[EM] (3) MJ -- The easiest method to 'tolerate'

C.Benham cbenham at adam.com.au
Thu Sep 8 11:11:32 PDT 2016

On 9/8/2016 7:59 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

> It is not more complicated than MTA; it's the same.
>     Its extra complexity over
>     those methods doesn't seem to buy much.
>     if you include in U/P 's explanation all the palaver about the
>     default ratings it becomes quite long and complex.
> So don't.

C:How default ratings are handled is an important part of the method's 
definition. Default ratings should be handled in a
way that is simple, clear and consistent. Normally the default rating 
should be bottom-most, but if say a score ballot is
used that includes positive and negative numbers it might be at least 
understandable and plausible to use zero as the default

Having some complex rule according to which default ratings are handled 
one way or another depending on what other voters
did is absurd and not justified.

Also U/P uses a more complex ballot than either MTA or 3-slot IBIFA.  It 
allows voters to give a candidate more than one mark.

Taking the full descriptions of the 3 methods into account, U/P is much 
more complex than MTA and has a longer and not less
complex description than 3-slot IBIFA's.

BTW in all the examples (at least the ones where the voters confine 
themselves to using no more than one of the 3 marks/ratings for
each candidate), U/P  gives the same result as MTA.

Can we perhaps see an example where you think U/P gives a better result 
than MTA?

The provision you've stuck on to U/P about hobbling "majority rejected" 
candidates in the following election is (it bears repeating)
unfair, undemocratic, rigid, vindictive and absurd.

If you're looking for something "NOTA"-like then you could give the 
voters the possibility of giving the winner a shorter-than-usual
term. So they could mark as many candidates as they like with L or S, 
and if for the winner more than half the voters gave hir an S,
then that winner would serve a short term.

But that is a very radical proposal that would usually be 
unconstitutional, and I don't consider it to be really part of the 
election method.

> If you want the thing you were expecting, then:
> 30: A>B
> 25: B>A
> 5: C>B
> 40: C

C: I wasn't particularly "expecting"  anything, but thanks.  Here U/P  
(along with the simpler MTA) manages to not elect the candidate
that is both the Approval winner and the Condorcet winner.

B > C  55-45,    B > A  35-30.    Approval scores: B 60,  A 55,  C 
45.    U/P  elects A.

It happens that normal Bucklin and MCA elect B.  Needless to say my two 
favourite FBC-complying methods, IBIFA and  TTR,MinGS(erw)
both also elect B.

>> Condorcet versus Majority Condorcet: I do not believe in the concept 
>> of "irrelevant ballots", or that we should "simplify" a scenario by 
>> removing a balanced set of ballots. 
> C: Why not?
> Because I think it matters if a candidate was opposed (bottom-ranked) 
> by a majority.

C: And why do you think that?  Who qualifies to be part of this 
"majority"?  Is the majority threshold based on the number of people who 
were marked as having voted,
or the number of valid ballots?

If I turn up and lodge a blank ballot-paper, is my "vote" counted as 
"opposing all the candidates"?    When "bottom-ranked" includes 
equal-bottom ranked or rated, then it can
look like an odd idea. Suppose I turn up to to bullet-vote for my 
(sure-loser) cousin and don't know anything about the other candidates, 
should my supposed "opposition" to
all the other candidates affect the result?

Chris Benham


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