[EM] Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.

Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn at gmail.com
Thu Sep 8 14:39:21 PDT 2016

2016-09-08 17:13 GMT-04:00 C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au>:

> C: But above you are suggesting that U/P somehow uses a both a 2-slot
> ballot and a 3-slot ballot.  Which is it?
> J:3 slots. Where and how do I suggest otherwise?
> J: "On the 3-slot ballots, they vote A>B. On the 2-slot ballots, they vote
> A. These are perfectly consistent."
> C: That was in response to me asking you how, in an example you gave, how
> some voters were able to vote one
> "unacceptable" candidate above another (they voted A>>B>C).

"On the 2-slot ballots" means "in the election as conducted under simple

And I now notice that is that last clause that makes it different from
> U/P.  When no candidate is majority approved it can give
> a different result.
> I would say usually the Approval winner pairwise-beats the Top-Ratings
> winner, and of course is  more "broadly supported".

The point is to minimize the chance of this situation happening in the
first place; or, equivalently, to make it as strategically unstable as
possible. Taking the strategic pressure off of approvals (and thus putting
it onto top-ratings) is the way to do that. The more successful this rule
is in this purpose, the less often the rule will be invoked. (Rules with
this property are not uncommon in mechanism design.)
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