[EM] Fwd: XA

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Sat Oct 29 14:19:59 PDT 2016


So XA fails Participation. So what? Participation is just one of those
"could-look-bad" criteria, like the Plurality Criterion.

We all know that if you want anything that Approval & Score don't offer,
then you have to pay for it, with "could-look-bad" criterion-failures.

And the more you want, the more "could-look-bad" you have to accept.

Plain MMPO is tops in important strategy criteria and properties, and so,
it has the most could-look-bad.
...which has been shown to not significantly wrong anyone or be a genuine
problem.

As I've been saying, improvements on Approval are mostly or entirely
illusory.

wv strategy could be some strategy improvement, but it's a bit
questionable. But, in addition to FBC & wv strategy, Plain MMPO offers full
reliable Weak CD compliance.  (Its failure of strong CD is mitigated by its
wv strategy's burial-deterrence.).

It's difficult to improve on Approval, but, if any method can, in some
meaningful way, Plain MMPO is the method that best qualifies for that claim.

You get what you pay for.

Michael Ossipoff



On Fri, Oct 28, 2016 at 6:32 PM, Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu> wrote:

> It looks like we'll have to settle for mono-add-plump.
>
>
> On Fri, Oct 28, 2016 at 8:56 AM, Toby Pereira <tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
>
>> I think Chiastic Approval would fail participation, assuming I've done
>> this right. Take the following ballots with scores out of 100:
>>
>> 2 voters: A=50, B=40
>> 1 voter: A=50, B=60
>>
>> A would have a score of 50. B would have a score of 40.
>>
> Everyone gives B a score of at least 40, and only a third give B a score
>> higher. Now imagine there are two extra voters and we have these ballots:
>>
>> 2 voters: A=50, B=40
>> 1 voter: A=50, B=60
>> 2 voters: A=100, B=60
>>
>> A still has a score of 50, but B now has a score of 60. So these two
>> ballots cause B to overtake A despite them both preferring A to B.
>>
>> ------------------------------
>> *From:* Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu>
>>
>>
>> Does it satisfy Participation?
>>
>>
>>
>
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