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<big>Ah yes, the old criticism against cumulative voting (made for
instance by Enid Lakeman) is relevant here. Cumulative votes count
against each other. <br>
I suppose the basic objection is that voters cannot be also their
own counters, because that is a function of peoples combined
votes, not of individual voters.<br>
</big><br>
<big>BTW I didn't answer your previous question about a formal basis
for my election method. It is based on work by SS Stevens on the
scales of measurement, published in "Science" in the 1940s. Long
ago, when I was a young man, Unesco gave me a copyright for this.<br>
Richard Lung.</big><br>
<br>
<br>
On 22/06/2017 21:31, Brian Olson wrote:
<blockquote
cite="mid:CAHKqFyOTW6JFH+dMC-WVCZ5D5jxMO=h+N4-=Am_XD8-fvnQDLA@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new
roman,serif">Compared to a rankings ballot, a ratings ballot
contains more information about a voter's preference or
utility for the available choices.</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new
roman,serif">I can say</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new
roman,serif">A > B > C > D</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new
roman,serif">or I can say with more detail</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new
roman,serif">A = 1.0; B = 0.9; C = 0.1; D = 0.0</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new
roman,serif"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new
roman,serif">If there is more information available, it is
possible for an election algorithm to use that information and
more accurately represent the voters and find the greater
global utility winner.</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new
roman,serif"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new
roman,serif">If we had a specially insightful rational
bayesian voting populace we might ask them for their
confidence interval of how sure they are are about each choice
and get more information still.</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new
roman,serif">A = 1.0 (e=.3); B = 0.9 (e=.1), C = 0.1 (e=0.5),
D = 0.0 (e=0.1)</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new
roman,serif"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new
roman,serif">And then we'd work out an election algorithm to
maximize the expected value of the global utility over the
known voter utility distributions.</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new
roman,serif"><br>
</div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 2:47 PM,
Richard Lung <span dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:voting@ukscientists.com" target="_blank">voting@ukscientists.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000"> <br>
Brian Olson,<br>
<br>
Where we differ is that I do not see ranked choice as a
constraint. Single order choice, the x-vote is the
constraint on ranked voting as a multiple-order choice. <br>
The problem with election methods, practical and
theoretical is that they impose constraints on the voters
freedom of choice, in one way or another, and so are that
much less true election methods.<br>
(A minor example, the classic objections to cumulative
voting seem to apply to some apprently modern versions or
variations.)<br>
<br>
When Condorcet and Borda, disagreed on the best way to
conduct a count of preference voting, Laplace decided in
favor of Borda. (I grant you that Condorcet has
information value, when weighted. But I am not well
informed on this approach and know of no convincing reason
why it should be adopted or how you would persuade the
public of that.) JFS Ross explained that Laplace favored
Method Borda because higher preferences were more
important and should count more. The Gregory method
removes the objection to Borda of "later harm." This is
the direction I have followed (weighted count of ranked
choice), following on from where Meek method STV leaves
off. <br>
<span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"> <br>
Richard Lung</font></span>
<div>
<div class="h5"><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
On 22/06/2017 15:01, Brian Olson wrote:
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:times new roman,serif">I
kinda don't accept this paradox. Just to compare
the form of a election method paradox statement:
Arrow's theorem was that given a set of desired
properties and the constraint of rankings
ballots, those set of desirable properties could
not all be simultaneously fulfilled. One can
almost trivially step outside of that paradox by
eliminating the constraint of the rankings
ballot.</div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:times new roman,serif"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:times new roman,serif">My
model of understanding people and elections is a
utilitarian one. A person derives some amount of
utility from the outcome of an election and
everyone is apportioned the same share of
utility which we might count as 0..1 or -1..1 .
These model persons can be summed up and and a
global social utility calculated. The ideal
election method perfectly knows every person and
elects the true global social utility maximizing
candidate. This sounds an awful lot like score
voting. But then we have to start to complicate
the model with imperfect knowledge of a voter's
utility, the imperfect expression of that on a
ballot, strategic ballot casting rather than
honest, messy computation and practical
administration issues of running an election in
the real world, and so on. So we might wind up
with a best practical method that isn't just
simple score voting.</div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:times new roman,serif"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:times new roman,serif">But I
still believe there is a pragmatic 'best'
method, we have techniques for evaluating that,
and we should do this and put something up in
the real world. Personally I'll take a rankings
ballot that's Condorcet counted with any cycle
resolution method as 'good enough' and
practically applicable; and tinkering around the
edges for a slightly better method is fun
mathematical curiosity but I'd also like to get
some laws passed.</div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:times new roman,serif"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:times new roman,serif">What
do you think of my model statement?</div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:times new roman,serif">Is
there a more formal statement of limitations you
were heading towards?</div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:times new roman,serif"><br>
</div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at
2:30 AM, Richard Lung <span dir="ltr"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:voting@ukscientists.com"
target="_blank">voting@ukscientists.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0
0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc
solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000"> <br>
<br>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span>The election
methods trade-off paradox/impossibility
theorems paradox.<br>
</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span>For the sake of
argument, suppose a trade-off theory of
elections that there is no consistently
democratic electoral system: the
impossibility supposition.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span>That supposition
implies some conception (albeit
non-existent) of a consistently derived
right election result.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span>If there is no
such measure, then there is no standard
even to judge that there is a trade-off
between electoral systems.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span>Suppose there is
a consistent theory of choice, setting a
standard by which electoral systems can
be judged for their democratic
consistency.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span>It follows that
the election result will only be as
consistent as the electoral system, and
there is no pre-conceivably right
election result, because that
presupposes a perfection not given to
science as a progressive pursuit.<span
class="m_1002364532082318285HOEnZb"></span></span></p>
<span class="m_1002364532082318285HOEnZb"><font
color="#888888"> <span></span></font></span><span
class="m_1002364532082318285HOEnZb"><font
color="#888888"> <br>
<br>
<pre class="m_1002364532082318285m_2969095498426562027moz-signature" cols="72">--
Richard Lung.
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="http://www.voting.ukscientists.com" target="_blank">http://www.voting.ukscientists<wbr>.com</a>
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
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E-books</a> in epub format:
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</blockquote>
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</blockquote>
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<br>
<pre class="m_1002364532082318285moz-signature" cols="72">--
Richard Lung.
<a moz-do-not-send="true" class="m_1002364532082318285moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.voting.ukscientists.com" target="_blank">http://www.voting.<wbr>ukscientists.com</a>
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
<a moz-do-not-send="true" class="m_1002364532082318285moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085" target="_blank">https://plus.google.com/<wbr>106191200795605365085</a>
E-books in epub format:
<a moz-do-not-send="true" class="m_1002364532082318285moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience" target="_blank">https://www.smashwords.com/<wbr>profile/view/democracyscience</a>
</pre>
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</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
<pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">--
Richard Lung.
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.voting.ukscientists.com">http://www.voting.ukscientists.com</a>
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085">https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085</a>
E-books in epub format:
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience">https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience</a>
</pre>
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