[EM] The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.
Richard Lung
voting at ukscientists.com
Fri Jun 23 00:23:22 PDT 2017
Ah yes, the old criticism against cumulative voting (made for instance
by Enid Lakeman) is relevant here. Cumulative votes count against each
other.
I suppose the basic objection is that voters cannot be also their own
counters, because that is a function of peoples combined votes, not of
individual voters.
BTW I didn't answer your previous question about a formal basis for my
election method. It is based on work by SS Stevens on the scales of
measurement, published in "Science" in the 1940s. Long ago, when I was
a young man, Unesco gave me a copyright for this.
Richard Lung.
On 22/06/2017 21:31, Brian Olson wrote:
> Compared to a rankings ballot, a ratings ballot contains more
> information about a voter's preference or utility for the available
> choices.
> I can say
> A > B > C > D
> or I can say with more detail
> A = 1.0; B = 0.9; C = 0.1; D = 0.0
>
> If there is more information available, it is possible for an election
> algorithm to use that information and more accurately represent the
> voters and find the greater global utility winner.
>
> If we had a specially insightful rational bayesian voting populace we
> might ask them for their confidence interval of how sure they are are
> about each choice and get more information still.
> A = 1.0 (e=.3); B = 0.9 (e=.1), C = 0.1 (e=0.5), D = 0.0 (e=0.1)
>
> And then we'd work out an election algorithm to maximize the expected
> value of the global utility over the known voter utility distributions.
>
>
> On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 2:47 PM, Richard Lung <voting at ukscientists.com
> <mailto:voting at ukscientists.com>> wrote:
>
>
> Brian Olson,
>
> Where we differ is that I do not see ranked choice as a
> constraint. Single order choice, the x-vote is the constraint on
> ranked voting as a multiple-order choice.
> The problem with election methods, practical and theoretical is
> that they impose constraints on the voters freedom of choice, in
> one way or another, and so are that much less true election methods.
> (A minor example, the classic objections to cumulative voting seem
> to apply to some apprently modern versions or variations.)
>
> When Condorcet and Borda, disagreed on the best way to conduct a
> count of preference voting, Laplace decided in favor of Borda. (I
> grant you that Condorcet has information value, when weighted. But
> I am not well informed on this approach and know of no convincing
> reason why it should be adopted or how you would persuade the
> public of that.) JFS Ross explained that Laplace favored Method
> Borda because higher preferences were more important and should
> count more. The Gregory method removes the objection to Borda of
> "later harm." This is the direction I have followed (weighted
> count of ranked choice), following on from where Meek method STV
> leaves off.
>
> Richard Lung
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On 22/06/2017 15:01, Brian Olson wrote:
>> I kinda don't accept this paradox. Just to compare the form of a
>> election method paradox statement: Arrow's theorem was that given
>> a set of desired properties and the constraint of rankings
>> ballots, those set of desirable properties could not all be
>> simultaneously fulfilled. One can almost trivially step outside
>> of that paradox by eliminating the constraint of the rankings ballot.
>>
>> My model of understanding people and elections is a utilitarian
>> one. A person derives some amount of utility from the outcome of
>> an election and everyone is apportioned the same share of utility
>> which we might count as 0..1 or -1..1 . These model persons can
>> be summed up and and a global social utility calculated. The
>> ideal election method perfectly knows every person and elects the
>> true global social utility maximizing candidate. This sounds an
>> awful lot like score voting. But then we have to start to
>> complicate the model with imperfect knowledge of a voter's
>> utility, the imperfect expression of that on a ballot, strategic
>> ballot casting rather than honest, messy computation and
>> practical administration issues of running an election in the
>> real world, and so on. So we might wind up with a best practical
>> method that isn't just simple score voting.
>>
>> But I still believe there is a pragmatic 'best' method, we have
>> techniques for evaluating that, and we should do this and put
>> something up in the real world. Personally I'll take a rankings
>> ballot that's Condorcet counted with any cycle resolution method
>> as 'good enough' and practically applicable; and tinkering around
>> the edges for a slightly better method is fun mathematical
>> curiosity but I'd also like to get some laws passed.
>>
>> What do you think of my model statement?
>> Is there a more formal statement of limitations you were heading
>> towards?
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 2:30 AM, Richard Lung
>> <voting at ukscientists.com <mailto:voting at ukscientists.com>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> The election methods trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems
>> paradox.
>>
>>
>> For the sake of argument, suppose a trade-off theory of
>> elections that there is no consistently democratic electoral
>> system: the impossibility supposition.
>>
>> That supposition implies some conception (albeit
>> non-existent) of a consistently derived right election result.
>>
>> If there is no such measure, then there is no standard even
>> to judge that there is a trade-off between electoral systems.
>>
>> Suppose there is a consistent theory of choice, setting a
>> standard by which electoral systems can be judged for their
>> democratic consistency.
>>
>> It follows that the election result will only be as
>> consistent as the electoral system, and there is no
>> pre-conceivably right election result, because that
>> presupposes a perfection not given to science as a
>> progressive pursuit.
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Richard Lung.
>> http://www.voting.ukscientists.com <http://www.voting.ukscientists.com>
>> Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
>> https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085
>> E-books <https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085E-books> in epub format:
>> https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience <https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience>
>>
>>
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>>
>>
>
>
> --
> Richard Lung.
> http://www.voting.ukscientists.com <http://www.voting.ukscientists.com>
> Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
> https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085 <https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085>
> E-books in epub format:
> https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience <https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience>
>
>
--
Richard Lung.
http://www.voting.ukscientists.com
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085
E-books in epub format:
https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience
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