[EM] Fwd: (3) MJ -- The easiest method to 'tolerate'

Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn at gmail.com
Thu Sep 8 11:59:52 PDT 2016

2016-09-08 14:11 GMT-04:00 C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au>:

> On 9/8/2016 7:59 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> It is not more complicated than MTA; it's the same.
>> Its extra complexity over
>> those methods doesn't seem to buy much.
>> if you include in U/P 's explanation all the palaver about the default
>> ratings it becomes quite long and complex.
> So don't.
> C:How default ratings are handled is an important part of the method's
> definition. Default ratings should be handled in a
> way that is simple, clear and consistent. Normally the default rating
> should be bottom-most, but if say a score ballot is
> used that includes positive and negative numbers it might be at least
> understandable and plausible to use zero as the default
> score.

For me, the bottom line with default ratings is to have clear, unambiguous
rules that approximate the will of the voter as closely as possible.
Simplicity is a concern, but secondary to intent.

I understand you disagree on these axioms. I think that now we've both
stated our axioms, further debate won't go anywhere.

> Also U/P uses a more complex ballot than either MTA or 3-slot IBIFA.  It
> allows voters to give a candidate more than one mark.

Um. I am assuming that the ballot is a piece of paper. Paper is a
technology that admits an unlimited number of marks. The fact that I
explicitly stated what I would do when such marks were made, while you did
not in describing IBIFA, is neither here nor there.

> Taking the full descriptions of the 3 methods into account, U/P is much
> more complex than MTA and has a longer and not less
> complex description than 3-slot IBIFA's.

Again, if you believe this, let's do the person-on-the-street test. Or if
you'd like to propose some other test, I may agree that it's fair. Each
side asserting things is not a test.

> BTW in all the examples (at least the ones where the voters confine
> themselves to using no more than one of the 3 marks/ratings for
> each candidate), U/P  gives the same result as MTA.
> Can we perhaps see an example where you think U/P gives a better result
> than MTA?

40: C
35: A>B
24: B>A
1: strategic ego with good information about others' likely ballots (to
within an error lower than the relevant margin). Honest preferences are
B>A. Strategic options are B or B>A. In MTA, truncation strategy would work
for this voter, so they vote B; in U/P, it wouldn't, so they vote B>A

> The provision you've stuck on to U/P about hobbling "majority rejected"
> candidates in the following election is (it bears repeating)
> unfair, undemocratic, rigid, vindictive and absurd.

More naked assertions.

Yet again: I've consistently said that IBIFA is a great system. You're
claiming that U/P, which would give the same result in a large majority of
realistic scenarios, is all kinds of bad things. Which one of us is being

> If you're looking for something "NOTA"-like then you could give the voters
> the possibility of giving the winner a shorter-than-usual
> term. So they could mark as many candidates as they like with L or S, and
> if for the winner more than half the voters gave hir an S,
> then that winner would serve a short term.

Um. I'm really speechless.


It seems to me that your suggestion is similar enough to mine that I cannot
fathom why you put a moral gulf between them. I can imagine arguments that
yours is better or vice versa, but those would be in terms of marginal
differences, not a night-and-day gap.
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