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I do agree that quantitative counts are better than qualitative
counts of "greater than". How much quantitative measurement
extracted from the voting data (rather than imposed on it) is a
simple way to assess a voting method's efficiency. Sooner or later,
tho, the method has to resort to less precisely based decisions of
greater or lesser. This, by the way, proves or shows that election
results are generally probabilistic rather than deterministic, and
therefore cannot be decisively judged by deductive standards of
electoral efficiency (like social choice theory).<br>
My own election method (Binomial Transferable Vote) does not resort
to elimination of candidates during the count, to avoid a more or
less arbitrary plurality count (greater than) decision.<br>
Richard Lung.<br>
<br>
<br>
On 23/06/2017 13:35, Brian Olson wrote:
<blockquote
cite="mid:CAHKqFyPPfR5cMCTnksEd80PyU+LpOe-H1H-5DW8pVU36Jb565Q@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:"times new
roman",serif">I was speaking only of ballots, and and in
the abstract that <i>some</i> election algorithm could take
that information and make a good outcome of it.</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:"times new
roman",serif"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:"times new
roman",serif">I don't favor raw Score summation. It's
strategy prone. For choices where my honest vote might be
[1.0, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2, 0.0] I should probably vote
strategically [1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0].</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:"times new
roman",serif"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:"times new
roman",serif">And if you don't like that and the varying
vote power depending on how you vote: I have a system for you!</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:"times new
roman",serif">"Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings" (IRNR)</div>
<div class="gmail_default"><font face="times new roman, serif">Each
ballot is normalized so that all ballots have the same
magnitude. The modified ballots are summed, and the choice
with the lowest sumarry rating is disqualified. Each ballot
is then normalized again as if the disqualified choice was
not there, redistributing the vote across the choices in
proportion to the original ballot. The new modified ballots
are summed and the process is repeated until there are two
choices remaining and one choice wins over the other.</font><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default"><font face="times new roman, serif"><br>
</font></div>
<div class="gmail_default"><font face="times new roman, serif">I
think this works better with an honest ballot in the case
where you like some choice more than another 'just a little
bit' or by whatever margin.</font></div>
<div class="gmail_default"><font face="times new roman, serif"><br>
</font></div>
<div class="gmail_default"><font face="times new roman, serif">/Brian</font></div>
<div class="gmail_default"><font face="times new roman, serif"><br>
</font></div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 1:02 AM, robert
bristow-johnson <span dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com" target="_blank">rbj@audioimagination.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<p>so many discussions here are more arcane than i can grok.
but i can grok most of this.</p>
<p><br>
---------------------------- Original Message
----------------------------<br>
Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off
paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.<br>
From: "Brian Olson" <<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:bql@bolson.org" target="_blank">bql@bolson.org</a>><br>
Date: Thu, June 22, 2017 4:31 pm<br>
To: "Richard Lung" <<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:voting@ukscientists.com" target="_blank">voting@ukscientists.com</a>><br>
Cc: "EM" <<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com"
target="_blank">election-methods@lists.<wbr>electorama.com</a>><br>
------------------------------<wbr>------------------------------<wbr>--------------<span
class=""><br>
<br>
> Compared to a rankings ballot, a ratings ballot
contains more information<br>
> about a voter's preference or utility for the
available choices.<br>
> I can say<br>
> A > B > C > D<br>
> or I can say with more detail<br>
> A = 1.0; B = 0.9; C = 0.1; D = 0.0<br>
><br>
> If there is more information available, it is
possible for an election<br>
> algorithm to use that information and more
accurately represent the voters<br>
> and find the greater global utility winner.<br>
<br>
</span>
but voters can skew that information quantitatively and,
if they want to be tactical, insincerely.</p>
<p>how does the voter know that by rating Candidate B with
0.9 and not lower, that he is not helping this candidate
beat his favorite, Candidate A? maybe it should be 0.8.
or
0.5.</p>
<p>while Score voting requires too much information from the
voters (making them act as a trained expert and consider
quantitatively how candidates should be rated as if they
are an Olympic ice skating judge) and while Approval
doesn't get enough information from voters (does not
differentiate preference between two "approved"
candidates), there has always been the problem of either
Score voting or Approval voting facing the voter about
what to do with their second choice (Candidate B). how
much juice should the voter give to Candidate B if they
want B to
beat C but do not want B to beat A? (and for Approval,
the question is, having the same concern, shall the voter
"approve" B or not?)<br>
<br>
Score and Approval cannot answer that question in any
simple manner. but with Ranked-Choice the answer is
clear.</p>
<p>and the other problem with Score is the
"One-Person-One-Vote" standard. if i really, really,
really like Candidate A over Candidate B and you only
sorta like B
over A by just a little bit, it should not matter to what
disparate degree we like our candidates. your vote for B
should weigh just as much as my vote for A, even if my
excitement for A exceeds your excitement for B. that's
what "one-person-one-vote" means.</p>
<p>i still just
do not get why Score and Approval (in application to
governmental elections) have the following they do have.</p>
<p>bestest,</p>
<p>r b-j</p>
<span class="">
<p><br>
><br>
> If we had a specially insightful rational bayesian
voting populace we might<br>
> ask them for their confidence interval of how sure
they are are about each<br>
> choice and get more information still.<br>
> A = 1.0 (e=.3); B = 0.9 (e=.1), C = 0.1 (e=0.5), D
= 0.0 (e=0.1)<br>
><br>
> And then we'd work out an election algorithm to
maximize the expected value<br>
> of the global utility over the known voter utility
distributions.<br>
</p>
</span>
<p>and, except for making examples to show how a system
breaks (like a Proof by Contradiction in mathematics), i
just cannot see how judging the comparative value of
systems with simulated assumptions is helpful. there are
not enough simulated cases to be able to consider how any
system will work under all conditions.</p>
<p> </p>
<div>
<div class="h5"><br>
> On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 2:47 PM, Richard Lung <<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:voting@ukscientists.com" target="_blank">voting@ukscientists.com</a>><br>
> wrote:<br>
><br>
>><br>
>> Brian Olson,<br>
>><br>
>> Where we differ is that I do not see ranked
choice as a constraint. Single<br>
>> order choice, the x-vote is the constraint on
ranked voting as a<br>
>> multiple-order choice.<br>
>> The problem with election methods, practical
and theoretical is that they<br>
>> impose constraints on the voters freedom of
choice, in one way or another,<br>
>> and so are that much less true election
methods.<br>
>> (A minor example, the classic objections to
cumulative voting seem to<br>
>> apply to some apprently modern versions or
variations.)<br>
>><br>
>> When Condorcet and Borda, disagreed on the best
way to conduct a count of<br>
>> preference voting, Laplace decided in favor of
Borda. (I grant you that<br>
>> Condorcet has information value, when weighted.
But I am not well informed<br>
>> on this approach and know of no convincing
reason why it should be adopted<br>
>> or how you would persuade the public of that.)
JFS Ross explained that<br>
>> Laplace favored Method Borda because higher
preferences were more important<br>
>> and should count more. The Gregory method
removes the objection to Borda of<br>
>> "later harm." This is the direction I have
followed (weighted count of<br>
>> ranked choice), following on from where Meek
method STV leaves off.<br>
>><br>
>> Richard Lung<br>
>><br>
>><br>
>><br>
>><br>
>><br>
>><br>
>> On 22/06/2017 15:01, Brian Olson wrote:<br>
>><br>
>> I kinda don't accept this paradox. Just to
compare the form of a election<br>
>> method paradox statement: Arrow's theorem was
that given a set of desired<br>
>> properties and the constraint of rankings
ballots, those set of desirable<br>
>> properties could not all be simultaneously
fulfilled. One can almost<br>
>> trivially step outside of that paradox by
eliminating the constraint of the<br>
>> rankings ballot.<br>
>><br>
>> My model of understanding people and elections
is a utilitarian one. A<br>
>> person derives some amount of utility from the
outcome of an election and<br>
>> everyone is apportioned the same share of
utility which we might count as<br>
>> 0..1 or -1..1 . These model persons can be
summed up and and a global<br>
>> social utility calculated. The ideal election
method perfectly knows every<br>
>> person and elects the true global social
utility maximizing candidate. This<br>
>> sounds an awful lot like score voting. But then
we have to start to<br>
>> complicate the model with imperfect knowledge
of a voter's utility, the<br>
>> imperfect expression of that on a ballot,
strategic ballot casting rather<br>
>> than honest, messy computation and practical
administration issues of<br>
>> running an election in the real world, and so
on. So we might wind up with<br>
>> a best practical method that isn't just simple
score voting.<br>
>><br>
>> But I still believe there is a pragmatic 'best'
method, we have techniques<br>
>> for evaluating that, and we should do this and
put something up in the real<br>
>> world. Personally I'll take a rankings ballot
that's Condorcet counted with<br>
>> any cycle resolution method as 'good enough'
and practically applicable;<br>
>> and tinkering around the edges for a slightly
better method is fun<br>
>> mathematical curiosity but I'd also like to get
some laws passed.<br>
>><br>
>> What do you think of my model statement?<br>
>> Is there a more formal statement of limitations
you were heading towards?<br>
>><br>
>><br>
>> On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 2:30 AM, Richard Lung
<<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:voting@ukscientists.com" target="_blank">voting@ukscientists.com</a>><br>
>> wrote:<br>
>><br>
>>><br>
>>><br>
>>> The election methods trade-off
paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.<br>
>>><br>
>>><br>
>>> For the sake of argument, suppose a
trade-off theory of elections that<br>
>>> there is no consistently democratic
electoral system: the impossibility<br>
>>> supposition.<br>
>>><br>
>>> That supposition implies some conception
(albeit non-existent) of a<br>
>>> consistently derived right election result.<br>
>>><br>
>>> If there is no such measure, then there is
no standard even to judge that<br>
>>> there is a trade-off between electoral
systems.<br>
>>><br>
>>><br>
>>><br>
>>> Suppose there is a consistent theory of
choice, setting a standard by<br>
>>> which electoral systems can be judged for
their democratic consistency.<br>
>>><br>
>>> It follows that the election result will
only be as consistent as the<br>
>>> electoral system, and there is no
pre-conceivably right election result,<br>
>>> because that presupposes a perfection not
given to science as a progressive<br>
>>> pursuit.<br>
>>><br>
>>><br>
>>> --<br>
</div>
</div>
>>> Richard Lung.<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://www.voting.ukscientists.com" target="_blank">http://www.voting.<wbr>ukscientists.com</a><span
class=""><br>
>>> Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in
pdf:<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085"
target="_blank">https://plus.google.com/<wbr>106191200795605365085</a><br>
</span>
>>> E-books <<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085E-books"
target="_blank">https://plus.google.com/<wbr>106191200795605365085E-books</a>>
in epub format:<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience"
target="_blank">https://www.smashwords.<wbr>com/profile/view/<wbr>democracyscience</a><br>
>>><br>
>>><br>
>><br>
>> --<br>
>> Richard Lung.<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://www.voting.ukscientists.com" target="_blank">http://www.voting.<wbr>ukscientists.com</a><span
class=""><br>
>> Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085"
target="_blank">https://plus.google.com/<wbr>106191200795605365085</a><br>
>> E-books in epub format:<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience"
target="_blank">https://www.smashwords.<wbr>com/profile/view/<wbr>democracyscience</a><br>
>><br>
>><br>
<br>
<br>
--</span>
<p>r b-j <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com" target="_blank">rbj@audioimagination.com</a></p>
<p>"Imagination is more important than knowledge."</p>
<br>
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for list info<br>
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</blockquote>
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<br>
<pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">--
Richard Lung.
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.voting.ukscientists.com">http://www.voting.ukscientists.com</a>
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085">https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085</a>
E-books in epub format:
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience">https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience</a>
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