[EM] Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.

[Toby Pereira]

This thread is getting increasingly difficult to follow. Am I to take it that the definition in the bit quoted from 9/9/2016 at 12:39 is the latest definition of U/P? As that time is currently in the future for the UK and anywhere west of it (and conveniently 9/9 means the same wherever you go), it should be fairly up-to-date!

But now I see this bit about having a note by candidates' names if they got majority unacceptable in the last election - what is this madness? What does this achieve? Presumably most candidates standing would get majority unacceptable as it would probably be most people's default rating. Obviously it's better than excluding them, but unless I've missed a chunk of conversation, this seems like a fairly arbitrary punishment to hand out to losers.


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On Thu, 8/9/16, C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au> wrote:

 Subject: Re: [EM] Fwd: U/P voting: new name for simple 3-level method.
 To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
 Date: Thursday, 8 September, 2016, 20:20
 
 
     On 9/9/2016
 12:39 AM, Jameson Quinn
       wrote:
 
       
 
       The main advantage of U/P
           voting over other systems like MJ or MCA is
 simplicity of
           description. So I'm going to try to describe
 it as simply as
           possible.
           
 
           
           To vote, you rate each person running as
 "preferred",
             "acceptable", or
 "unacceptable". You can rate any number at
             each level.
           
 
           
           If more than half of voters rate a person
 "unacceptable",
             that person can't win, unless the same is
 true of all the
             people running. Of those remaining, the winner
 is the one
             rated "preferred" by the most
 voters.
           
 
           
         
       
 
       C:  By this definition, the U/P method uses a simple
 3-slot ballot
       just like MTA and MCA.
 
       
 
       
           
             C:  Again, I'd be interested in seeing a
 plausible example
             of when U/P doesn't elect the Approval
 winner.
 
             
 
             Easy.
 
             20: A>>B>C
 
             35: B>A>>C
 
             45: C>>A=B
 
             
 
             Threshold in approval is >>. In U/P,
 voters are as
             expressive as possible.
 
           
           
 
         
         C: On 3-slot ratings ballots, how are the 20 A
 supporters able
         to vote one unapproved candidate above the
 other?
       
 
       On the 3-slot ballots, they
 vote A>B.
         On the 2-slot ballots, they vote A. These are
 perfectly
         consistent.
       
 
       C: But above you are suggesting that U/P somehow uses
 a both a
       2-slot ballot and a 3-slot ballot.  Which is it?
 
       
 
       Actually it seems to me that the stripped-down 3-slot
 version (if
       default rating is "Unacceptable") is
 actually the same method
 
       as MTA. "Unacceptable" is just the inverse
 of "Approved".  Any
       candidate who doesn't get a majority
 "Unacceptable" score must
 
       get a majority Approval score.   
 
       
 
       I prefer MTA's more positive wording.  In U/P it
 seems as though
       the middle rating slot doesn't do anything.
 
       
 
       Any candidate, including an
           incumbent, who had gotten over 50%
 "unacceptable" in the prior
           election would have a note to that effect next to
 their name
           on the ballot. (In prior messages, I'd
 suggested not allowing
           them on the ballot. I now think that allowing them
 on, but
           with a note, would be
 better.)
       
 
       C: Yes, that is far less draconian, a big improvement,
 and not a
       big deal.  I suppose there's nothing wrong with a
 bit of history.
 
       
 
       Chris Benham
 
       
 
       
 
     
     
 
   
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