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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 9/8/2016 7:59 AM, Jameson Quinn
wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div>It is not more complicated than MTA; it's the same.</div>
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<div> Its extra complexity over<br>
those methods doesn't seem to buy much.<br>
<br>
if you include in U/P 's explanation all the palaver about
the default ratings it becomes quite long and complex. </div>
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</blockquote>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>So don't.</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
C:How default ratings are handled is an important part of the
method's definition. Default ratings should be handled in a<br>
way that is simple, clear and consistent. Normally the default
rating should be bottom-most, but if say a score ballot is<br>
used that includes positive and negative numbers it might be at
least understandable and plausible to use zero as the default<br>
score.<br>
<br>
Having some complex rule according to which default ratings are
handled one way or another depending on what other voters<br>
did is absurd and not justified.<br>
<br>
Also U/P uses a more complex ballot than either MTA or 3-slot
IBIFA. It allows voters to give a candidate more than one mark.<br>
<br>
Taking the full descriptions of the 3 methods into account, U/P is
much more complex than MTA and has a longer and not less<br>
complex description than 3-slot IBIFA's.<br>
<br>
BTW in all the examples (at least the ones where the voters
confine themselves to using no more than one of the 3
marks/ratings for<br>
each candidate), U/P gives the same result as MTA.<br>
<br>
Can we perhaps see an example where you think U/P gives a better
result than MTA?<br>
<br>
The provision you've stuck on to U/P about hobbling "majority
rejected" candidates in the following election is (it bears
repeating)<br>
unfair, undemocratic, rigid, vindictive and absurd.<br>
<br>
If you're looking for something "NOTA"-like then you could give
the voters the possibility of giving the winner a
shorter-than-usual <br>
term. So they could mark as many candidates as they like with L or
S, and if for the winner more than half the voters gave hir an S,<br>
then that winner would serve a short term.<br>
<br>
But that is a very radical proposal that would usually be
unconstitutional, and I don't consider it to be really part of the
election method.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div>If you want the thing you were expecting, then:</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>30: A>B</div>
<div>25: B>A</div>
<div>5: C>B</div>
<div>40: C</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
C: I wasn't particularly "expecting" anything, but thanks. Here
U/P (along with the simpler MTA) manages to not elect the
candidate<br>
that is both the Approval winner and the Condorcet winner.<br>
<br>
B > C 55-45, B > A 35-30. Approval scores: B 60, A
55, C 45. U/P elects A. <br>
<br>
It happens that normal Bucklin and MCA elect B. Needless to say
my two favourite FBC-complying methods, IBIFA and TTR,MinGS(erw)<br>
both also elect B.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><span class="">
<blockquote type="cite">Condorcet versus Majority Condorcet: I
do not believe in the concept of "irrelevant ballots", or
that we should "simplify" a scenario by removing a balanced
set of ballots. </blockquote>
<br>
</span> C: Why not?
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Because I think it matters if a candidate was opposed
(bottom-ranked) by a majority.</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
C: And why do you think that? Who qualifies to be part of this
"majority"? Is the majority threshold based on the number of
people who were marked as having voted,<br>
or the number of valid ballots? <br>
<br>
If I turn up and lodge a blank ballot-paper, is my "vote" counted
as "opposing all the candidates"? When "bottom-ranked" includes
equal-bottom ranked or rated, then it can<br>
look like an odd idea. Suppose I turn up to to bullet-vote for my
(sure-loser) cousin and don't know anything about the other
candidates, should my supposed "opposition" to<br>
all the other candidates affect the result?<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
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