[EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.

Richard Lung voting at ukscientists.com
Fri Jun 23 00:23:22 PDT 2017


Ah yes, the old criticism against cumulative voting (made for instance 
by Enid Lakeman) is relevant here. Cumulative votes count against each 
other.
I suppose the basic objection is that voters cannot be also their own 
counters, because that is a function of peoples combined votes, not of 
individual voters.

BTW I didn't answer your previous question about a formal basis for my 
election method. It is based on work by SS Stevens on the scales of 
measurement, published in "Science" in the 1940s. Long ago, when  I was 
a young man, Unesco gave me a copyright for this.
Richard Lung.


On 22/06/2017 21:31, Brian Olson wrote:
> Compared to a rankings ballot, a ratings ballot contains more 
> information about a voter's preference or utility for the available 
> choices.
> I can say
> A > B > C > D
> or I can say with more detail
> A = 1.0; B = 0.9; C = 0.1; D = 0.0
>
> If there is more information available, it is possible for an election 
> algorithm to use that information and more accurately represent the 
> voters and find the greater global utility winner.
>
> If we had a specially insightful rational bayesian voting populace we 
> might ask them for their confidence interval of how sure they are are 
> about each choice and get more information still.
> A = 1.0 (e=.3); B = 0.9 (e=.1), C = 0.1 (e=0.5), D = 0.0 (e=0.1)
>
> And then we'd work out an election algorithm to maximize the expected 
> value of the global utility over the known voter utility distributions.
>
>
> On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 2:47 PM, Richard Lung <voting at ukscientists.com 
> <mailto:voting at ukscientists.com>> wrote:
>
>
>     Brian Olson,
>
>     Where we differ is that I do not see ranked choice as a
>     constraint. Single order choice, the x-vote is the constraint on
>     ranked voting as a multiple-order choice.
>     The problem with election methods, practical and theoretical is
>     that they impose constraints on the voters freedom of choice, in
>     one way or another, and so are that much less true election methods.
>     (A minor example, the classic objections to cumulative voting seem
>     to apply to some apprently modern versions or variations.)
>
>     When Condorcet and Borda, disagreed on the best way to conduct a
>     count of preference voting, Laplace decided in favor of Borda. (I
>     grant you that Condorcet has information value, when weighted. But
>     I am not well informed on this approach and know of no convincing
>     reason why it should be adopted or how you would persuade the
>     public of that.) JFS Ross explained that Laplace favored Method
>     Borda because higher preferences were more important and should
>     count more. The Gregory method removes the objection to Borda of
>     "later harm." This is the direction I have followed (weighted
>     count of ranked choice), following on from where Meek method STV
>     leaves off.
>
>     Richard Lung
>
>
>
>
>
>
>     On 22/06/2017 15:01, Brian Olson wrote:
>>     I kinda don't accept this paradox. Just to compare the form of a
>>     election method paradox statement: Arrow's theorem was that given
>>     a set of desired properties and the constraint of rankings
>>     ballots, those set of desirable properties could not all be
>>     simultaneously fulfilled. One can almost trivially step outside
>>     of that paradox by eliminating the constraint of the rankings ballot.
>>
>>     My model of understanding people and elections is a utilitarian
>>     one. A person derives some amount of utility from the outcome of
>>     an election and everyone is apportioned the same share of utility
>>     which we might count as 0..1 or -1..1 . These model persons can
>>     be summed up and and a global social utility calculated. The
>>     ideal election method perfectly knows every person and elects the
>>     true global social utility maximizing candidate. This sounds an
>>     awful lot like score voting. But then we have to start to
>>     complicate the model with imperfect knowledge of a voter's
>>     utility, the imperfect expression of that on a ballot, strategic
>>     ballot casting rather than honest, messy computation and
>>     practical administration issues of running an election in the
>>     real world, and so on. So we might wind up with a best practical
>>     method that isn't just simple score voting.
>>
>>     But I still believe there is a pragmatic 'best' method, we have
>>     techniques for evaluating that, and we should do this and put
>>     something up in the real world. Personally I'll take a rankings
>>     ballot that's Condorcet counted with any cycle resolution method
>>     as 'good enough' and practically applicable; and tinkering around
>>     the edges for a slightly better method is fun mathematical
>>     curiosity but I'd also like to get some laws passed.
>>
>>     What do you think of my model statement?
>>     Is there a more formal statement of limitations you were heading
>>     towards?
>>
>>
>>     On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 2:30 AM, Richard Lung
>>     <voting at ukscientists.com <mailto:voting at ukscientists.com>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>         The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems
>>         paradox.
>>
>>
>>         For the sake of argument, suppose a trade-off theory of
>>         elections that there is no consistently democratic electoral
>>         system: the impossibility supposition.
>>
>>         That supposition implies some conception (albeit
>>         non-existent) of a consistently derived right election result.
>>
>>         If there is no such measure, then there is no standard even
>>         to judge that there is a trade-off between electoral systems.
>>
>>         Suppose there is a consistent theory of choice, setting a
>>         standard by which electoral systems can be judged for their
>>         democratic consistency.
>>
>>         It follows that the election result will only be as
>>         consistent as the electoral system, and there is no
>>         pre-conceivably right election result, because that
>>         presupposes a perfection not given to science as a
>>         progressive pursuit.
>>
>>
>>
>>         -- 
>>         Richard Lung.
>>         http://www.voting.ukscientists.com  <http://www.voting.ukscientists.com>
>>         Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
>>         https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085
>>         E-books  <https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085E-books>  in epub format:
>>         https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience  <https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience>
>>
>>
>>         ----
>>         Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em
>>         for list info
>>
>>
>
>
>     -- 
>     Richard Lung.
>     http://www.voting.ukscientists.com  <http://www.voting.ukscientists.com>
>     Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
>     https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085  <https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085>
>     E-books in epub format:
>     https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience  <https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience>
>
>


-- 
Richard Lung.
http://www.voting.ukscientists.com
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085
E-books in epub format:
https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience


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