<div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><span class="">2016-09-08 14:11 GMT-04:00 C.Benham <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" target="_blank">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>></span>:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
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<div><span>On 9/8/2016 7:59 AM, Jameson Quinn
wrote:<br>
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<div>It is not more complicated than MTA; it's the same.</div>
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<div> Its extra complexity over<br>
those methods doesn't seem to buy much.<br>
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if you include in U/P 's explanation all the palaver about
the default ratings it becomes quite long and complex. </div>
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<div>So don't.</div>
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C:How default ratings are handled is an important part of the
method's definition. Default ratings should be handled in a<br>
way that is simple, clear and consistent. Normally the default
rating should be bottom-most, but if say a score ballot is<br>
used that includes positive and negative numbers it might be at
least understandable and plausible to use zero as the default<br>
score.<br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>For me, the bottom line with default ratings is to have clear, unambiguous rules that approximate the will of the voter as closely as possible. Simplicity is a concern, but secondary to intent. </div><div><br></div><div>I understand you disagree on these axioms. I think that now we've both stated our axioms, further debate won't go anywhere.</div><span class=""><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000"><div>
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Also U/P uses a more complex ballot than either MTA or 3-slot
IBIFA. It allows voters to give a candidate more than one mark.<br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>Um. I am assuming that the ballot is a piece of paper. Paper is a technology that admits an unlimited number of marks. The fact that I explicitly stated what I would do when such marks were made, while you did not in describing IBIFA, is neither here nor there.</div><span class=""><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000"><div>
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Taking the full descriptions of the 3 methods into account, U/P is
much more complex than MTA and has a longer and not less<br>
complex description than 3-slot IBIFA's.<br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>Again, if you believe this, let's do the person-on-the-street test. Or if you'd like to propose some other test, I may agree that it's fair. Each side asserting things is not a test.</div><span class=""><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000"><div>
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BTW in all the examples (at least the ones where the voters
confine themselves to using no more than one of the 3
marks/ratings for<br>
each candidate), U/P gives the same result as MTA.<br>
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Can we perhaps see an example where you think U/P gives a better
result than MTA?<br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>40: C</div><div>35: A>B</div><div>24: B>A</div><div>1: strategic ego with good information about others' likely ballots (to within an error lower than the relevant margin). Honest preferences are B>A. Strategic options are B or B>A. In MTA, truncation strategy would work for this voter, so they vote B; in U/P, it wouldn't, so they vote B>A honestly.</div><span class=""><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000"><div>
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The provision you've stuck on to U/P about hobbling "majority
rejected" candidates in the following election is (it bears
repeating)<br>
unfair, undemocratic, rigid, vindictive and absurd.<br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>More naked assertions.</div><div><br></div><div>Yet again: I've consistently said that IBIFA is a great system. You're claiming that U/P, which would give the same result in a large majority of realistic scenarios, is all kinds of bad things. Which one of us is being absurd?</div><span class=""><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000"><div>
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If you're looking for something "NOTA"-like then you could give
the voters the possibility of giving the winner a
shorter-than-usual <br>
term. So they could mark as many candidates as they like with L or
S, and if for the winner more than half the voters gave hir an S,<br>
then that winner would serve a short term.<br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>Um. I'm really speechless.</div><div><br></div><div>...</div><div><br></div><div>It seems to me that your suggestion is similar enough to mine that I cannot fathom why you put a moral gulf between them. I can imagine arguments that yours is better or vice versa, but those would be in terms of marginal differences, not a night-and-day gap.</div></div></div></div>
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