
> <https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085E-books>> in epub
> format:https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience
> <https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>
> >> --
> >> Richard Lung.http://www.voting.ukscientists.com
> <http://www.voting.ukscientists.com>
> >> Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in
> pdf:https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085
> <https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085>
> >> E-books in epub
> format:https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience
> <https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience>
> >>
> >>
>
>
> --
>
> r b-j rbj at audioimagination.com <mailto:rbj at audioimagination.com>
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
>
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Richard Lung.
http://www.voting.ukscientists.com
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085
E-books in epub format:
https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience
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