[EM] Fwd: (3) MJ -- The easiest method to 'tolerate'
jameson.quinn at gmail.com
Thu Sep 8 11:59:52 PDT 2016
2016-09-08 14:11 GMT-04:00 C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au>:
> On 9/8/2016 7:59 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> It is not more complicated than MTA; it's the same.
>> Its extra complexity over
>> those methods doesn't seem to buy much.
>> if you include in U/P 's explanation all the palaver about the default
>> ratings it becomes quite long and complex.
> So don't.
> C:How default ratings are handled is an important part of the method's
> definition. Default ratings should be handled in a
> way that is simple, clear and consistent. Normally the default rating
> should be bottom-most, but if say a score ballot is
> used that includes positive and negative numbers it might be at least
> understandable and plausible to use zero as the default
For me, the bottom line with default ratings is to have clear, unambiguous
rules that approximate the will of the voter as closely as possible.
Simplicity is a concern, but secondary to intent.
I understand you disagree on these axioms. I think that now we've both
stated our axioms, further debate won't go anywhere.
> Also U/P uses a more complex ballot than either MTA or 3-slot IBIFA. It
> allows voters to give a candidate more than one mark.
Um. I am assuming that the ballot is a piece of paper. Paper is a
technology that admits an unlimited number of marks. The fact that I
explicitly stated what I would do when such marks were made, while you did
not in describing IBIFA, is neither here nor there.
> Taking the full descriptions of the 3 methods into account, U/P is much
> more complex than MTA and has a longer and not less
> complex description than 3-slot IBIFA's.
Again, if you believe this, let's do the person-on-the-street test. Or if
you'd like to propose some other test, I may agree that it's fair. Each
side asserting things is not a test.
> BTW in all the examples (at least the ones where the voters confine
> themselves to using no more than one of the 3 marks/ratings for
> each candidate), U/P gives the same result as MTA.
> Can we perhaps see an example where you think U/P gives a better result
> than MTA?
1: strategic ego with good information about others' likely ballots (to
within an error lower than the relevant margin). Honest preferences are
B>A. Strategic options are B or B>A. In MTA, truncation strategy would work
for this voter, so they vote B; in U/P, it wouldn't, so they vote B>A
> The provision you've stuck on to U/P about hobbling "majority rejected"
> candidates in the following election is (it bears repeating)
> unfair, undemocratic, rigid, vindictive and absurd.
More naked assertions.
Yet again: I've consistently said that IBIFA is a great system. You're
claiming that U/P, which would give the same result in a large majority of
realistic scenarios, is all kinds of bad things. Which one of us is being
> If you're looking for something "NOTA"-like then you could give the voters
> the possibility of giving the winner a shorter-than-usual
> term. So they could mark as many candidates as they like with L or S, and
> if for the winner more than half the voters gave hir an S,
> then that winner would serve a short term.
Um. I'm really speechless.
It seems to me that your suggestion is similar enough to mine that I cannot
fathom why you put a moral gulf between them. I can imagine arguments that
yours is better or vice versa, but those would be in terms of marginal
differences, not a night-and-day gap.
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